Chinese state-owned company Jilin Chemical Fiber Group supplied Russia with 46 metric tons of raw material for producing carbon fiber — enough to produce components for roughly 1,300 Geran-type attack drones — according to a joint investigation by Politico and The Telegraph, which based their findings on internal Russian transport and customs documents.
According to the outlets, the supplies went directly to Alabuga-Volokno, a subsidiary of UMATEX — Rosatom’s division for advanced materials and composites that operates a plant in the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan supplying high-strength carbon fiber for the mass production of Russia’s long-range Geran (“geranium”) drones, which are built on the basis of the Iranian Shahed.
The raw material in question is polyacrylonitrile tow, or PAN precursor, an indispensable component for producing lightweight, high-strength carbon fiber. It is used to reinforce the drone’s wing and internal structures, including the fuel tank and engine.
According to David Albright, founder of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, the volume of PAN precursor supplied is enough to produce carbon fiber for roughly 1,300 Russian-made suicide drones. “You can’t build the airframe without it,” Albright explains.
The documents also indicate that the shipment may have been deliberately disguised, as it was filed under a customs code that is used for civilian synthetic fibers like nylon and polyester. Under the correct classification, the shipment should have gone through as a dual-use good, Albright says.
Kerri Bitsoff, a former U.S. Treasury official who worked on sanctions against Russian arms procurement networks, concurred that the use of a different customs code could indicate an attempt to conceal the sensitive nature of the shipment.
Ukraine’s Center for Security and Cooperation (USCC) obtained the paperwork from Russian sources and shared it with the U.S. and UK governments. The U.S. House Select Committee on China reviewed the documents and found them to be authentic, an American official said. Their authenticity was also confirmed by the Ukrainian government.
USCC says it has identified at least eight tenders since 2022 for container shipments of PAN precursor from Jilin Chemical Fiber Group to Alabuga-Volokno.
Alabuga-Volokno and UMATEX have been under Western sanctions since 2023. Jilin Chemical Fiber Group is not currently under Western sanctions, and the company did not respond to reporters’ requests for comment. Meanwhile, Rosatom stated the parent company and its enterprises operate “in full compliance with applicable laws and regulations,” and called claims to the contrary false.
China’s embassy in Washington also rejected the accusations, saying they “smear China and turn it into a scapegoat.” The embassy stressed that Beijing “has never supplied lethal weapons to either side of the conflict” and strictly controls the export of dual-use goods.
At the same time, Dennis Wilder, former deputy assistant CIA director for East Asia and the Pacific, said supplies of this scale could not have taken place without the knowledge of Chinese authorities. According to the Kiel Institute, China supplies more than 60% of the components Russia needs in order to sustain its defense industry. Kurt Campbell, a former U.S. deputy secretary of state, previously said that the number of Chinese companies supplying dual-use goods to Russia’s defense industry is already in the dozens.
