Humanity’s historical experience shows that new technologies and automation do not bring about total unemployment. Studies of long-term labor market trends confirm the benefits of automation.

In the U.S., for example, in the year 1900, 41% of all workers were employed in the agricultural sector, but by 2000, this figure had fallen to 2%. Without question, the appearance of combines and other specialized machinery drove people out of the fields, but they did not simply become unemployed. Instead, they moved to factories and the service sector, which were growing rapidly at the time. In addition, mechanization sharply lowered food prices, leaving more money to be devoted to satisfying other needs.

In another example, the invention of the standard shipping container in the 1950s cut the cost of loading one metric ton of cargo from $5.86 to $0.16, and the profession of dockworker disappeared almost entirely. However, shipping became so cheap that its positive impact on world trade exceeded that of all postwar international agreements combined.

After that, the advent of personal computers led to the closure of typing pools, and with the appearance of automatic telephone exchanges, telephone switchboard operators disappeared. At the same time, however, tens of millions of new jobs were created: for programmers, systems analysts, marketers, and designers.

Data gathered by Our World in Data show that from the start of the common era up to 1820, average world income per person remained within the range of 1,100–1,300 international dollars a year. The turning point came during the Industrial Revolution — thanks to the mechanization of labor, output outpaced population growth for the first time. As a result, in the two centuries that followed, global GDP per capita grew by a factor of 15, to exceed $18,000.

In the countries that spearheaded industrialization (Great Britain, and then the U.S. and Western European nations), the gap turned out to be even more impressive, with per capita GDP growing 25–30 times from 1820 to today (from $2,000–$3,000 to a present-day $60,000–$75,000).

Contrary to stereotypes, statistics show that the multiple growth of output over the past two centuries was accompanied not by increased “exploitation of workers,” but by a steady reduction in working hours and an increase in paid leisure.

In the 19th century, the prevailing opinion was that factory production had to rely on continuous and exhausting labor. In the 1870s, the working day in Europe and the U.S. usually lasted 10–12 hours, with a six-day workweek and no right to vacation. Workers agreed to such conditions simply because the alternative of peasant labor in the fields was even less attractive.

However, as mechanization and automation progressed, this trajectory changed. Today, in most developed economies, average working time has almost halved, with a standard five-day 40-hour workweek (and as low as 35 in some countries). Benefits appeared that did not exist in the preindustrial era: paid vacation and maternity leave, sick leave, public holidays, a ban on child labor, and old-age pensions.

So what is the origin of the fear that the development of algorithms will leave almost half of the planet’s population without work? This is a misunderstood estimate released in 2013 by University of Oxford researchers, who argued that 47% of jobs in the U.S. are at risk of disappearing because of AI. However, the researchers themselves stressed that 47% is merely the share of work tasks that computers are technically capable of performing, and not at all a forecast that half of people would actually be laid off. In other words, researchers examined the fundamental possibility of replacing a human with an algorithm in individual operations, not real job losses.

Later, OECD researchers approached the question by breaking down each occupation into specific repetitive operations. Having studied the structure of work of thousands of workers in 21 developed countries, the researchers found that people holding seemingly identical positions often perform fundamentally different tasks. Their calculation showed that the real risk of full replacement by machines applies not to 47%, but to only 9% of jobs, ranging from 6% in South Korea to 12% in Austria. For the vast majority of people, technology does not abolish an entire profession but takes over routine functions and complements human labor.

The real risk of full replacement by machines applies not to 47% but to only 9% of jobs, ranging from 6% in South Korea to 12% in Austria

In the history of the world, no country has achieved sustained growth in its population’s incomes without regularly adopting major technical inventions, such as the steam engine, electricity, the internal combustion engine, and computers. But technology is not the only growth factor, as it delivers results only when combined with quality education, intelligent investment, and functioning government institutions. After all, a transition period is always accompanied by difficulties that require effective management.

How AI is changing the labor market

Artificial intelligence largely repeats the path of earlier technological revolutions, but it features several fundamental differences. The main similarity is that technologies rarely destroy professions instantly. Any job consists of many small operations, and a machine that performs two or three of them cannot replace the human specialist completely.

Experts at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) stress that automating individual tasks changes the structure of the workday, as its calculations showed that 27% of jobs in developed countries are in occupations with a high share of potentially automatable operations. However, even in those, algorithms take over only 20% to 40% of specific routine duties, while tasks requiring critical judgment, communication, and personal responsibility remain with humans, who continue to be responsible for goal-setting and decision-making in disputed or nonstandard situations.

Humans continue to be responsible for goal-setting and decision-making in disputed or nonstandard situations

The link between falling costs and rising demand is clearly visible in the market for language translation and digital services. According to industry associations, the appearance of machine translation systems cut the cost of rough processing one page of text by more than 70%. However, rather than destroying the translator’s profession, it led to a significant increase in the volume of material processed: companies began translating dozens of times more internal documentation, instructions, and customer reviews. As a result, overall employment in localization and editing grew, shifting from mechanical translation to review, semantic adaptation, and fact-checking.

The falling price of services such as writing software code and performing legal and financial consulting tasks makes them accessible to those who could not afford them in the past. As a result, the market expands, and demand for labor remains.

Just like previous technologies, AI needs time to lead to an explosive rise in macroeconomic indicators. Economist Paul David described this pattern in a 1990 study by using the electrification of factories as an example. Three decades passed between the appearance of reliable electric motors in the 1880s and the surge in labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing. The share of electrified factories exceeded 50% only by 1920, and for many years annual growth in factory output did not exceed 1.5%.

At first, enterprises simply replaced the old steam boiler with a single electric motor, keeping the existing layout and belt drives in place. The real leap in productivity — to a record 5% a year — began only when factory owners rebuilt the environment from scratch, erecting spacious single-story shops, connecting an individual motor to each machine, and training managers in new work schemes.

The good news for us is, the adaptation process for today’s office and service workers is far milder than the upheaval of past eras. And this is an important difference between the adoption of AI and that of classical technologies. In the 19th century, the mass departure of illiterate peasants to factories was accompanied by severe disruption of everyday life and required the creation of school education.

Today, the threshold for changing career paths within the services and information sector is incomparably lower. Most specialists already possess basic literacy, as well as business communication and information-search skills, allowing them to master adjacent fields without the need to spend years retraining.

AI also differs from earlier technologies in that the algorithms themselves help people master new duties, taking on the role of a personal instructor. Studies of software assistants in corporate support showed that by using model prompts, even the least experienced employees tend to reach the level of qualified specialists in just two months rather than the previous transition time of six months, and the speed and success of their task resolution rose by 34%.

A micro effect and faith in the future

To assess the impact of AI on the modern economy objectively, researchers divide the available data into three different levels.

The first is direct measurements inside individual enterprises, where it is possible to empirically compare the performance of employees with and without a neural network.

The second is general statistics of national labor markets in the first years after the appearance of mass chatbots, showing changes in real wages, hours worked, and the hiring process.

The third is predictive macroeconomic calculations that model the technology’s impact on aggregate productivity and the country’s GDP years ahead.

The most accurate evidence of real productivity growth today has been obtained at the first level. A study published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics analyzed the work of a tech giant’s customer support department. The authors observed 5,172 employees and processed 3 million conversations during the phased rollout of a software assistant based on the GPT-3 model. In the baseline calculation, the number of successfully resolved inquiries per hour rose by 15%. The program essentially accumulated the best phrasing of experienced specialists and passed it on to newcomers.

PwC calculated that productivity growth is 40% higher in the companies that are most exposed to AI. Since 2022, the leaders in corporate AI use have tripled their lead in labor productivity growth over those that have barely adopted it. A link was also established with growth in wages and headcount, which both grow faster in companies where AI is widely used.  

If we turn to labor market data for the first years of ChatGPT’s existence, the macroeconomic picture looks more restrained. Researchers studied survey data and the official state employment register in Denmark, presenting their findings in a paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research.

The analysis showed that although employees began actively using algorithms for tasks and rated their convenience positively, this had no statistically significant effect on their earnings or recorded working hours over the first two years.

At the same time, a study by the Stanford University Digital Economy Lab recorded a worrying trend in the U.S. labor market. While no mass layoffs have been observed, employment of people aged 22 to 25 in the occupations most exposed to automation has been lagging noticeably behind that of other fields.

By June 2026, the hiring gap with occupations less affected by the technology had reached 19%, though the Stanford authors stress that this link is descriptive and does not in itself prove the negative impact of algorithms. However, it still suggests that many young specialists are having a problematic start to their careers.

In long-term macroeconomic scenarios, researchers’ conclusions vary substantially. The OECD’s 2024 model suggests that the use of AI could bring the U.S. economy an additional annual labor productivity gain of 0.4–0.9 percentage points in ten years’ time. However, economist Daron Acemoglu offers a much more cautious estimate. By his baseline calculations, the increase in total factor productivity (TFP) over the decade will not exceed 0.66% — that is, less than 0.1% a year. Still, taking into account investment in fixed capital, the impact on overall GDP should be somewhat higher, Acemoglu notes.

To compare these models, it is important to use a single indicator: the OECD’s corresponding TFP calculation projects from 0.25 to 0.6 percentage points of additional growth each year — noticeably higher than Acemoglu’s estimate.

This discrepancy in figures illustrates the subject of present-day debates. Economists no longer argue about whether algorithms can speed up specific intellectual operations. After all, at the level of individual work tasks, the productivity gain has already been reliably recorded and measured. The main question now is how quickly and to what extent the benefit from innovative software at individual workplaces can translate to the national level.

In aggregate indicators — real wages, the number of jobs, and GDP growth — the effect has been barely noticeable. This inconsistency forces researchers to be more conservative in their forecasts, but this does not mean that the technology will not become the basis for powerful long-term development.

How robots close the demographic hole

The optimistic scenario for adopting artificial intelligence does not mean that the labor market will automatically adjust to the new conditions. A positive result is possible only through a combination of objective demographic processes and well-considered actions by the government and business, which can soften the loss of jobs and help people find new roles in the economy.

The demographic crisis in developed countries has become the most important backdrop for current automation. According to Employment Outlook 2025, the working-age population has begun to decline in many OECD countries. According to demographic forecasts, by 2030 the number of people aged 20 to 64 in European Union countries will fall by more than 10 million. In Japan and Germany, a shortage of workers is already holding back business development.

Under these conditions, adopting software algorithms helps maintain production volumes despite the growing shortage of personnel. However, the deficit of employees is distributed extremely unevenly across sectors and regions, affecting health care, home nursing care, construction, and technical trades most acutely. Meanwhile, generative models are most actively adopted in the corporate sector, marketing, basic programming, and workflow management.

Generative models are most actively adopted in the corporate sector, marketing, basic programming, and workflow management

An acute shortage of nurses or workers does not guarantee that a laid-off office analyst or lawyer can easily change profession and fill such a vacancy, meaning that the development of solutions to the imbalance in workforce availability across sectors requires a targeted government policy. Restrictions on the adoption of AI are not the answer, as attempts to ban technologies or force enterprises to keep unneeded jobs only slow productivity growth across the whole country.

An effective strategy consists of supporting specialists during their transition by providing guaranteed income insurance upon job loss, free retraining programs, and compensation of relocation costs to regions with high demand for personnel. For example, in Denmark about 20% of workers change profession or employer every year, but thanks to targeted payments and short-term retraining courses, this process does not lead to prolonged unemployment or a social crisis.

Young specialists require special attention. Since neural networks are taking over the drafting of simple reports, data collection, and the writing of initial code, the customary chain of internships is beginning to break. As studies show, when entry-level tasks disappear, companies need to rebuild their on-the-job training and mentoring programs. Instead of routine manual work, students and interns are taught to check generated results, set tasks for algorithms, and coordinate work chains.

Finally, a key role in distributing the benefits brought by new technologies belongs to market competition. If advanced models and infrastructure end up concentrated in the hands of a few monopolies, the savings from lower costs will remain inside these corporations in the form of excess profits. By contrast, active rivalry between companies forces businesses to lower selling prices for goods and services for end consumers.

Economic history shows that the decline in the cost of computing and communications in the late 20th century was the result of market competition — consumers got higher-quality and cheaper hardware and services, which in turn expanded the overall market and created new jobs in adjacent sectors.

In 2004, William Nordhaus calculated that thanks to market competition, the creators of new technologies capture only about 2% of the total economic value of their innovations, while the remaining 98% “flows” to consumers, who get much cheaper and better products — and therefore a higher purchasing power.

The authors of another study proved mathematically that the fall in prices of computer components (caused by progress in semiconductors and competition among manufacturers) triggered an avalanche-like accumulation of capital across the entire economy: in banking, logistics, trade, and media. This did not reduce aggregate demand for labor but led to an employment boom in adjacent sectors like distribution and applied software development.

How productivity turns into prosperity

A person’s well-being is determined by their real, not nominal, income. If algorithms lower the cost of a service without reducing its quality, the consumer benefits even if they do not receive a pay raise, because the same amount of money buys more. Here it is more appropriate to speak of relative cost: specific goods and services become cheaper compared with what they would have cost without the adoption of new tools.

Whether cost savings are reflected in the consumer price depends on external conditions — above all market competition, the absence of artificial scarcity, and the buyer’s real ability to switch to another supplier.

As already mentioned, from the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th, working time fell sharply in developed countries, but then the reduction slowed and almost stopped as society on the whole opted to direct further efficiency growth not toward a larger share of free time but toward the volume and quality of consumption (sophisticated medicine, higher education, electronics, improved housing, and the service sector).

High productivity opens room for wage growth. However, the median wage of an ordinary worker will not necessarily rise at the same pace. An OECD study showed that in 24 developed countries between 1995 and 2014, the gap between growth in labor productivity and growth in the real median wage averaged 13%. Productivity rose by about 28%, while median pay for workers rose by only 15%.

The study notes a fall in labor’s share of national income and a rise in market concentration — that is, high returns on capital go to a narrow circle of those who control the algorithms, computing power, databases, or the business that adopts the technologies. On the other hand, the development of technology creates new areas of activity that complement automated systems. If demand for people with scarce skills in such adjacent tasks grows, this helps sustain the overall level of employment and pay.

The fact that automation does not simply replace people but creates complementary tasks was shown by an MIT study. About 60% of all jobs in today’s developed economies did not exist at all in 1940. In fact, they arose directly as a result of technological growth.

A win for everyone or just for the chosen few?

Debates about who will benefit from the spread of artificial intelligence are dominated by two opposing views. Some consider growing inequality an inevitable consequence of the use of algorithms, while others attribute it solely to government policy. In reality though, the result depends on the joint action of technology players and public institutions.

The aforementioned Acemoglu and fellow economist Pascual Restrepo studied the impact of automation on the labor market in detail. In their 2022 paper, they showed that 50% to 70% of the growth in wage inequality in the U.S. over the period from 1980 to 2016 was linked to technological displacement — a situation in which machines and software replaced people in routine operations.

Computer systems do indeed devalue repetitive labor, but at the same time they raise the value of other skills, such as the ability to set a task correctly, to double-check a machine’s result, to take on legal or professional responsibility, and to communicate effectively with people. The adoption of algorithms stimulates demand for specialists who prepare quality data, train and adapt systems for narrow industries, or coordinate complex automated processes.

Another important change concerns the concentration of capital. Training large models and maintaining server infrastructure require billions in investment, which gives a gigantic head start to a small number of technology corporations. This monopoly, of course, is not guaranteed to last. The emergence of open and lightweight architectures, as well as a sharp drop in the cost of computing, creates accessible alternatives and prevents a narrow circle of players from closing off the market completely.

The viability of open-source architectures proves that total monopolization of the AI market is unlikely, and the gap in performance between commercial giants and open systems has rapidly narrowed on key benchmarks (MMLU, HumanEval). This democratization is confirmed by statistics: by March 2026, total downloads of open AI models on Hugging Face reached 2 billion — an almost sixfold rise from the 340 million recorded a year earlier.

Today there is no need to pay for a ChatGPT subscription or other popular neural networks every month. Powerful artificial intelligence can be downloaded from the internet and run on a laptop retailing for $1,500. Such a program will work solely on your computer’s resources and deliver results on a par with paid services. The rule here is simple: the more powerful your “hardware,” the smarter and more complex a model you can install on it.

This opens huge opportunities for business. Any company can install free neural network models on its servers and build powerful, customized AI tools for its tasks without depending on giant corporations or purchasing expensive access. Everything works on-premises, securely and under full control. Thus open source forms a powerful market counterweight, turning basic AI tools into publicly available infrastructure.

Any company can install free neural network models on its servers and build powerful, customized AI tools for its tasks

Under such circumstances, antitrust regulation decides whether competition ultimately forces companies to lower prices for buyers or allows them to retain technological rent in the form of excess profits. Labor market rules are equally important — where there are strong trade unions, a transparent system of collective agreements, and a clear minimum wage level, the gain from productivity reaches ordinary workers faster. The experience of the Nordic countries shows that, with the same level of digital tool adoption as in the U.S., developed labor institutions keep income inequality at a significantly lower level.

The transition to new kinds of activity requires support from the tax system and social insurance. Accessible retraining programs allow people whose professional tasks are being automated to master adjacent fields without a catastrophic drop in income. An example is the Danish flexible employment system (flexicurity), in which ease of hiring and firing is combined with high government payments during the job search and mandatory training in new specialties.

Finally, rules of professional responsibility and quality control are critically important in industries such as health care, education, and law. Clear standards prevent service providers from lowering quality to save money, which protects consumers from the hidden costs of automation.

Studies show that high levels of technology adoption do not necessarily lead to income polarization, as inequality is consistently lower in high-tech states than in commodity-based countries. A high Economic Complexity Index, reflecting the diversity and technological knowledge intensity of the goods produced, usually means a lower level of income inequality. A high-tech economy requires distributed human capital, whereas a commodity-based one concentrates wealth around narrow rent-extraction chokepoints.

Countries with the highest density of technology and complex industrial production (Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Nordic states) keep the Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers in the range of 0.26–0.33. However, large resource exporters (the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf when migrants are counted, commodity economies of Latin America, and also Nigeria and Angola) show a Gini coefficient at the level of 0.42–0.55 and higher, with a colossal gap between the top decile and the rest of the population.

Overall, the history of technological development shows one stable pattern: the advent of more efficient tools has invariably made society richer as a whole. Even when entire professions became a thing of the past and individual workers had to change occupations or go without work, the resulting standard of living, the availability of goods, and the quality of everyday life for the majority invariably rose.

The foundation for well-founded optimism about artificial intelligence is built precisely on this proven mechanism. When new solutions make it possible to achieve the same or a better result at lower total cost, the economy gets a real surplus of resources. Even if it does not take advantage of the opportunity, society at least gains the chance to direct this surplus where it is needed most: raising the quality of medicine and education, increasing the affordability of goods, developing public services, and increasing free time. Attempts to hold on to every familiar job and preserve obsolete labor operations have historically always led to a dead end. Instead, adaptability is the key to prosperity.

According to the rights group’s figures, four people died under such circumstances in 2022, 10 in 2023, 26 in 2024, and 13 in 2025. In the first 10 months of 2026, 16 deaths had already been recorded. Of the 69 people who died, 63 were men and six were women, with an average age of around 51. The youngest were 18-year-old Ukrainians Daniil Dakhov and Pavel Grimak, who were abducted by Russian security forces in occupied Melitopol. The oldest was 81-year-old scientist Valery Mitko, who was accused of treason and died while under house arrest.

The rights group identified illness and the lack of timely medical care as the leading causes of death, accounting for 29 cases. Ten are believed to have died by suicide or in circumstances resembling suicide. The causes of eight deaths remain unknown. The report separately examines the death of pianist Pavel Kushnir after a hunger strike and the murder of opposition politician Alexei Navalny in an Arctic penal colony.

Memorial’s figures do not include everyone killed during operations by Russian security services since February 2022. As calculated by the independent investigative outlet Important Stories, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) had reported killing 87 people during detention operations between the start of the war and July 2026. In most cases, the agency claimed those killed had been preparing acts of sabotage on behalf of Ukrainian intelligence services. In other cases, the Russian authorities alleged that the deceased had links to Islamist terrorist organizations. The figures cannot simply be added to Memorial’s statistics as the studies cover different categories of deaths but may overlap.

Of the 16 deaths Memorial recorded in 2026, 10 were linked to illness and the absence of necessary medical care. The report describes judges and Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) staff ignoring complaints from seriously ill prisoners. One case involved 64-year-old Oleg Tyryshkin, who was sentenced to two years in a penal colony over a comment posted on VK, Russia’s largest social network. During an appeal hearing held by video link in March 2025, Tyryshkin lay down on the floor of his cell because he was unable to stand. A medic at the pretrial detention center said all his vital signs were normal, and the judge accused him of pretending. In February 2026, Tyryshkin died in a hospital after suffering a heart attack.

Another prisoner, 46-year-old Sergei Sviridov, had a progressive form of cancer, but courts denied his release three times despite requests from prison doctors. One of the courts’ arguments was that he had no family members who could care for him if he were released. Authorities agreed to free him only after he fell into a coma and could no longer breathe on his own. Two weeks later, on June 12, 2026, Sviridov died in a hospice.

The rights group devoted a separate section of the report to Ukrainian citizens who died after being detained by Russian security forces. Among them was journalist Viktoria Roshchyna, who died in September 2024 after being held in Russian detention facilities. After her body was returned to Ukraine, experts found signs of torture and discovered that several of her internal organs were missing. Memorial stressed that its study does not include statistics for the countless Ukrainians held outside formal criminal proceedings. The number of deaths among that group may be significantly higher, but information about such cases is almost entirely unavailable.

The report’s authors said even official claims that prisoners died by suicide cannot be treated as reliable without independent verification. As one example, they cited the death of musician Anatoly Berezikov, who told his lawyer before his death that security officers had tortured him with electric shocks and threatened to kill him and make it look like a suicide. Authorities later declared suicide to be the official cause of death.

Memorial places responsibility for the deaths of victims of political repression not only on security officers and prison staff, but also on investigators, judges, doctors, and the Russian authorities more broadly. The report includes a list of all 69 people by name, along with the circumstances of their persecution and deaths.

The letter, reviewed by Reuters, said Uganda’s embassy in Moscow had been able to confirm the deaths of 11 of its citizens, and another 16 are presumed dead: their whereabouts could not be established, their bodies have not been found, and they are not listed among the prisoners of war being held by Ukraine. The embassy said it received the information from Russia’s Foreign Ministry through a formal diplomatic communication known as a verbal note, or note verbale. Reuters said a Ugandan Foreign Ministry spokesperson confirmed the authenticity of the letter.

The Insider has also reported that Russia is sharply expanding recruitment in African countries, increasingly targeting states with lower incomes and weaker democratic institutions. After Kenya and South Africa issued warnings and moved to curb recruitment, Russia stepped up enlistment in Burundi, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, and multiple other countries. In the first nine months of 2026, the Russian military signed contracts with 699 Burundian citizens, compared with 30 in all of 2025. In Zimbabwe, the number recruited over the same periods rose from 65 to 530.

According to data from Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 45,900 citizens of foreign countries and unrecognized territories had signed contracts with the Russian military as of Oct. 1, 2026. They included 5,400 people from 43 African countries, or about 12% of all identified foreign recruits. In the first nine months of 2026, Russia recruited 16,200 foreigners, according to Ukrainian figures, more than the 16,000 recruited during all of 2025.

Ukraine’s state railway operator, Ukrzaliznytsia, said a jet-powered drone struck a platform at Dnipro’s main station as Train No. 866, a commuter service to nearby Zaporizhzhia, was preparing to depart. Despite an air raid warning and notice of an increased threat, a large number of passengers were on the platform.

Images posted by President Volodymyr Zelensky showed bodies on the ground as emergency workers carried wounded people away on stretchers. Regional authorities said at least 13 people were injured, four of them seriously, including a child.

Importantly, the ceasefire that is in effect applies only to the area around Oleshky, located on the Russian-occupied eastern bank of the Dnipro River; it is intended to allow humanitarian aid into the city and civilians to evacuate. The agreement was reached with U.S. mediation and took effect on Oct. 27. Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets said Thursday that no violations had been recorded after 54 hours and that crews were clearing mines from evacuation routes ahead of planned aid deliveries.

Elsewhere in Ukraine, Russia has continued drone and missile attacks on critical infrastructure, including the railway network, increasing pressure on civilians and the economy as Ukraine faces shortages of air defense missiles.

Moscow denies deliberately targeting civilians. Nevertheless, two 15-year-old girls were killed and 23 people wounded when a drone struck a busy street in the northern city of Chernihiv. And in the central city of Kremenchuk, a strike on an apartment building killed three people and wounded 15.

“Russia is deliberately targeting civilians: on trains, at stations, in residential buildings,” Ukrainian Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskyi wrote on Telegram. “There is no justification for this terror, and there never can be.”

Dmytro Bryzhynskyi, the head of Chernihiv’s military administration, wrote: 

“Ordinary, peaceful people were attacked who were just going to work, going about their daily business, making plans for the day.”

Overall, the attacks in Dnipro, Chernihiv and Kremenchuk killed at least 19 people Thursday, according to a report by Interior Minister Ivan Vyhivskyi.

Zelensky responded to the Dnipro attack by urging Ukraine’s international partners to increase pressure on Moscow. Earlier in October, the United States temporarily eased sanctions enforcement in order to allow for increased Russian diesel exports under an agreement between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. The European Union also removed Russian billionaires Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman from its sanctions list in September.

“Just how many terrorist strikes has Russia carried out against our people since sanctions were lifted on certain Russian oligarchs and the Russian energy sector, rather than de-escalating?” Zelensky wrote on X.

“Another drone attack on Sterlitamak has been repelled. Forces of the Defense Ministry and the Combat Army Reserve shot down all 8 drones. Debris fell on the territory of one of the enterprises. Minor damage was caused, and the plant is operating normally.”

Using NASA FIRMS thermal anomaly maps, The Insider confirmed a fire at the Bashkir Soda Company — one of Russia’s largest chemical enterprises — which supplies products to the defense sector, among other customers.

Bashkir Soda Company JSC was founded in May 2013 through the merger of two large enterprises, Soda and Kaustik, and is part of the chemical holding Roskhim JSC. The company ranks first in Russia in the production of soda ash and baking soda. In addition, its website openly states that it supplies products to Russia’s military-industrial complex. In particular, the plant produces hydrochloric acid and dichloroethane, as well as terephthaloyl chloride, a unique component used in making ultra-strong materials (cables for parachute lines, space and aviation equipment, and other military products). According to the company’s website, it is the only enterprise in Russia that manufactures terephthaloyl chloride.

As Astra notes, Ukrainian drones had already attacked the Bashkir Soda Company on Aug. 27.

The Moscow Region was also subjected to a massive drone attack on the night of Oct. 28-29. According to Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, 613 drones flew toward Moscow and Moscow Region, of which 231 were destroyed on approach to the city. As the outlet Kommersant noted, Moscow’s Vnukovo, Domodedovo, and Zhukovsky airports suspended arrivals and departures during the night. In addition, airports in Kaluga, Penza, Saratov, Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, Saransk, Samara, Ulyanovsk, Cheboksary, Kazan, Nizhnekamsk, Bugulma, Cherepovets, Kirov, Ufa, Orenburg, Izhevsk, and Perm suspended operations.

As Der Spiegel reports, both are also suspected of involvement in the Sept. 14 arson attack on an industrial park in Brașov, Romania, where a defense company that manufactures grenade launchers and ammunition operates. Romanian prosecutors are seeking the extradition of the two Belarusians, as well as a Ukrainian national detained in Poland in connection with the case.

Earlier this week, the Romanian Intelligence Service said that it had uncovered a sabotage network run from Russia. According to the agency, the network was behind the fire at the Carfil defense plant in Brașov. The Romanian Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism clarified that two suspects had been detained in Germany, where they were preparing similar attacks. Authorities in Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Denmark have previously reported planned acts of sabotage targeting the defense industry and facilities linked to aid for Ukraine.

According to the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), North Korean IT workers get jobs at American and other foreign companies using fake documents, stolen personal data, and fictitious identities. Most of the income these workers receive is seized by North Korean authorities and sent to finance military programs. In addition, North Koreans who gain access to various corporate networks use their positions to steal confidential data and plant malicious software. Intermediaries help North Koreans move money as part of these schemes.

The Treasury named Russian national Vitold Obertas as one such intermediary. Acting on behalf of the North Korean company Amnokgang Technology Development Company (Amnokgang), which was already sanctioned by the U.S., Obertas carried out cryptocurrency conversions worth about $2 million, along with other currency transactions worth $1.25 million.

A full namesake of the sanctioned Vitold Viktorovich Obertas appears in various Russian public registries. According to RBC Companies, a person with that name was registered as an individual entrepreneur in Primorsky Territory on July 16, 2009. His main line of business was listed as fishing, but other spheres of activity included cargo handling, manufacturing of household appliances, and repair of personal and household goods. His individual entrepreneur status was terminated on Nov. 22, 2025. It is also known that Obertas headed AS-Holder LLC (liquidated in 2023) and worked at other companies connected with maritime shipping and security services.

According to OFAC, the other Russian national, Ilya Boykov, has been helping LLC Alis, which is linked to North Korea’s Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company. The U.S. Treasury alleges that Boykov handled cryptocurrency exchange, transaction tracking, and logistical support, and that the total amount of cryptocurrency transactions carried out with his help amounted to around $3.5 million.

Also sanctioned was the First Financial and Technical Development Center (FFTDC), an organization that, according to the U.S. Treasury, is located in Russia and controlled by North Korean authorities. The center allegedly laundered money using cryptocurrency. Six North Koreans working in Russia have earned more than $750,000 for the organization since 2025. All of them were included on the sanctions list by name.

The Insider has found that Russia continues to import advanced measuring instruments, components, and materials for optics and quantum electronics. The equipment being purchased — along with the research interests of the importers and end users — suggests that Russia is seeking to develop advanced laser technologies despite its continued reliance on imports for more basic laser applications.

If any country succeeds in building a “cryptographically relevant” quantum computer, and if such a machine falls into the hands of a totalitarian regime, it would significantly alter the international balance of power. Even without a quantum computer, however, mastery of advanced laser technologies would allow Russia’s military-industrial complex to develop domestic production capabilities across a range of military sectors far more quickly and effectively than it has managed to do so far.

A “cryptographically relevant” quantum computer in the hands of a totalitarian regime would significantly alter the international balance of power

Quantum computers are expected to outperform classical computers dramatically on tasks such as cracking encryption. Existing quantum computers, however, are not yet “cryptographically relevant” — meaning they remain far from being able to break the standard encryption algorithms in use at the present time. According to the latest estimates, a cryptographically relevant quantum computer capable of breaking RSA encryption with a 2,048-bit key would require at least one million physical qubits, with the number needed to break elliptic-curve cryptography with a 256-bit key estimated at around 10,000 physical qubits.

How a quantum computer works

Building a quantum computer capable of breaking modern encryption remains beyond the capabilities of even Google and IBM. IBM’s Condor quantum computer, for example, has 1,121 physical qubits based on superconducting technology. Quantum computers with around 100 qubits can be considered commercially available, in a limited sense, to major research institutions in the West.

Estimates vary on the countdown to Q-day — the point at which a cryptographically relevant quantum computer becomes available. Cloudflare, which helps secure websites around the world, cites the policies and research interests of IBM and Google to put Q-day in 2029 or 2030. In fact, the company is adjusting its own policies accordingly, transitioning to “post-quantum” protocols designed to remain resistant to the sorts of quantum attacks that could materialize in the foreseeable future.

Why photonic quantum computers require laser equipment

Russia’s most powerful quantum computers have been developed by the Lebedev Physical Institute (LPI), Rosatom, Moscow State University (MSU), and the Russian Quantum Center. The LPI–Rosatom computer has the equivalent of 70 qubits and uses ytterbium ions. MSU’s neutral-rubidium-atom computer has 72 qubits. The Russian Quantum Center’s computer uses trapped cold calcium ions and has the equivalent of 72 qubits. According to the Scientific Russia website, a 16-qubit superconducting quantum computer has been developed at the National University of Science and Technology MISIS.

The Russian Quantum Center is also involved, and in 2025, its researchers were ready to showcase a 35-qubit photonic quantum computer. The challenge now is to scale it up.

According to the Russian tax authorities’ records of fines, the work on a quantum computer for the Russian Quantum Center is being carried out by a Rosatom entity, joint venture Quantum Technologies. This conclusion is also supported by the numerous quantum computing patent applications filed by Quantum Technologies covering integrated circuit topologies for both photonic and superconducting quantum computers, as well as quantum computing algorithms and error-correction codes. Notably though, Quantum Technologies does not appear in customs records, suggesting that other organizations are handling equipment purchases on its behalf.

Such purchases are often made by subsidiaries or other companies linked through a common founder. In the case of the Russian Quantum Center, one possible candidate is its affiliated company, K2 LLC — almost all current and former K2 employees also have work experience at Quantum Technologies, including in specialized units responsible for procurement and logistics, cost accounting, reporting to federal executive authorities, support for the Committee on Quantum Technologies, and supplying equipment and consumables. This staffing structure suggests that K2 may be acting as a procurement agent for Quantum Technologies.

Advanced laser technologies — not just for quantum computers

Russian propagandists claim that Russia is now using lasers to shoot down drones; however, independent experts question the effectiveness of these systems. Whatever the case, advanced laser technologies are essential to the military-industrial complex.

Manufacturing complex-shaped components, additive manufacturing, welding and cutting, and quality control are all vital to industries such as aircraft and drone production, and all require sophisticated laser equipment. Some laser technologies, notably lidars and 3D scanners, also have direct military applications in guiding drones, artillery, and loitering munitions, as well as in reconnaissance. For years, however, Russia remained a consumer rather than a developer of laser technologies, and its own solutions were uncompetitive.

As recently as a decade ago, a trade publication reported that there were 10 Western and 100 Chinese laser specialists for every Russian one. Even during the relatively prosperous 2000s, foreign experts were critical of the capabilities of research lasers at Russian scientific centers. Industrial laser technology, meanwhile, remained largely dependent on imports, leaving many options unavalable after Western sanctions were levied in 2014. Russian-made lasers were not used at all in consumer or medical devices. Russia’s advanced laser sector was further devastated not only by neglect of science but also by the criminal prosecution of laser specialists amid the political repression of the 2020s.

Russia’s advanced laser industry collapsed not only because of the neglect of science, but also because laser specialists were prosecuted

According to data reviewed by The Insider, Russia imported $250 million worth of industrial laser equipment in 2024, excluding consumer and medical laser devices, civilian telecommunications equipment, and equipment for the entertainment industry.

The imports consisted primarily of high-power equipment: laser-cutting machines for sheet metal, pipes, other metal workpieces, and glass; machines for 3D cutting, engraving, and laser cleaning; laser welding and sintering machines; and equipment for high-precision manufacturing and measurement. The latter category included laser equipment for chip manufacturing, 3D printers, coordinate measuring machines, lidars, 3D laser scanners, rangefinders, sights, interferometers, particle-size analyzers, weld-seam inspection devices, and film-thickness gauges.

The Insider also found that Russia had imported components and assemblies in recent years to manufacture its own industrial lasers. These included blanks for active laser elements (neodymium-doped yttrium aluminum garnets and other crystals), lenses transparent to the relevant wavelengths, optical fibers, high-precision polishing machines, laser beam profile meters, and spectrometers. This suggests that efforts are also underway to rebuild Russia’s domestic laser industry, rather than relying solely on off-the-shelf Chinese laser equipment.

How the West is helping Putin with lasers

Russia imports predominantly sophisticated industrial laser equipment of Chinese origin, but approximately 10% is manufactured in Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Japan, the United States, and Israel. Among Western products, the most prominent suppliers by volume include Leica Geosystems (surveying scanners), Adige SPA (tube-cutting systems), Toptica Photonics AG (laboratory lasers), Stiefelmayer Lasertechnik GmbH & Co. KG (laser-cutting machines), Z-Laser GmbH (laser-cutting and welding equipment), and Sick AG (laser scanners). The leading beneficiaries of China’s laser-equipment trade include Jinan Senfeng Laser Technology, Hubei Jiuzhiyang Infrared System, Shandong Oree Laser Technology, and HSG Laser.

Supplies came almost exclusively from China, Turkey, and Israel. Individual items were shipped directly from Italy and Germany, accounting for less than 1% of the total.

Israel remains virtually the only Western country from which industrial laser equipment continued to be sold openly and directly to Russia in 2023–2025. The company that benefited in practice, regardless of its degree of involvement or awareness, was Ophir Optronics, registered in Israel but owned by the publicly traded American corporation MKS Inc. Operating in Russia under the Ophir Optronics name, the Russian company Kristalltechno LLC trades in and imports laser beam profile and spectrum analyzers.

The use of Ophir Optronics’ name, trademark, and logo in Russian commercial courts has not been challenged to date. Kristalltechno LLC has registered declarations of conformity in Russia covering a wide range of Ophir Optronics industrial cameras and their components.

On paper, the equipment is supplied by intermediaries in Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, the United Arab Emirates, China, and Hong Kong. However, customs records for some shipments identify Israel, rather than the country of the nominal supplier, as the country of dispatch.

In Russia, the equipment was most often received by Kristalltechno LLC, an established supplier to the military-industrial complex. According to 2024 data, the company did business with such Russian defense-sector enterprises as the Priborostroitelny Zavod Federal State Unitary Enterprise, the Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant (UOMZ), and the Ekran Research Institute. In effect, Kristalltechno was Ophir Optronics’ alter ego in Russia, apparently engaged in both manufacturing and resale. Curiously, according to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Ophir Optronics has ties to Israel’s military establishment.

The Insider contacted Ophir Optronics for comment. The company responded through a representative from Kekst CNC, a reputation-management firm hired by MKS. A journalist from The Insider spoke with the representative by phone several times.

The representative issued the following statement:

“Ophir ceased working with Kristalltechno in early 2022, when the war began. We are not aware of any Ophir products being supplied to Russia through third parties. We were unaware that Kristalltechno was using our trademarks on its website and have taken steps to have them removed from the company’s website and all other marketing and sales materials. Ophir and its parent company comply with all applicable regulations governing the sale and export of our products.”

Ophir sidestepped The Insider’s question about its relationships with the companies that had exported its products to Russia, including whether they were partners, dealers, or distributors. The Insider had provided a list of these companies. Ophir also declined to explain why it had waited more than four years to check whether Kristalltechno had stopped distributing its products and using its branding. Despite repeated questions, both orally and in writing, the company also made no statement condemning either Russia’s military aggression or political repression in Russia.

Separately, a Kristalltechno employee offered a journalist from The Insider an Ophir Optronics VEGA 7Z01560 laser radiation analyzer for $5,000, with delivery in Moscow in one to two days. The journalist had inquired about the equipment’s availability from the publication’s editorial email address. The offer suggests that the device was in stock in Moscow.

A Kristalltechno LLC employee offered an Insider journalist a laser radiation analyzer for $5,000 in Moscow

The market price of the same equipment in the West is around $1,300, illustrating the additional costs that sanctions and export controls impose on Russia’s high-tech industries.

What Russia’s modern private laser industry looks like

Russia has every reason to develop its own advanced laser technologies rather than simply buying finished equipment. Two leading examples of Russian companies in this field are Special Systems Photonics LLC and Leningrad Laser Systems JSC (LLS), both based in St. Petersburg.

Special Systems Photonics is a regular supplier to Russian state organizations. In recent years, it has supplied the Lebedev Physical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences with components for an interferometric system to monitor laser-processing speed. Other supplies have included lasers, optical materials, light sources, spectrofluorometers, spectrometers, detectors, optical probe stations, microchip inspection systems, fiber-processing laser systems, alignment systems, optomechanical systems, and systems for precisely positioning nanoscale objects in quantum optics laboratories.

Special Systems.Photonics has also supplied equipment to Bureau 1440, which is developing Russia’s Rassvet satellite communications system, an alternative to OneWeb. According to commercial court records, the company works extensively with Russia’s military-industrial complex. Its counterparties include NPO GIPO JSC (under sanctions), the Kvant joint venture (under sanctions), the Defense Ministry’s 18th Central Research Institute, and the Elektropribor Central Research Institute Concern JSC (under sanctions).

In 2023–2025, Special Systems Photonics imported large quantities of optical equipment, including lasers, optical tables, lenses, optical fiber, fiber-splicing tools, fiber cleavers, electro-optic and acousto-optic laser modulators and their drivers, mirrors, prisms, acousto-optic filters, signal generators, and spectrum analyzers.

Among other items, the company imported German-made Carl Zeiss objective lenses, Rigol optical spectrum analyzers, and Thorlabs diffraction gratings. The company’s website showcases an impressive range of high-quality equipment. Alongside instruments for scientists and developers, customers can also purchase lidars for drone guidance systems.

The research published by Special Systems Photonics employees focuses on highly specialized subjects, including laser-induced emission spectroscopy, quantum precision measurement instruments, magneto-optical traps, quantum gravimeters, optical vector analyzers for measuring the characteristics of integrated optical circuits, and single-frequency fiber lasers for quantum applications. Single-frequency lasers play a key role in working with ultracold atoms, a technology that could provide one of the foundations for a quantum computer. The researchers have also worked on precision quantum measurements. Beyond its academic interest in quantum computing and quantum metrology, Special Systems Photonics explicitly advertises the supply of cold-atom quantum computers made by the Chinese company CAS COLD ATOM, including the 100-qubit HANYUAN-1 model and custom-built systems.

All of the above suggests that Special Systems Photonics LLC is deeply embedded in Russia’s high-tech quantum optics sector, acting as a systems integrator, developer, and center of expertise rather than merely a reseller of equipment to state organizations. The company’s purchasing patterns, combined with its interest in related technologies, suggest that its imports could potentially be used to develop a more powerful photonic quantum computer than any currently operating in Russia.

Leningrad Laser Systems JSC has imported semiconductor blanks, machinery for processing metals and other materials, fiber-optic amplifiers, optical splitters, multiplexers, plugs and sockets, diffraction gratings, and laser vibrometers. Most of the equipment came from Chinese manufacturers, though some devices and components were made in the West.

Among the Western equipment imported by Leningrad Laser Systems, high-quality German products stand out: spectroscopy cameras from Basler AG, adapters from SmarAct GmbH, optical components and optical connector cleaners from Schäfter+Kirchhoff GmbH, laser scanner heads from Scanlab GmbH, and precision dimensional measurement instruments from SIOS Messtechnik GmbH.

German equipment remains indispensable for a wide range of engineering applications, and Russian companies continue to procure it by every available means for military production. Leningrad Laser Systems has also purchased laser power and energy meters from Israel’s Ophir Optronics, discussed in the previous section. This makes it the second-largest seller of Ophir products on the Russian market, after the Moscow-based former distributor that continues to operate under the Israeli company’s branding.

Judging by its employees’ research publications, some of which are partly promotional, Leningrad Laser Systems is interested in radio-over-fiber technology for shipboard communications, high-power fiber laser cutting machines, ultraviolet laser cutting, optical fibers for specialized applications (including specially doped fibers), beam-profile shaping for specific tasks such as drilling holes, metrology, and wind lidars. LLS employees also devote considerable effort to promoting laser multiplexing equipment.

Research publications by Leningrad Laser Systems suggest that the company does more than handle customs paperwork: it develops, tests, and markets the relevant technologies in Russia. LLS also actively fulfills government contracts, supplying equipment such as fiber-drawing towers for manufacturing optical fiber used in fiber-optic cables, plasma research rigs, laser beam homogenizers, multispectral systems, photon counters, optical reflectometers, and optoacoustic modulators. Its customers have primarily been civilian universities and research institutions, including Moscow State University, St. Petersburg State University, KAI, and institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as specialized institutes such as VNIIFTRI, VNIOFI, and Voenmekh.

According to court records, LLS has done business with the Ramenskoye Instrument-Making Plant JSC (under sanctions), the Ural Electromechanical Plant, and the Astron Optical-Mechanical Design Bureau, which manufactures drones and thermal imaging systems. Astron also produces laser ranging systems, while NPO GIPO JSC makes military sights, Elektropribor produces laser gyroscopes, and the Ramenskoye Instrument-Making Plant has developed a direct laser command-guidance system for guided missiles and electro-optical sighting systems for helicopters.

These companies are therefore more than intermediaries reselling Chinese or Western equipment. They are highly qualified specialists in the field, capable of testing equipment themselves and fulfilling complex contracts for both civilian research institutions and defense-industry enterprises. The Insider sent requests for comment to Special Systems Photonics and Leningrad Laser Systems but received no response.

More widespread military applications of lasers

Even at a less advanced technological level, Russia’s military-industrial complex is trying, with varying degrees of success, to keep pace in the field of laser technology. The following is a far from exhaustive list of technologies developed or deployed by Russia’s defense industry during the full-scale war. These systems are commercially available in the West and far less sophisticated than the cutting-edge research and development discussed above.

• At the Army-2022 exhibition, the Spectrum-AT Scientific and Production Center presented its Plastun system for multichannel observation of targets in optically opaque environments, equipped with a laser rangefinder and laser illuminator.
• Laser Components manufactures laser gyroscopes for military applications.
• Aviation and Marine Electronics Research and Production Company showcases laser rangefinders and target designators as part of multichannel surveillance systems for drones.
• In its report from the Army-2022 forum, the Regional Center for Laser Technologies (RCLT) showcased (at 3:46) a phased-array base fabricated by laser welding.
• The Inject Research and Production Enterprise developed an industrial laser soldering system.
• Laser cutting is used (at 2:29) at Uralvagonzavod.
• Lasergrad equipment is used to clean the K-3 submarine using lasers.

All this points to active efforts to develop these technologies and reduce Russia’s dependence on imported equipment and systems.

As The Insider has found, advanced Western laser technologies — in the form of equipment, components, and materials — continue to reach Russia. This is one of the few remaining fields in which Chinese manufacturers cannot always fully replace Western suppliers. At the top of the technological hierarchy are quantum computers (which, despite all the promises, may not become cryptographically relevant in the foreseeable future), quantum metrology, and quantum communications. Below these are more widely used, practical applications already in widespread use.

With military needs an overriding state priority and funding for civilian scientific research being cut, there is little doubt that the technologies and equipment entering Russia are intended not to advance fundamental science but to strengthen the capabilities of the military and security services.

Putin called Musk a “truly brilliant” man before adding, “We are in close contact with American partners, including Mr. Musk, because in orbit it is very important not to interfere with each other and to observe a certain discipline and order.”

This is not the first time Musk’s name has come up in the context of Russia’s space operations. In July, The Insider and its investigative partners revealed documents outlining joint Russian-Chinese initiatives to counter Starlink.

Nevertheless, according to Putin, Russia values its cooperation with Musk’s tech company “despite all the political issues” and is proud to be creating a domestic analog of Starlink –  the Rassvet system. The broadband internet constellation is being developed by Bureau 1440, which put the first 16 production satellites into orbit in March and a second batch in July. Commercial launch of the service is planned for next year, with more than 900 satellites anticipated to be in operation by 2035.

Earlier this month, Volodymyr Zelensky held Musk and Donald Trump responsible for restrictions on Ukraine’s access to Starlink, which helps the Ukrainian Armed Forces repel Russian missile and drone attacks. Trump denied ordering a speed reduction, and Musk accused Ukraine of violating his company’s rules by using the service for offensive drone strikes. On Oct. 24, Kyiv reported that the restrictions had been lifted. According to The Wall Street Journal, Trump had asked Musk to remove them beforehand.

On Oct. 27, the Ukrainian company HIMERA and Denmark’s GomSpace announced the launch into orbit of the test satellite OBRIA NANO, which is meant to become the basis of an independent Ukrainian communications network. The device was launched on Oct. 1 on a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket. In the future, the developers plan to deploy a constellation that will cover all of Ukraine in order to reduce its dependence on external communications providers.

According to T24, investigators found that members of the group, which operates both in Turkey and abroad, were recruited through social media and then received further instructions through WhatsApp groups.

As Der Spiegel reported, two Turkish nationals — 38-year-old Ümit E. and 34-year-old Müslüm T. — were detained on Oct. 12 in Nürtingen, in the German state of Baden-Württemberg, at Poland’s request. Polish authorities suspect the men of involvement in the Starlink station arson. Law enforcement sources in several countries said the two either belong to the Daltons or were hired by members of the gang.

The Starlink station in Poland’s Masovian Voivodeship caught fire on Sept. 23. The site is used in part to support communications for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The Daltons are a major organized crime group active in Turkey, Germany, and other parts of Europe. They are involved in extortion, racketeering, arms trafficking, and contract killings. The group’s suspected leader, Beratcan Gökdemir, was detained in Russia in 2024. Turkey sought his extradition, but German intelligence officials said Russian authorities later released him and placed him under their protection. His current whereabouts are unknown.

According to Stoyanov, “A container ship was hit...with three naval drones, approximately 21 miles southeast of Shabla.” As Reuters notes, the container ship was in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone at the time of the attack. A source in the maritime security sector told the outlet that the ship’s crew had been evacuated.

According to Starboard data examined by The Insider, the Contship Jet left the Israeli port of Haifa on Oct. 24 and was heading to the Romanian port of Constanta. The attack on the merchant ship took place on the day of an emergency meeting between the defense ministers and chiefs of the general staff of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania in Sofia – a gathering focused precisely on the safety of civilian shipping in the Black Sea.

Against the backdrop of frequent attacks, Romania proposed that NATO’s Black Sea countries create a joint command to protect against drones. In addition, NATO spokesperson Allison Hart said that the alliance will strengthen its grouping of maritime patrol aircraft and drones in the region.

However, as military analyst David Sharp explained to The Insider, ordinary patrolling will not help protect civilian ships from drones. As Sharp noted:

“Patrolling is more of a demonstration of presence so that the adversary does not get too bold. Of course, you can detect drones without destroying them and report the sighting to all ships in the area, including civilian ones. But sounding the alarm will not help here: at most, there might be time to put everyone into lifeboats. To truly protect civilian shipping, it is necessary to create a large grouping of ships and aircraft that will closely scan this part of the sea and destroy emerging threats. So everyone considering creating such groupings needs to answer the question of how far they are willing to go. Protecting civilian ships will require political will and specific decisions.”

Sharp stressed that NATO countries have the technical capabilities to counter even advanced naval drones, but the absence of a political decision to take on the protection of civilian shipping is explained by the alliance members’ fear of escalation with Russia:

“Civilian ships cannot protect themselves; they are too slow. They are a defenseless target. However, a political decision to cover civilian shipping would already imply, to some extent, participation in the war. You would have to hunt for drones and shoot at them, and also risk a drone hitting you. NATO avoids this. In Romanian or Bulgarian waters, ships would have to be covered, and aggression countered, but such actions in international waters amount to participation in combat operations.”

Notably, an exclusive economic zone is not considered part of a country’s territory, meaning that a hypothetical operation to destroy a drone like the one that struck the Contship Jet could be interpreted by an adversary in a variety of ways. As Sharp explains:

“When a sea drone operated by an unknown actor is sailing about its own business in neutral waters and you destroy it, some doubt arises: if it is not threatening you and did not enter your waters, on what grounds are you destroying it? Reasons to take defensive action appear only if it is clearly attacking a civilian ship.”

According to Kpler, the tankers are in question are the Talisman (IMO number 9292060), which is under U.S. and EU sanctions; Leruo (IMO number 9385831), which is on the U.K. and EU sanctions lists; and Agioi Fanendes (IMO number 9798375). Together, the three vessels are carrying 924,000 barrels of diesel fuel, roughly one-third of the U.S. transportation sector’s daily diesel consumption.

Only one of the three tankers, the Talisman, sails under the Russian flag. Leruo flies the flag of Sierra Leone, and Agioi Fanendes that of Malta. The latter two are going around the UK, avoiding the English Channel.

The ships left the Russian port of Primorsk between Oct. 16 and 22. They are expected to arrive on the U.S. East Coast on Nov. 7–11. Agioi Fanendes is heading to New York; for the other two vessels; the specific destination on the U.S. Atlantic coast is not listed.

On Oct. 27, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak confirmed that three tankers carrying Russian fuel are heading to the U.S., adding that a fourth tanker is due to depart on Oct. 28.

The shipments became possible after Trump and Putin reached an agreement earlier this month to ease U.S. sanctions in exchange for Russia increasing the supply of diesel fuel on the world market. As AFP notes, the decision — which will not deliver appreciable quantities of diesel to the United States, and which will not result in actual deliveries until mid-November — is widely seen as an attempt by Trump to lower fuel prices for American consumers ahead of the U.S. congressional midterm elections scheduled for Nov. 3.

The agreement has drawn sharp criticism from Ukraine and its allies. Volodymyr Zelensky called Washington’s decision “weak,” and relations between Kyiv and Washington have worsened since the deal was struck.

Since mid-August, a total of 11 Ozon logistics facilities have been hit by Ukrainian drone strikes. The company added that part of its own risks were insured, and compensation for the damage is now being discussed with insurers.

Despite the losses, Ozon’s net profit for the third quarter rose by 25% (3.7 billion rubles, or $46 million). Revenue came to 421.2 billion rubles ($5.2 billion), and the number of orders was 76% higher.

Ozon’s warehouses became targets of drone attacks starting in the second half of August, following a campaign of strikes against its competitor, Wildberries, which began in mid-July. For the latter, only estimates of losses are available. A source for The Bell puts Wildberries’ losses at 100–200 billion rubles ($1.2–$2.5 billion), but alternative estimates go as high as 600–800 billion rubles ($7.5–$9.9 billion) when the losses of sellers who used the platform are factored in.

Satellite images from Oct. 26 show changes compared with earlier imagery. Greenpeace experts who analyzed the data told The Insider that burn marks are visible in the upper left of the image. Additional signs of fire can be seen in the center near a hangar and in the lower left.

The Ukrainian open source intelligence (OSINT) project Oko Hora ✙ News and Analytics claims that the strikes hit workshops No. 24 and No. 25, which specialize in repairing and restoring components for Russia’s S-300V and Buk surface-to-air missile systems, its Tunguska-M air defense systems, and radar equipment. The site, formerly an arsenal of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU), only became the largest known storage base for air defense equipment in Russia after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

OSINT analyst Jompy wrote in March 2024 that researchers had identified an air defense equipment storage base at the 75th Arsenal site in Serpukhov, adding that the facility had originally served as an artillery depot before being repurposed to store air defense systems. Satellite images show numerous hangars at the site that may contain systems including the Buk or S-300. The analyst said it appeared to be the largest known storage base for air defense and surface-to-air missile systems in Russia.

Another OSINT analyst, Athene Noctua, wrote in June 2024 that the 75th Arsenal base held about 60% of the identified reserve of Russian Ground Forces air defense equipment — 574 out of 950 units.

The German military court’s ruling describes in detail how a Bundeswehr serviceman came to hold a leadership position in the Night Wolves.

The soldier is not named in the document, but the charges list the actions that formed the basis of the case against him. They include his participation on April 11, 2022, in a Rossiya Segodnya video conference featuring a Soviet flag in the background, several links to RT and Sputnik material that he posted in 2015, and criticism of Polish authorities for refusing to allow a Night Wolves motorcycle convoy to cross their border. According to publicly available information, the only German participant in the aforementioned April 2022 news conference was Alexander Sautner, and the same posts cited in the ruling can be found on Sautner’s Facebook page (1, 2).

According to the court, Sautner was born in Kazakhstan, moved to Russia with his parents at the age of 2, and relocated with his family to Germany in 1994. He holds both Russian and German citizenship.

Sautner joined the Bundeswehr in July 2007 as a noncommissioned officer candidate and attended the German Air Force’s NCO school. After completing his training, he served in transport units, working in vehicle logistics. In February 2010, he was promoted to Stabsunteroffizier, a junior noncommissioned officer rank, and in January 2013 he was transferred to a logistics battalion.

From July to November 2013, Sautner took part in the International Security Assistance Force mission in Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan, receiving the Bundeswehr’s bronze deployment medal for his service. He was also awarded the gold-level military service badge.

A September 2013 performance review described Sautner as an experienced, motivated, and results-oriented noncommissioned officer. His commanders praised his openness, honesty, good relations with fellow soldiers, and overall strong performance. In August 2018, at his own request, Sautner transferred to another unit within the logistics battalion.

Sautner’s Bundeswehr contract was not due to expire until June 30, 2032. However, even before the 2018 transfer, Sautner had begun participating in the activities of the Night Wolves motorcycle club — infamous for its longstanding ties to Vladimir Putin, including its role in Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. According to Germany’s Military Counterintelligence Service, known by its German acronym MAD, Sautner had been a club member since around 2016 and had taken part in its motorcycle rallies even earlier than that.

Sautner later became the first German member of the Night Wolves to achieve “full color” status, meaning full membership in the motorcycle club. In biker culture, “colors” are patches bearing a club’s name and emblem that members wear on their vests. The right to wear the complete set signifies that a person has progressed from supporter and prospective member to a full member of the club.

Sautner later became vice president of the Roads of Victory division, replacing his wife’s uncle in the role. The court ruling does not specify exactly when that happened, but MAD describes him as a longtime vice president and says that until the spring or summer of 2022, he played a key role in organizing and running international motorcycle rallies.

Roads of Victory is a themed Night Wolves division that organizes annual motorcycle rallies around May 9, Russia’s Victory Day commemorating the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. Before an independent German chapter was established, Night Wolves activities in Germany were carried out through Roads of Victory, which was headed by Andrei Bobrovsky. Bobrovsky, for his part, is an associate of Night Wolves founder Alexander Zaldostanov, who came under European Union sanctions in 2022. As vice president, Sautner effectively headed Roads of Victory activities in Germany.

The Night Wolves motorcycle club itself was founded by Zaldostanov in 1989. MAD documents say the organization has about 45 chapters in different countries and operates under a strict hierarchy. According to the counterintelligence agency, members are required to follow the club leadership, while Zaldostanov can issue instructions directly to members of foreign chapters.

The Night Wolves and several of the club’s leaders are under EU sanctions for supporting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The sanctions justification says the organization spreads Russian propaganda, supports pro-Russian armed formations in Ukraine, and maintains close ties to the Kremlin.

German military counterintelligence regards the Night Wolves’ activities as one instrument of Russia’s hybrid warfare efforts against Germany. MAD assesses that the annual motorcycle rallies are used not only as commemorative events, but also to spread pro-Russian political messages.

How the investigation into Sautner began

The first suspicions among Bundeswehr commanders emerged in 2020, when Sautner’s battalion commander and a security officer noticed a Night Wolves emblem sticker on the rear window of Sautner’s car while it was parked on military premises. At the time, Sautner was working primarily as part of the Bundeswehr’s assistance to civilian health authorities. However, after his links to the Russian motorcycle club were discovered, his commanders concluded that he could no longer be assigned to perform work involving classified information.

Sautner’s former direct superior, whose name was withheld in the ruling, testified that the soldier was primarily assisting civilian health authorities at the time, but the restriction on deploying him to posts requiring security clearance created problems for a unit that had commitments to NATO’s rapid-response forces. The situation was compounded by Sautner’s military specialty, which was in short supply, making him difficult to replace.

Sautner also told the court about the circumstances that prevented him from passing the security vetting required for access to classified information, saying that he had retained Russian citizenship because renouncing it would have involved significant expense. He also refused to sign a pledge not to visit certain countries that were considered potential security risks. The ruling does not identify those countries. Holding a second citizenship is not itself prohibited for Bundeswehr service, and the court documents do not indicate that Sautner concealed the existence of his Russian passport from his commanders.

On Feb. 4, 2021, the Bundeswehr’s logistics command formally opened disciplinary proceedings against Sauter, and in December of that year, he was informed of the main findings, which centered on four Facebook posts he had made between 2015 and 2019. Sautner was offered the opportunity to respond, but declined.

On Jan. 27, 2015, Sauter commented on a Sputnik report about Ukrainian military losses in the Donetsk region, writing that Ukrainians could now try out their crematorium. Military disciplinary prosecutors interpreted the remark as incitement to violence and hatred.

On April 27, 2015, Sautner criticized Polish authorities for refusing to allow Night Wolves participants in a motorcycle rally to transit the country on their way to Berlin. He complained that the bikers were being prevented from honoring those killed in World War II and called the Polish authorities “dirty U.S. vassals.”

On Sept. 4, 2015, Sautner shared an article from the German magazine Compact describing the country as an occupied American colony. He posted another article, this time from RT Deutsch, on June 26, 2019. It concerned historical memory and relations between Russia and the West.

The Insider found the first two posts, which were described in detail in the court ruling, on Sautner’s Facebook page. The court ultimately did not consider the four posts in its final judgment, and they were not brought up during Sautner’s disciplinary hearing because they were unlikely to materially affect the type or severity of the punishment.

Notably, despite the investigation, Sautner continued participating in Night Wolves activities. On May 9, 2021, during one of the Roads of Victory rallies, he was seen carrying the flag of the self-proclaimed “Luhansk People’s Republic.” MAD assessed that displaying the symbol of the unrecognized Russian-backed statelet demonstrated how commemorative events were being used to promote Russian political messages.

Instructions from Night Wolves leaders and a pro-Russian demonstration in Berlin

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, German military counterintelligence uncovered evidence of direct interaction between Sautner and the club’s Russian leadership. MAD materials cited in the court ruling say Sautner maintained direct contact with Alexander Zaldostanov and Andrei Bobrovsky and received instructions from them, including while members of the club leadership were in the war zone in Ukraine.

One such episode occurred in early March 2022, mere days after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24.

In club correspondence from March 4 and 5, counterintelligence officers found discussions of a demonstration in Berlin that was to be held under the stated aim of opposing alleged persecution of Russian-speaking residents of Germany. According to MAD, Sautner received a personal message containing instructions from Roads of Victory president Bobrovsky, who was referred to as Hauptkommandant, or “commander in chief” in the correspondence. Participants were urged to fight on the “information front.”

Sautner then sent a voice message to the German Roads of Victory group chat strongly urging other club members to attend. On March 5, 2022, Sautner appeared with other Night Wolves members at a demonstration at Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate, where he posed with a Russian flag bearing state symbols and the word “Russia.” Photographs from the event were later reviewed by the court.

Sautner said he attended the demonstration to protest discrimination against Russian-speaking people in Germany, adding that he was particularly concerned about his own children. The court, however, viewed the event as a public display of solidarity with Russia staged against the backdrop of the start of its invasion of Ukraine.

The court ruling also mentions another public appearance by Sautner. On April 11, 2022, he participated by video link in a news conference organized by the Russian state media group Rossiya Segodnya. A Soviet flag with a hammer and sickle was visible behind him. MAD interpreted the episode as a further demonstration of Sautner’s senior position within the Night Wolves leadership.

Raising money for Donbas

During the investigation, German military counterintelligence also examined messages from a WhatsApp group called NW DP GERMANY, which was found on Sautner’s phone.

One message asked club members to contribute 1,000 rubles (around $13 at the time) each by Feb. 1, 2022, and then another 500 rubles per month to support Night Wolves chapters in Donbas. The appeal was posted by Denis N., whom German counterintelligence described as a close confidant of Sautner. The person was Denis Nalyotov, who later became head of the club’s German branch.

MAD assessed that the collected funds could have been used to purchase equipment suitable for armed operations against Ukraine. On Feb. 27, 2022, after the full-scale invasion had begun, Sautner himself called on members of the German Roads of Victory organization to send 13 euros each to a person named Badja. According to the message, the money was intended for humanitarian aid to Donbas.

On March 1, Denis Nalyotov discussed the collection with another club member, Thorsten M. He said the money could be sent by PayPal but that it would be better to wait for an in-person meeting and hand it over in cash so the transfers would leave no record.

On April 26, Sautner said in a WhatsApp voice message that around 1,000 euros had been collected. He said the money had been transferred to a fund called “Humanitarian Aid for Donbas.”

MAD materials also cite correspondence from March 2, 2023, in which Badja again called for donations for humanitarian aid. A Roads of Victory representative in Germany replied that fundraising was already underway.

The court ruling does not establish that Sautner personally purchased military equipment or that the funds collected were in fact used for armed activity against Ukraine. The possible military purpose of the money appears specifically as an assessment by MAD.

How Sautner became vice president of Germany’s Night Wolves

In the spring or summer of 2022, Sautner stepped down as vice president of the German Roads of Victory organization, being replaced by Denis Nalyotov. Сounterintelligence assessed that Sautner may have given up the title because of pressure from German law enforcement. Disciplinary proceedings against him were already underway, and MAD documents also refer to an investigation by Germany’s Federal Prosecutor’s Office. The court ruling does not disclose details of that investigation.

The formal transfer of the post, however, did not mean Sautner stopped playing a leadership role. According to MAD, he continued coordinating all major decisions with Nalyotov, with the two generally making and implementing them together.

In early 2023, the Night Wolves established an independent German chapter, Night Wolves MC Germania. Nalyotov became president of the new organization, while Sautner became vice president.

The two informally divided Germany into two zones. Nalyotov ran the northern chapter from Hanover, while Sautner oversaw the south from Bad Mergentheim in Baden-Württemberg. Flight records reviewed by The Insider also indicate that Sautner and Nalyotov traveled to Moscow together after Russia launched its full-scale invasion. (Nalyotov flew from Kaliningrad to Moscow on Jan. 15, 2023, and returned on Jan. 21.)

Sautner therefore obtained a new formal leadership position in the Night Wolves’ German structure after the Bundeswehr’s disciplinary proceedings had already begun. MAD assessed that Sautner’s appointments as club president and vice president indicated a particularly high level of trust from Alexander Zaldostanov. MAD also found that the Russian leadership continued to control foreign chapters, including the organization of propaganda events in Germany.

At the court hearing, Sautner confirmed that he remained a full member of the Night Wolves and continued to serve as vice president of the German chapter.

Why Sautner was not dismissed from the Bundeswehr until 2026

On March 9, 2022, the proceedings were suspended pending additional disciplinary charges. The Bundeswehr’s Federal Office of Personnel Management later considered dismissing Sautner under a law allowing the expedited removal of soldiers involved in anti-constitutional activities without lengthy court proceedings. Sautner was temporarily suspended from official duties in April 2022, and the hearings continued for several more years. On May 26, 2025, the agency determined that there were insufficient grounds execute Sautner’s expedited removal, and the disciplinary case against him continued.

Then on Oct. 10, 2025, Sautner was served with an amended charge sheet. In addition to the earlier Facebook posts, the case now included three new allegations: participation in the pro-Russian demonstration on March 5, 2022; serving as vice president of the German Night Wolves chapter from at least early 2023 through July 29, 2025; and sending an insulting email to a fellow soldier.

The final incident occurred on April 19, 2025. During the night, Sautner emailed a senior NCO in his unit complaining that he had not been informed about the death of a former fellow serviceman. Sautner said the man had died by suicide and accused the command of inaction. The email contained numerous insults directed at members of the unit.

At the court hearing, Sautner apologized to the recipient. The court nevertheless found that he had deliberately violated his duty to treat fellow soldiers with respect.

The court also heard testimony from Sautner’s former commanders, who described him as an experienced, calm, and reliable soldier widely respected by his colleagues. One commander said he had been surprised by the allegations against him.

At the same time, Sautner’s former superiors said that given his actions, they no longer considered his return to the Bundeswehr possible. According to the court ruling, Sautner had openly discussed his Night Wolves activities on his Facebook page, meaning his links to the club were known within his unit.

When Sautner was asked during the hearing whether he even wanted to remain in the Bundeswehr, he was unable to answer immediately. Ultimately, the judges concluded that Sautner had deliberately violated his soldierly duties to remain loyal to Germany, to uphold its constitutional order, and to refrain from conduct that could undermine trust in the Bundeswehr. The court separately stressed that Sautner’s leadership role in an organization closely linked to the Russian state was incompatible with service in Germany’s armed forces.

The ruling also noted that Sautner did not end his Night Wolves activities after the investigation began. On the contrary, while disciplinary proceedings were already underway, he assumed an even more prominent position in the club. The court considered that to be an aggravating factor.

“He can no longer be the servant of two masters,” the ruling said. The judges were quoting wording used by Sautner’s own defense, although the document does not explain the context in which his lawyer used the phrase.

The judges ruled that the Bundeswehr’s trust in Sautner had been irreparably destroyed. On Jan. 28, 2026, Germany’s military disciplinary court found him guilty of disciplinary violations and ordered his dismissal from service. Sautner was also denied special transitional payments following his dismissal and ordered to pay court costs.

The judgment became final on Feb. 5, 2026. The decision was based on Sautner’s leadership role in an organization that German counterintelligence links to the Russian state, his public participation in a pro-Russian demonstration after the start of the full-scale invasion, and his violations of military duties.

Ukraine’s ombudsman wrote on Telegram:

“Today, at 3 a.m. Kyiv time and 4 a.m. Moscow time, a ceasefire was introduced in designated areas connected with the humanitarian mission.

This is taking place as part of a humanitarian mission that we are carrying out jointly with Russian Human Rights Commissioner Yana Lantratova, with the mediation and coordination of U.S. first lady Melania Trump.

The parties are observing the agreements that Yana Lantratova and I reached.”

Russia’s Defense Ministry also confirmed the ceasefire:

“In connection with preparations for a humanitarian operation in the area of the settlement of Oleshky in the Kherson region, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have ceased fire on the Kherson front and introduced a ‘regime of silence’ starting from 4 a.m. Moscow time on Oct. 27, 2026.”

As Lubinets previously said, before the evacuation begins, demining teams will first clear roads of explosives. Humanitarian aid will then be delivered to the city, and registration will begin for residents who want to leave Oleshky. The evacuation is expected to start only after those steps are completed.

The agreement on a ceasefire in Oleshky became public on Oct. 23. The White House announced it first, after which officials in Moscow and Kyiv confirmed the arrangement.

According to the latest estimates from Ukrainian authorities, about 2,000 people remained trapped in Oleshky under a complete blockade — without food, medical care, or a stable electricity supply. In addition to Melania Trump, Pope Leo XIV had also joined the efforts to secure a humanitarian corridor for residents of the occupied city, calling Vladimir Putin from a hospital and asking him to halt the fighting in Oleshky as soon as possible.

In late September, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Michael O’Flaherty called for an immediate ceasefire in occupied Oleshky in order to allow unhindered access for humanitarian organizations and the safe evacuation of civilians. He said the humanitarian crisis in the city was rapidly worsening and that civilians, including children, were trapped without adequate food, medical care, running water, or electricity.

In early October, Ukrainian officials reported that the country’s National Guard had carried out a successful operation to deliver humanitarian supplies to Russian-occupied Oleshky. Drones delivered about 400 packages weighing nearly 4 metric tons in total. The shipments contained food, medicine, and supplies for children.

In addition, the agency links another 1.1 million monitored profiles to political violence and criticism of the authorities, 1.5 million to drugs and drug-related content, and 906,000 to the promotion and rehabilitation of Nazism. It is unclear from Ashirov’s remarks what criteria the agency uses to determine the presence of criticism of the war and the authorities, whether the listed categories overlap, and what share of the accounts belongs to minors. It is also not specified how many unique users stand behind these profiles.

The figures were cited in the context of protecting children from dangerous online content. State Duma family protection committee chair Nina Ostanina noted that existing mechanisms for blocking content do not make it possible to fully restrict the spread of banned materials, and teenagers continue to use digital tools to bypass restrictions. At the same time, the lawmaker acknowledged that bans alone cannot solve the problem — as Ostanina herself explained, restrictions can pique heightened interest in banned content among underage users.

At the same meeting, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs said that in the first nine months of 2026, Russian law enforcement authorities identified 62,300 people suspected of committing crimes on the internet; 4,220 of them (6.8%) were minors. Another 692 minors were held liable for fraud.

How Rosmolodezh monitors social media users

Rosmolodezh has a Center for the Study and Network Monitoring of the Youth Environment (CISM), created on Vladimir Putin’s instruction. The organization searches the internet for information that the Russian authorities consider dangerous to minors.

As The Insider previously reported, the center takes part in identifying “socially dangerous” schoolchildren and students. According to Rosmolodezh head Grigory Gurov, thanks to the center’s work, Russia opened approximately 500 criminal and several hundred administrative cases in 2024. In addition, thousands of people were subjected to “preventive measures” aimed at countering the spread of banned information.

In August 2026, DOXA reported on the center’s work. Journalists studied the court system and found 48 rulings from 2025 and the first half of 2026 in which information supplied by the center served as the basis for prosecution. Among them is the case of Magnitogorsk resident Sergei Sokolov, who was fined 30,000 rubles ($373) after the center reported him to the prosecutor’s office over his VKontakte comments criticizing the Russian army. In Novosibirsk Region in 2025, the most common category of “destructive” content identified by Rosmolodezh was criticism of the war in Ukraine. Anarchist ideas and drug propaganda came in second and third.

The center has also been mentioned in investigations by international law enforcement agencies. In December 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that, according to the charging documents, several CISM employees were members of the pro-Russian hacker group NoName057(16), which carried out DDoS attacks on government institutions, banks, and infrastructure facilities in various countries. According to the U.S. investigation, center employees also took part in creating the network infrastructure for those attacks. Vot Tak previously linked the center’s leadership to the development of the DDoSia program used by the group to attack the websites of European states.

Earlier, media reports also covered Russia’s development of a system called Generation Index. Its closed part is designed to track the ideological attitudes of young people, including their views on the West, LGBT people, and the war in Ukraine. In particular, the system is designed to assess the share of young people who believe in Russia’s war effort, and low figures are supposed to serve as grounds for the authorities to take “urgent measures.”

An investigation carried out jointly with other intelligence agencies found that several people from former Soviet states were involved in the arson.

“The information obtained so far indicates that the network’s missions were not limited to Romania. Coordinators in the Russian Federation had assigned it a wide range of targets in the region: state-owned and private weapons production facilities, as well as other targets of military and industrial interest.”

Romania’s Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism, or DIICOT, separately said that two Belarusian citizens and one Ukrainian citizen are suspected of involvement in the Brașov sabotage operation. Romanian authorities have issued arrest warrants for all three individuals. Two suspects were detained in Germany “while they were preparing to commit similar acts,” DIICOT said. Another suspect is in Poland.

In recent months, investigations have also uncovered other attempted acts of sabotage in Romania, including at international military facilities and sites used to train members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the SRI said.

According to the intelligence service, operatives are typically recruited through social media. They are initially offered money to carry out a small task, such as watching or photographing a site, but the assignments then become progressively more serious. Over time, they can include assaults, arson, and even attempted killings. If a recruit refuses, the network’s handlers may resort to pressure and blackmail.

“These networks primarily exploit financial vulnerabilities, addictions, or criminal histories. To conceal their identities and movements, their members frequently use transportation, lodging, and payment methods registered under other people’s names, as well as communications via SIM cards from third countries and encrypted messaging apps.”

Authorities in Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Germany, Lithuania, and Denmark have previously reported sabotage targeting defense companies and facilities involved in supporting Ukraine. Officials in those countries have accused Russian intelligence services of organizing the operations, while the people carrying them out have most often been Ukrainian citizens or nationals of EU member states.

Biryukov described a colleague’s visit to Kynev at the detention center:

“My colleague visited Alexander Kynev today and said: ‘Alexander has been on a hunger strike since the weekend. He was transferred to Cell 213, the largest in Medved, designed for 34 people, but there are 35 detainees there. Instead of a toilet, there is a hole in the floor, and because his leg is in a cast after being broken in two places, he cannot use it. So he is not eating.’ We have taken every possible step to have him transferred today to conditions appropriate for his medical condition.”

As The Insider previously reported, Kynev was detained in Moscow on Sept. 25. He is accused of the illegal production, sale, or distribution of narcotics on a large scale under Article 228.1, Part 4, Clause “g” of Russia’s Criminal Code. The charge carries a prison sentence of 10 to 20 years.

On Oct. 22, Kynev personally told the Moscow City Court that he had suffered the injuries during his arrest. He said the officers did not identify themselves and that the force they used caused a serious double fracture of his right leg, along with multiple bruises. Kynev said he remembered little of what happened after he was forced to the floor. He also complained that he was not receiving necessary medical care and was having difficulty moving around the detention center.

Also on Oct. 22, the Moscow branch of Russia’s Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) said it had found no violations of Kynev’s rights. The legal rights project Slovo Zashchite (lit. “Word to the Defense”) reported the finding after publishing FSIN’s response to an appeal by urbanist Mikhail Popov, who had asked the authorities to investigate reports that Kynev was beaten. In its Oct. 22 statement, FSIN said Kynev’s detention conditions complied with Russian law and that it had found no threat to his life or health.

The agency also said it had found no violations of Kynev’s rights or treatment degrading to his human dignity. The published response, however, said nothing about the circumstances of his arrest, the incident during which Kynev says he was injured. Instead, the review concerned his detention at Pretrial Detention Center No. 1 (nicknamed “Matrosskaya Tishina”), even though on Oct. 14 he had already been transferred to another facility, Pretrial Detention Center No. 4 (SIZO-4 “Medved”).

Alexander Kynev is a political scientist who specializes in the structure of political power in Russia’s regions and analyzes election results at both the regional and federal levels. In February, he was added to Russia’s register of “foreign agents,” a politically charged designation that imposes extensive reporting requirements and restrictions and has been widely used against journalists, activists, researchers, and other critics of the Putin regime.

The Nobel Peace Prize-winning human rights organization Memorial has recognized Kynev as a political prisoner. 

According to the prosecution, Nesterov copied onto a flash drive a classified FSB database containing compromising material on the leadership of Russia’s Finance Ministry, the Central Bank, and several of the largest state banks, and then posted an advertisement for its sale on the internet. A hacker, whose name has not been disclosed, responded to the ad and offered 9 million rubles ($108,800) for the files.

From here, however, the accounts diverge. According to one version, FSB operatives supposedly detained the buyer before he could acquire the classified data. According to another, the hacker succeeded in buying the database, was subsequently detained, then struck a deal with investigators and testified against Nesterov.

Still though, according to The Insider’s source, the buyer was an informant from the hacker community cooperating with Department K of the FSB’s Economic Security Service (ESS), and in addition to the theft of the secret database, investigators looked into Nesterov’s involvement in extorting a large bribe from the management of the construction company PIK. After all, more than 20 different contacts labeled “PIK” were purportedly found in his phone.

The Insider previously reported on PIK owner Sergei Gordeev’s connections, and his real estate development company is at the heart of this story as well. In 2025, when the firm refused to pay a bribe, Nesterov allegedly organized a DDoS attack on the Lovit internet provider, which serves PIK’s new developments in Moscow and St. Petersburg. For unknown reasons though, this episode did not make it into the final version of the charges.

The criminal case was first heard at Moscow’s Basmanny Court. At the defense counsel’s request, the hearings were then moved to the Moscow Region city of Khimki, the defendant’s official place of residence (although Nesterov had lived for several years in the Edem gated community near Solnechnogorsk). Among those summoned for questioning was Nesterov’s older brother, Ilya, who works as an auditor at Sheremetyevo Airport. He told the investigator that he knew nothing about his brother’s double life.

The Khimki City Court, which sat behind closed doors, sentenced Nesterov to 13 years in a maximum-security penal colony. He will most likely serve his term in Penal Colony No. 11 in the city of Bor, Nizhny Novgorod Region, which holds former officers of the FSB, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Federal Protective Service (FSO), Interior Ministry, and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) — a penitentiary facility The Insider also previously reported on.

Nesterov’s career

Anton Nesterov was born in 1992 in Ulyanovsk and developed an interest in computers early on. As a young man, he worked as an engineer at the Signal plant. In 2014, he took his father’s advice and enrolled in the Voronezh Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, joining the department of radio engineering and electronics — a program known for training students from Belarus, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Mongolia, and Angola, alongside Russians.

After the institute, Nesterov was assigned to the ministry’s Bureau of Special Technical Measures (BSTM), where he rose to become a senior operative at the 4th section of the 40th department, handling financial crimes committed with the use of information technology and working under the supervision of the FSB’s Department K.

The 40th department, where Nesterov served, is considered the most corrupt and scandal-ridden unit within the BSTM. “They control all the well-known hackers. The guys from the 40th department drive decrepit Soviet vehicles to work, while in their garages they have posh cars registered to relatives and mistresses,” a Ministry of Internal Affairs source told The Insider.

During interrogations, Nesterov refused to name accomplices and took all the blame. However, The Insider’s source is confident that the operative most likely had accomplices from the FSB or the BSTM: “He sat in the FSB compound on Bolshaya Lubyanka Street and worked in tandem with guys from the FSB. It is hard to believe that Anton pulled it all off alone.”

“He sat in the FSB compound on Bolshaya Lubyanka Street and worked in tandem with guys from the FSB. It is hard to believe that Anton pulled it all off alone”

Fugitives from the BSTM and mysterious deaths in Mexico

The Bureau of Special Technical Measures was established in 1992 to combat the illegal distribution of radio-electronic and special technical equipment, electronic payment fraud, terrorism, incitement of ethnic hatred, and child pornography online. It excels in various technological tricks for surveillance and data interception and has at its disposal several direction-finding vehicles with extendable antennas capable of eavesdropping on any cell phone from a distance of 20 km. As a rule, these minibuses and GAZelles are disguised as vehicles marked “Refrigerator repair” or “We install windows.” Some of these special vehicles have been transferred to the occupied territories of Ukraine to track phone calls.

How effective these devices are in practice, however, is unclear. Raisa Parshina, owner of the Far Eastern Transport Group, told The Insider that when her son Maxim was kidnapped in 2005 and a ransom of $7 million was demanded, acquaintances advised her to turn privately to the BSTM to triangulate the incoming numbers. She met with employees of the bureau and was told that a direction finder costs $10,000 a day. Parshina agreed, but a week later she was told that no results had been obtained.

Regional BSTM units operate in all the main directorates of Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, also carrying out tasks for their colleagues at the FSB. Since the Bureau’s creation, nearly all key positions have been held by former FSB officers.

Since 2017, BSTM has been headed by Lieutenant General Mikhail Litvinov, who previously worked as deputy head of the FSB’s 12th Center — responsible for tapping phones, monitoring internet traffic, and intercepting information from technical communication channels. Litvinov’s office was located in downtown Moscow, at 26 Myasnitskaya Street, next door to three units of the FSB’s Operational Search Directorate (military units 52295, 96586, and 98933). For secrecy he was listed as head of the Center for Applied Research and supposedly engaged in studying public opinion.

Incidentally, since 2019 bailiffs from Moscow’s Zyuzino district have been unable to “squeeze” 46,668 rubles ($578) in taxes out of the general, left unpaid from his time working at the Center.

The appointment of Litvinov allowed the FSB to take the BSTM under its control, and the bureau expanded its remit to cover the wiretapping and surveillance of anti-Kremlin opposition figures and independent journalists.

However, in 2023 Litvinov was on the verge of dismissal after his subordinates — Georgy Satyukov, head of the 3rd section of the BSTM’s 40th department, and Dmitry Sokolov, a former colleague from Tyumen — fled abroad. According to the investigation, Sokolov’s brokering helped Satyukov secure a bribe of almost 5 billion rubles ($62 million) in bitcoin from Alexei Ivanov (Bilyuchenko), co-founder of the crypto exchange BTC, who was seeking the closure of a criminal case.

Satyukov received almost $62 million in bitcoin as a bribe for the closure of the criminal case against BTC founder Alexei Ivanov

The correspondence and phone conversations of Satyukov, Sokolov, and the crypto tycoon Ivanov were recorded by the FSB’s 12th Center, where General Litvinov used to serve. Shortly before their arrest, the corrupt operatives were tipped off by accomplices from the FSB and the BSTM, allowing them to flee the country.

It remained unclear how the fugitives crossed the border, since their passports were supposed to be kept in General Litvinov’s safe, and during questioning, the general denied having handed over the documents.

Following a suit by Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office, the state seized millions of dollars’ worth of real estate from Satyukov: 13 apartments in Moscow and St. Petersburg (including a 200-square-meter unit in the elite Moscow complex Nezhinsky Kovcheg), and 11 non-residential properties in Saratov, Izhevsk, and the Sverdlovsk Region. His mansion in the UAE is currently frozen. 

From Sokolov, the authorities confiscated: a nearly 500-square-meter apartment in St. Petersburg valued at 400 million rubles ($4.96 million), three luxury apartments on Kamenny Island, and a mansion in a historic district of the Petrograd Side. At the request of the Prosecutor General’s Office, the authorities in Dubai also froze Sokolov’s apartment in the Burj Khalifa tower.

Then, in 2024, Satyukov and Sokolov supposedly died in Mexico — one after the other, even if investigators suspect their deaths have been faked. In a conversation with The Insider, investigative journalist Andrei Zakharov said that phone billing records of the “dead” Satyukov and Sokolov feature the same BSTM operatives whom Nesterov called, along with three dozen alleged crypto figures, hackers, and businessmen from all over Russia.

Still, a source at the FSB told The Insider that after Nesterov’s imprisonment, BSTM head Litvinov is unlikely to keep his seat. Most likely, he will be given an order and sent off to a well-earned retirement.

The public discontent began in late September with a blockade of a high school near Paris, where students complained of teacher shortages, overcrowded classrooms, and crumbling buildings. A month later, trade unions and the Yellow Vests joined the students, expanding the list of demands to include more funding for hospitals, higher wages, lower fuel prices, and wealth redistribution. In Limoges, the historic city hall was set on fire; in Marseille, protesters stormed a government building; and in Paris, stores were looted.

President Emmanuel Macron addressed the nation on television, speaking of “anger and shame” and insisting that the protesters’ demands had been heard. However, he said nothing about money — after all, parliament is debating the 2027 budget, which must convince France's creditors that Paris can rein in its growing debt.

Debt is growing, but the economy is not

France’s public debt stands at nearly €3.6 trillion — or 119% of GDP, an all-time high — and it is rising rapidly. A year ago, it stood at 115%, and the government expects it to reach 122% by the end of 2027. 

Servicing the debt is becoming increasingly expensive. Next year the public sector will pay €91.2 billion in interest, up from €79.2 billion this year. Debt-servicing costs in the central government budget will rise by €10.3 billion. No other spending item is growing as fast. Excluding civil-service pensions, interest payments are becoming the government’s largest expenditure item, surpassing both defense (€64 billion) and education (€62.2 billion).

Excluding civil-service pensions, which are allocated across ministries, interest payments are becoming the government’s largest spending item

The average yield for French bonds sold in 2025 was 3.4%, Fitch notes, but earlier this month yields on French 10-year bonds topped 5% — the first time since 2002. The difference between the interest rate investors demand from France is now more than 1.4% higher than that demanded of Germany — wider than at any point since 2012, when the eurozone was in the midst of a debt crisis.

By mid-October, markets had calmed somewhat, but France was still paying more to borrow than countries that had been at the heart of that previous crisis: 4.8%, compared with 4.5% for Italy and 4.05% for Spain. (During the 2011 debt crisis, Italy paid as much as 7% — a rate that ultimately cost Silvio Berlusconi his job.)

Even with its new measures, the government projects a budget deficit of 5% of GDP in 2027. Without them, it estimates, the deficit would have reachd 6.4%. To keep public debt from rising relative to GDP, France needs to cut its deficit by around 3.5 percentage points of GDP, Fitch estimates.

A comparison with other countries shows how unusual France’s situation is. Sweden demonstrates that a generous welfare state can coexist with low public debt. The United States has a similar debt-to-GDP ratio to France’s, but it borrows in its own currency and controls its monetary policy. As a member of a currency union, France has no such option.

France spends more on healthcare as a share of GDP than any of the other countries in the comparison, and almost as much as Italy on pensions. It also spends a larger share of GDP on education than Germany, Italy, or Spain, though considerably less than Sweden.

Sweden shows that generous social spending does not necessarily lead to high public debt. It spends more than the EU average on old-age benefits and more than any of the other countries on education, yet its debt-to-GDP ratio is roughly one-third of France’s. France, by contrast, spends heavily on pensions without standing out for its education spending.

The growth picture is more complicated. In 2025, the French economy grew more slowly than those of Spain, Sweden, and the United States, but faster than Germany’s and Italy’s. However, Germany’s public debt is just 63% of GDP.

Spain presents the opposite picture. In the first half of 2026, its public debt rose by 4.3% in nominal terms, but its debt-to-GDP ratio fell by 1.8 percentage points, to 101.4%, as the economy grew faster than the debt. In the second quarter, Spanish GDP rose by 0.7%, while French GDP stagnated.

France may be much harder to rescue than the countries bailed out during the debt crisis, and experts like Nobel laureate Paul Krugman believe a bailout may no longer even be feasible. “France may have crossed the line between ‘too big to fail’ and ‘too big to save,’” he wrote earlier this month. France’s economy is far larger than those of Greece or Portugal, making a bailout much more expensive. Eurozone countries would also be likely to argue far more bitterly over who should foot the bill.

How France got to this point

The French economy is hovering on the brink of stagnation. Growth is being held back by weak consumer spending, rising borrowing costs, a decline in construction, the the hesitancy of businesses to commit to investment.

The main source of uncertainty is energy prices driven by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. The Bank of France expects the purchasing power of wages to fall by 0.7% in 2026 and unemployment to rise to 8.4% by the end of the year.

The weak economy is putting pressure on public finances. The projected 2026 budget deficit has risen to 5.4% of GDP — already in excess of its 5% target. Fitch attributes this to two factors: the economic and labor-market slowdown is weighing on tax revenues, while interest payments on the debt are rising. In effect, the economy itself is contributing to the budget problem.

There are two familiar explanations for France’s troubles. The first is that the state spends too much. The second is that it allocates money, failing to turn government outlays into effective public services.

Two familiar explanations for France’s troubles: excessive public spending and poor allocation of funds

According to the IMF, France's public spending will reach a whopping 57.6% of GDP in 2026, and social spending exceeds 30% of GDP, one of the highest levels among OECD members. It is important to note that this OECD measure excludes schools and universities, covering only childcare and care for children under six. France’s exceptionally generous social spending is therefore not inconsistent with high school students’ complaints about teacher shortages.

A special OECD study put France’s social spending at 31.6% of GDP in 2022, compared with 26.7% in Germany. Pensions alone account for 24.3% of all public spending. France does collect significant amounts of tax revenue — but this fact means that there is little room to raise them further, as government revenue is already among the highest in the eurozone, the IMF notes.

Public money is also poorly allocated — at least, that's what citizens themselves say. In a 2022 survey conducted by the OECD, respondents in France were, on average, less satisfied with access to high-quality, affordable public services than respondents in Germany and the UK.

Where the government plans to make savings

On Oct. 1, Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s government presented its 2027 budget. New measures are expected to directly save €43 billion, and the government puts the total expected impact at €54 billion once the lingering effects of past measures are factored in. Overall, the plan calls for cuts to spending and in increase in tax revenues.

The main puzzle with this budget is the arithmetic. The €43 billion in new measures amounts to roughly 1.4% of GDP, yet the deficit is expected to fall by just 0.4 percentage points, from 5.4% to 5% of GDP. Without the new measures, however, the deficit would have been expected to rise to 6.4%.

Two possible scenarios: both are worse

France faces a choice between two strategies: continuing to borrow or rapidly cutting the deficit. Neither guarantees the desired outcome.

Continuing to pile up debt is the least painful option for those in power. Pensions, benefits, and public-sector salaries would continue to be indexed, consumption would hold up, and the protest wave would likely subside. However, every year of deficit spending adds to public debt, and each new loan becomes more expensive.

Debt accumulated when interest rates were near zero now has to be refinanced at significantly higher rates. Eventually, interest payments will crowd out other spending, including on education and healthcare. Fitch estimates that debt-servicing costs as a share of GDP are rising by 0.2–0.3 percentage points a year.

France could face another problem even sooner: a loss of investor confidence that sees them demand higher interest rates that in turn widen the deficit and thereby further reduce the market's faith in the French government. Unlike the United States, France cannot unilaterally devalue its currency or print money. In the event of a true debt criis, Paris would simply have to impose much harsher spending cuts.

For now, however, this remains a theoretical risk, and the eurozone also has a safety net in place in the event that creditors panic. Since 2022, the European Central Bank has been able to buy a country’s bonds when their yields rise unjustifiably, with no predetermined limit on purchases. The instrument is intended to counter market panic unrelated to a country’s economic fundamentals, and before using it, the ECB assesses whether the country complies with EU fiscal rules and whether its debt is sustainable.

“The first and foremost solution lies within France itself — in its fiscal policy,” as ECB President Christine Lagarde said on Oct. 14.

The alternative — radically cutting spending to reduce the deficit — would be painful. Sharp austerity would mean reductions in pensions, public-sector salaries, and government procurement. Such a move would increase the likelihood of even larger protests and greater instability while also weakening demand. As an IMF review of fiscal consolidation programs shows, spending cuts have a particularly severe impact during economic downturns, with low-income people hit hardest due to the fact that they have little access to credit to help them weather a loss of income.

If GDP contracts sharply enough, the debt-to-GDP ratio can even rise despite the presence of a smaller deficit. According to the IMF, austerity programs have frequently relied on overly optimistic growth forecasts, with debt ultimately rising rather than falling. The French Pensions Advisory Council illustrated this mechanism using economic models: cutting pension spending by 0.2% of GDP in the short term reduces economic activity by about 0.1 percentage points.

In practice, Paris is unlikely to choose either extreme, instead gradually reducing the deficit by reviewing spending and phasing out tax breaks. This is the approach the IMF recommends: bring the deficit below 3% of GDP by 2029 while protecting the most vulnerable members of society.

France will take a middle path, gradually reducing the deficit by reviewing spending and phasing out tax breaks

In May, IMF staff recommended scrapping ineffective tax breaks, eliminating duplicate spending, and developing a “credible pension reform strategy.” Still, even if the plan goes ahead, the IMF forecasts that public debt will continue to rise in 2028, reaching 121% of GDP.

The current budget, however, may pass more easily than its predecessor, as the approaching presidential election in April 2027 gives parties an incentive to leave the next government with the current budget, which it will then have to revise.

“We inherit the mistakes of our leaders, and they fall on our children’s shoulders,” read one placard in Place de la République captured by Euronews. The central question for France now is how to distribute the inevitable costs among generations and social groups.

The case against Belenky was prompted by a cryptocurrency transfer to an account published by blogger Arkady Babchenko, who was raising funds for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). The Binance cryptocurrency exchange provided a report on the transfers at the request of Russia’s Investigative Committee.

Belenky had lived in Bulgaria since 2015 and held a European Union residence permit but periodically visited Russia. In September 2025, he was detained at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport on the pretext of “petty hooliganism.” Soon afterward, a criminal case was opened against him for assisting terrorist activity.

Belenky was charged with six transfers totaling 742.26 USDT (62,000 rubles, or $770) for the needs of the AFU. Babchenko’s cryptocurrency addresses are public: any user can view the transaction history and current balance. Law enforcement learned of Belenky’s specific transfers from the journalist’s Telegram chat, in which users reported their transfers.

At that time, in October 2025, the Investigative Committee sent Binance a request to provide the transfer history of several users (including Belenky), citing criminal cases opened under a “terrorism” article.

The report that the crypto exchange sent to the Investigative Committee in response contained a detailed history of Belenky’s account. The file included personal data, scans of documents, the history of cryptocurrency transfers, deposits, withdrawals, Binance Pay card transaction data, login history, and a list of trusted devices. Using the report, law enforcement learned of nine more transfers by Belenky to Babchenko’s address, as a result of which the defendant was charged with 15 transfers totaling 1,680.69 USDT (135,000 rubles, or $1,680).

Arkady Babchenko is a Russian journalist and outspoken critic of the Kremlin who left Russia in 2017. He is known for providing critical coverage of Russia’s wars in Chechnya in the 1990s and early 2000s, the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, and Russia’s war against Ukraine. Babchenko has worked for outlets including Novaya Gazeta and Ukraine’s ATR television channel. In 2018, Ukrainian authorities staged Babchenko’s killing in Kyiv as part of an operation that they said was meant to thwart a Russian-backed assassination plot. In July 2020, Rosfinmonitoring added Babchenko to its list of terrorists and extremists, and in April 2023, Russian authorities designated him as a “foreign agent.”

Russia ceded third place to South Africa, which increased shipments by 8% to 52.1 million metric tons. Based on BigMint’s published figures, The Insider calculated that Russian shipments fell by about 9.7 million metric tons from the same period in 2025.

Overall, global trade in non-coking coal declined by 3.2% to 602.5 million metric tons, a drop of about 19.9 million metric tons. That means the decline in Russian exports accounted for roughly 49% of the overall contraction in global trade in the category as tracked by BigMint. Russia’s share of that market fell from about 8.4% to 7.1%.

Indonesia remained the world’s largest exporter despite a 10% decline in shipments that lowered its output to 240.3 million metric tons. Australia ranked second after increasing exports by 2% to 151.2 million metric tons.

Among major suppliers, Mongolia recorded the strongest growth, with exports rising 73% to 24 million metric tons.

The biggest declines in Russian exports were to China and Turkey. Shipments to Turkey fell 32% to 15.7 million metric tons, while exports to China dropped 26% to 15.1 million metric tons.

India was the only major destination in where Russian companies managed to increase sales, rising by 63% to 9.6 million metric tons and surpassing the 7.4 million metric tons Russia shipped to India during all of 2025.

Analysts interviewed by the Kremlin-aligned newspaper Kommersant attributed the decline in Russian exports to weaker demand for power-station coal in Turkey, high fuel inventories in China, and growing competition from Mongolia. Russian suppliers also face additional pressure from the cost of rail transportation, shipping, and vessel insurance. Companies were able to increase sales in India by offering discounts, analysts said, although higher logistics costs could make Russian coal less attractive in that market as well.

BigMint’s figures should not, however, be treated as a measure of Russia’s entire coal export sector. According to data from Kpler, Russian seaborne exports of all types of coal rose 7.25% from January through September, reaching 135.86 million metric tons.

The two estimates cover different product categories and use different methodologies.

Nearly two-thirds of Russian coal companies are unprofitable

The deterioration in Russian exporters’ position comes amid a prolonged crisis in the country’s coal industry. According to official data from Russia’s state statistics agency Rosstat, coal-mining companies posted a combined net loss of 178.2 billion rubles ($2.2 billion) from January through July 2026. Profitable companies earned 45 billion rubles ($556.9 million), while total losses among the rest reached 223.2 billion rubles ($2.8 billion). Overall, 64.5% of companies in the sector were unprofitable.

The situation is particularly severe in Kuzbass, Russia’s largest coal-producing region. According to data from the regional Coal Industry Ministry, 20 of the region’s 93 underground mines and open-pit operations were not operating as of August 2026. Employment in the coal sector fell from 103,000 to 97,300 workers over the course of a year.

Russia’s Energy Ministry, however, says the industry has passed the worst stage of the crisis. Deputy Energy Minister Dmitry Islamov said recently that prices had begun to recover, although the situation remained difficult. The ministry estimates that the industry’s losses for all of 2026 will be as high as 310 billion rubles ($3.8 billion).

As The Insider previously reported, among suppliers to the Chinese market Russia fell from second to third after being displaced by Mongolia. In August, Mongolia exported 9.81 million metric tons of coal to China, compared with Russia’s 9.2 million metric tons.

Experts cited Chinese import duties of 3% to 6% on Russian coal — tariffs from which Russia’s main competitors are exempt — as well as rising transportation costs as being among the reasons for Russia’s declining position.

In June, The Insider also reported on a Green Think Tank study that concluded redirecting exports to China had failed to compensate Russian coal companies for the loss of the European market. The initiative’s researchers estimated that the industry’s combined financial losses during the years of the full-scale war exceeded 2.5 trillion rubles ($30.9 billion). For Russian coal companies, maintaining export volumes has become increasingly dependent on government benefits, tax deferrals, and state support for rail transportation, rather than on actual market mechanisms.

In January–September 2026, Russia recruited 23 times more contract soldiers from Burundi than it did in all of 2025, and the number of recruits from Zimbabwe rose more than eightfold. In total, Russia signed up 1,229 fighters from the two countries over the course of nine months, compared with 95 in 2025.

Another notable source of new recruits is Madagascar, whose military officials have expanded their cooperation with the Kremlin in recent months. Ukrainian intelligence assesses that the campaign is aimed at making up for the Russian army’s losses and personnel shortages.

At the same time, according to Bloomberg, Russia has all but stopped military recruitment in at least nine countries where it faced resistance from local authorities. Instead of army contracts, citizens of those countries have been offered jobs at Russian defense enterprises.

African governments demand an end to recruitment

Authorities in several African countries have previously accused Russian recruitment networks of deceiving their citizens. Men who were offered well-paid civilian jobs, including as drivers, security guards, or cooks, ended up at the front after arriving in Russia. Recruiters also promised potential soldiers large payments and the chance to obtain Russian citizenship.

In February, Kenya’s National Intelligence Service stated that more than 1,000 Kenyans had been recruited into the Russian army, and a month later, Foreign Minister Musalia Mudavadi traveled from Nairobi to Moscow to demand an end to recruitment. Following the talks, the Kenyan government reported that Russian authorities agreed to add Kenya to the list of states whose citizens should no longer be accepted for military service.

Meanwhile, Kenya continues to seek the return of its citizens who are already serving in the Russian army. In early October, Mudavadi told Parliament that the authorities have information about 354 Kenyans who became participants in the war. Of them, 84 are believed to have been killed or have gone missing.

On Oct. 26, Mudavadi again headed to Moscow — this time to take part in the Russia-Africa summit, scheduled for Oct. 28–30. Kenyan authorities have previously said that the problem of recruiting citizens for the war remains one of the issues in bilateral relations.

In Zimbabwe, the authorities have also begun prosecuting alleged recruiters. In March, the government confirmed the deaths of 15 citizens recruited to fight in the war against Ukraine, adding that it was trying to bring back 66 more.

Authorities detained several alleged recruiters, including two Russian citizens. This past May, Russian citizen Sofia Leonova, who is accused of recruiting local residents under the guise of job offers to work as truck drivers in Russia, appeared in court. And in June, Russian citizen Leonid Koftev was detained at Harare airport on the suspicion that his facilitation of a Zimbabwean citizen’s trip to Russia constituted human trafficking.

Ukrainian authorities: more than 5,400 Africans recruited into the Russian army

According to data from Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, approximately 45,900 foreign nationals and residents of unrecognized territories had signed contracts with the Russian army as of Oct. 1, 2026. Among them are 5,400 people from 43 African countries — about 12% of all identified foreign contract soldiers. In the first nine months of 2026, according to Ukrainian data, Russia recruited 16,200 foreigners — more than in all of 2025, when the figure was 16,000.

Russia denies allegations of illegal recruitment of Africans. The Russian embassy in Kenya has previously acknowledged that foreign citizens have the right to voluntarily join Russia’s armed forces, but the Kremlin has rejected claims of a shortage of contract soldiers and a need for a new mass mobilization.

The Insider has previously reported in detail how Russian recruiters use social media and promises of high pay and citizenship to lure Africans into the war. Journalists uncovered recruitment-related websites and Telegram accounts, including contacts leading to entities in Bashkortostan. One advertisement offered foreigners signing bonuses of up to 3.1 million rubles ($38,500) and a monthly salary of 260,000 rubles ($3,200). In another investigation, The Insider established that hundreds of foreign mercenaries passed through an assembly point in the Central Russian city of Saransk.

The report outlined how Sberbank’s role expanded after Vladimir Putin signed Federal Law No. 282-FZ on Aug. 4, allowing Russian companies to settle foreign trade transactions using digital currencies. Kaplan Panesh, deputy chairman of the State Duma’s Budget Committee, said the law allows companies to pay foreign partners while “circumventing sanctions.”

Sberbank, which has been under full U.S. sanctions since 2022, began processing crypto payments of this kind immediately after Putin’s signature brought the law into effect. According to the report, that gave Russia access to state-backed payment channels operating in parallel with the A7 network.

Shelbit, which has companies in Georgia, Poland, and the United Arab Emirates, was sanctioned by the United States in August for transferring funds linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). TRM Labs estimates that $6.3 billion passed through Shelbit-linked wallets, including $318 million connected to A7. In September 2025, the platform transferred $2 million to a wallet that Israel later identified as being part of Hamas’ financial infrastructure. TRM Labs cautioned, however, that while blockchain data can show the path of funds, it does not establish what participants knew about the ultimate destination or purpose of the transactions.

TRM Labs also assessed that TokenSpot serves as a front for Grinex (the successor to the sanctioned Russian crypto exchange Garantex), and that it had transferred around $680 million to A7. The United Kingdom imposed sanctions on TokenSpot on Oct. 8. The United States has not yet done so, and as of Oct. 10, Kyrgyzstan’s financial regulator still listed the exchange as licensed.

The authors separately pointed to Putin’s August law allowing digital-currency settlements in foreign trade, after which Sberbank immediately began facilitating such payments.

The Middle East Forum recommended that the United States sanction TokenSpot and also proposed targeting Russian banks that process cryptocurrency payments for Iranian counterparties. Its authors suggested warning those banks that they could face the same treatment as VTB, which was sanctioned in September over its involvement in payment channels using rubles and Iranian rials.

The report also said the U.S. Treasury should seek to freeze USDT held in wallets linked to A7. According to a report by the Democratic minority in the U.S. Senate, 84% of 846 sanctioned crypto wallets linked to Iran used USDT.

On Oct. 1, the U.S. Treasury Department designated A7 as a transnational criminal organization, while the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) proposed cutting the network’s subagents off from the U.S. financial system.

According to the Treasury Department, more than $17 billion passed through those intermediaries between January 2025 and June 2026. The network was used by Iran’s central bank, the IRGC, and Hamas.

A7 was created in late 2024 by Russia’s Promsvyazbank and fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor.

“Following yesterday’s reports of a Russian-linked tanker in difficulty in the North Atlantic, HM Coastguard has confirmed that assistance was not required.

An RAF aircraft established contact with Myra, which had 21 people aboard. The crew reported that the distress signal had activated as they left an area of large swells. Following assessment, the vessel continued its passage.”

The maritime monitoring project SeaNews said waves in the area where Myra was sailing reached as high as 8.8 meters (nearly 29 feet), while wind gusts reached 70 knots (about 130 kilometers per hour).

According to data from the ship tracking platform Starboard Maritime Intelligence, Myra remained in the North Atlantic west of Ireland as of the evening of Oct. 25. Its declared destination is Port Said, Egypt.

Myra, which is sanctioned by the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Canada, and Ukraine, sent a distress signal from the North Atlantic west of Ireland on Oct. 24.

Maritime monitors said the tanker had departed the Russian port of Ust-Luga and sailed around the northern coast of the UK, bypassing the English Channel.

According to Ukrainian military intelligence, Myra is linked to the shipping network of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, the son of Ali Shamkhani, a former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and an adviser to the country’s supreme leader. The vessel’s records list Fleet Armada Pvt Ltd. as Myra’s owner.

In GISIS, the International Maritime Organization’s shipping information system, Myra’s flag is listed as “Cameroon False,” indicating suspected fraudulent use of the Cameroonian flag. Ukraine’s military intelligence database lists the vessel’s current flag as unknown.

An industry task force under the ministry divided critical data centers into three categories, proposing different security requirements for each:

• K1 — strategic facilities whose damage would disrupt government functions for at least one hour;
• K2 — facilities that support economically or socially important systems at the regional or industry level;
• K3 — corporate data centers whose disruption would primarily affect the company rather than government agencies.

For existing data centers, the recommendations call for reducing their visibility from the air and building layered defenses around them. Strategically important data centers that are still under construction should be placed underground or in bunker-type facilities, and all protective structures should ensure the continued operation of server halls, cooling systems, and power supplies.

The recommendations also call for the creation of a centralized coordination center through which data center operators can communicate with emergency services, law enforcement agencies and the military. Industry representatives interviewed by Kommersant generally described the measures as effective.

Following a recent wave of attacks on data centers, with the latest targeting facilities run by Russia’s Federal Tax Service in the Nizhny Novgorod Region, operators have already begun installing anti-drone netting at their facilities. Implementing the new measures, however, could increase provider service prices by as much as 10%.

The announcement is part of a larger trend. In January, the IWF allowed Russian athletes in the under-23 category to compete internationally under the Russian flag and anthem. In June, the federation lifted all remaining restrictions on athletes from Russia and Belarus. And in July, the International Olympic Committee reinstated the Russian Olympic Committee and recommended that international sports federations lift restrictions on Russian athletes’ participation in competitions.

On Oct. 25, the IWF selected the hosts of four world championships, scheduled to take place between 2028 and 2030. In 2028, the Youth World Weightlifting Championships will be held in Pristina, Kosovo, while the Junior World Championships will take place in Caracas, Venezuela. The Senior World Weightlifting Championships will be held in Ahmedabad, India, in 2029.

The new ring of air defense towers protecting Valdai passes through the Khotilovo airfield, which Putin uses, and covers a secret biological laboratory on Lisiy Island known as the Center for Experimental Physiology. The towers are expected to host Pantsir or Tor air defense systems.

In December 2025, Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed that Ukrainian drones had attempted to attack Putin’s Valdai residence — an allegation Kyiv denied. During a conversation with Donald Trump, Putin personally repeated the story, accusing Ukraine of committing an “act of state terrorism.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed the accusation as false, and The Insider detailed the chronology of the “attack” as part of its Antifake reporting.  

Responding to a question from The Insider on Dec. 30, Zelensky said reports of an attack on the Valdai residence were intended to obstruct the peace process.

Putin’s longtime partner, Alina Kabaeva, and their two sons are reported to live at the Valdai residence.

“Workslop” and copy-pasting instead of meticulous bureaucracy

At first glance, the use of boilerplate language may not seem significant. Council Decision No. 2026/2279 relies on just two standard phrases to justify sanctions against 1,569 individuals and organizations. That marks a clear departure from previous sanctions packages, which generally included a specific explanation for why each newly designated person or entity had been targeted.

Additionally, for the first time, the EU writes the names of all legal entities as literal transliterations from Russian rather than as they appear in Russia’s official register of legal entities. When Russian organizations are registered, the database typically includes both their full and abbreviated Russian names as well as the English-language name chosen by the organization itself. Some companies use a transliteration in that field, while others provide an actual translation.

In the latest sanctions document, however, company names appear to have been transliterated mechanically and with little quality control. Capitalization was omitted throughout. While similar formatting errors had appeared occasionally in earlier EU sanctions lists, in the latest package nearly every legal entity contains the same type of error.

The transliteration itself is also inconsistent. Different systems appear to have been used for different entries. In most cases, the latest package appears to rely not on a standard transliteration system for Cyrillic but on output generated by the Python library transliterate, with apostrophes subsequently removed. Names of individuals, meanwhile, were generally rendered using the British-American BGN/PCGN system, though not consistently and sometimes with further modifications.

The document is also inconsistent in deciding when to translate Russian names, when to transliterate them, and when to do both at once. One example is the address of Neva-Ferrit LLC. The original address — “198320, St. Petersburg, Krasnoe Selo, Svobody St., 50” — was rendered as “98320, city Sankt-Peterburg, city Krasnoe village, ul. Svobody, bld.50.”

The result mixes translation and transliteration in a way that makes little sense. The place name “Krasnoe Selo,” which should normally remain a proper name, was partially translated into English as “Krasnoe village,” while the street name “Svobody” was left transliterated rather than rendered as “Freedom Street” or “Street of Freedom.”

One possible explanation is that large language models were used to generate parts of the document. That could also account for the apparent use of a Python transliteration library — when asked to automate a task of this kind, an AI system may generate a script, and such a script would likely rely on an existing software library.

If a Python library was in fact used to transliterate company names, that would explain some of the unusual spellings. It would not, however, explain instances in which Latin and Cyrillic characters appear within the same word, such as in the name of the Kalinovsky Chemical Plant: «Акcionерное общество калиновский химический завод».

Similar errors have appeared in earlier sanctions documents, but those usually involved letters that look identical in the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets — such as A, B, T and E. In those cases, the mistake was invisible to the eye but detectable by software and most likely resulted from a person typing without switching the keyboard layout.

The latest document is different. The mixing of alphabets within a single word is more consistent with errors that occur in text generated by neural networks, especially when a task requires several languages to be handled at once.

Another example is the English-language address given for CJSC Tehkrim: “Address: 426063, Udmurtskaya Republic of …” A human translator or conventional machine-translation system would be unlikely to produce that wording, as the standard English form is “Udmurt Republic.”

While a human translator would be unlikely to translate the phrase with such an awkward rendering, a large language model, which does not translate strictly word for word but predicts the most likely sequence of words, certainly could. Because many Russian regions are rendered in English using the construction “Republic of …,” a model could plausibly predict that “of” should follow the name of a Russian republic even where that order is incorrect.

The careless transliteration appears to have affected website addresses as well. For example, the website listed for LLC NPO AMB — rendered by EU sanctions officials as “Obschestvo s ogranichennoj otvetstvennostju Nauchno-proizvodstvennoe obedinenie amb” — became https://www.licenzia-gos.rf. The problem is obvious: the top-level domain “.rf” does not exist. Nor does the listed website exist in that form, or even in the corresponding Cyrillic version, лицензия-гос.рф.

Factories of days gone by

A telling example of an anachronism on the list involves the imposition of sanctions on the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Novosibirsk Experimental Plant of Measuring Instruments” (TIN / INN 5425100089) and its director, Aleksey Timofeevich Morozov (designation no. 2549, TIN / INN 542505153869). However, this legal entity no longer exists, as it was reorganised in 2021 through a merger with the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “National Testing Association ‘State Ammunition Testing Ranges of Russia’” (TIN / INN 5023002050). That organisation was also subject to sanctions, but its CEO, Stanislav Gennadievich Yuzov, was not included on the EU sanctions list.

It is possible to see how such an error arose. Many companies appear to have been added to the list on the following basis:

“The entities concerned appear in a list recently established by the Government of the Russian Federation that identifies them as belonging to the Russian military-industrial complex, and they are therefore entitled to receive subsidies from the Government of the Russian Federation.”

That suggests an AI model or Python script may have been given a source list that, while broadly reflecting the composition of Russia’s military-industrial complex, was not fully up to date. The resulting entries appear not to have been adequately checked by experts.

More importantly, even an up-to-date list would have limited value as a sanctions tool. Companies in Russia’s defense sector generally do not make foreign purchases directly, meaning sanctions against them may have little practical effect on procurement. Instead, separate intermediary firms typically acquire goods on their behalf — a practice The Insider has documented repeatedly, as have other researchers who study Russian military-industrial procurement.

Even a cursory reading of the latest EU package reveals at least 25 discrepancies in the names and legal forms of the organizations on the list, and numerous errors occur when it comes to naming the positions held by individuals coming under restrictions. In some cases, parts of company names are missing, and in most cases, the legal form is incorrectly stated.

For example, Nikolay Nikolaevich Grechushkin (designation no. 2224) was sanctioned as the CEO of Textile Trading Company LLC (TIN / INN 9701054138). However, that position is actually held by Anatoly Mikhailovich Trubin. At the same time, the list correctly lists Trubin’s INN as 592003498702. Grechushkin, for his part, serves as deputy CEO of the company, and his TIN is 253303297804.

Evgeniya Vladimirovna Kovalenko (TIN / INN 525714947515), is listed as the director of JSC “Himreaktiv.” However, the CEO of this company is actually Vladimir Nikolaevich Lyamkin, who holds TIN 525702072428.

OJSC “Radiodetal,” with TIN 1308038496, also appears on the sanctions list. This organization has a different legal entity and a different name — PJSC “Zubovo-Polyansky Radio Component Plant” — which again indicates that the data used is outdated.

The list also includes the “Federal State Institution Federal Scientific Center Research Institute for Systems Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences” (original spelling retained) with TIN 7727086772. This is also an anachronism. This institute was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Russian Academy of Sciences to the Kurchatov Institute Research Center on Feb. 7, 2023, by Decree No. 268-r of the Government of the Russian Federation. Its current name is “Federal State Autonomous Institution ‘Federal Scientific Center Research Institute for Systems Studies of the National Research Center “Kurchatov Institute”’.”

Sanctioning everyone with the same name — and missing the mark

As previously noted by investigative journalist Sergei Ezhov, EU officials failed to specify the  patronymic, date of birth, or taxpayer identification number of Promsvyazbank CEO Mikhail Dorofeev when imposing sanctions against him, thereby creating risks for all people named “Mikhail Dorofeev” worldwide. When compiling the new list, the European Commission expanded this practice: in fact, in the case of the 743 individuals on the current sanctions list, none are supplemented with a date of birth or passport number. However, tax identification numbers (TINs) — rarely used in previous sanctions designations — are provided.

The absence of birth dates and passport numbers significantly increases the risk of false matches or missed matches during automated sanctions screening. When processing a Schengen or other visa application, consular officials typically verify an applicant’s passport information and date of birth, but not a Russian taxpayer identification number. After all, if a person is not publicly linked to a Russian company as a founder or director, authorities may have no reliable way to match a TIN to that individual using open-source records, as such information is not generally public. (The same problem can arise in bank compliance checks, which typically rely on a person’s full name and transliterations, date of birth, passport details, address, job title and employer — but not a Russian TIN.)

The Insider has already seen the consequences of this approach: one of our employees was temporarily unable to receive their salary simply due to the fact that they share a surname with a person added to the latest sanctions list, prompting the bank to freeze the payment.

Previously, journalists had repeatedly pointed out factual errors made by European officials when compiling sanctions lists. For example, the EU imposed sanctions on comedian Mikhail Galustyan by using his stage name (the artist’s official name is Nshan). An error was also made regarding his date of birth: Galustyan was born in 1979, not in 1970, as stated in the EU Council’s implementing regulation. These errors have not been corrected a year and a half after the document was published.

These oversights may seem minor, but they can have serious legal consequences for EU authorities. In May 2025, for example, an EU court lifted sanctions against Andrei Kharkovsky, described as a “representative of the Cossack Union,” after Brussels failed to establish his connection to the organization. The sanctions listing did not include his date of birth or other identifying information sufficient to distinguish him unambiguously.

Documents such as the October package are examples of “Potemkin sanctions.” They create the appearance of intense activity, and the sheer scale of the lists might impress an outside observer. In reality, however, the latest package completely ignores the Chinese manufacturers and banks that continue to supply Putin’s war machine.

The elephant in the room: Brussels ignores China

Investigations by The Insider and other publications have repeatedly pointed to China’s leading role in the supply of critical goods to Russia. It is Chinese manufacturers and their affiliated Chinese banks — not intermediary exporters or importers — that represent the potential bottlenecks in Russian factories’ supply chains.

The Insider has identified several bottlenecks in a series of investigations related to long-range unmanned systems, such as the Geran attack drone and the Gerbera decoy drone, as well as the mass production of first-person-view (FPV) drones. Both are absolutely critical to the Russian war machine. About 70% of combat losses result from the use of FPV drones, while civilians and civilian infrastructure suffer the most from Geran drones.

Not a single Chinese company — neither manufacturers nor resellers — was included among the hundreds of companies listed in the latest round of EU sanctions. Given the documented role that Chinese products play in the Russian military-industrial complex, the absence of Chinese entities suggests that Brussels lacks the political will to address the driving force sustaining the Russian war machine: imports from Chinese suppliers.

Washington, however, placed fertilizer on a list of goods exempt from sanctions as early as March 2022.

Josh Linville, Vice President of Fertilizer at U.S. financial services company StoneX, told The Insider that Russian fertilizer shipments to the United States never stopped even after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine — and in the case of nitrogen fertilizers, deliveries actually increased substantially:

“Since 2022, Russia’s share of U.S. urea imports has jumped from 21.5% to 40.7%, rising from 1.07 million metric tons to 2.2 million metric tons. Over the same period, Russia’s share of UAN [urea-ammonium nitrate] imports increased from 42% (1.12 million metric tons), to 57.2% (1.37 million metric tons).”

According to data Linville provided to The Insider, Russia’s share of U.S. potash fertilizer imports declined over the same period, though it was relatively small to begin with. Russia accounted for 10.35% of all U.S. potash imports in FY 2021, or 1.48 million metric tons. By FY 2026, its share had fallen to 7.12%, or 980,000 metric tons.

Linville said Putin’s statement appeared to be politically motivated.

“Assuming there are no major changes in global fertilizer markets, it is possible that Russian flows could increase. Russia is the world’s largest urea exporter, with 8.2 million tons exported in 2025.

However, they have had little issue in finding homes for those tons. Even without the U.S., they have plenty of friendly destinations to sell to. Recent flow volumes are ‘market right’ and any increase would likely take outside forces.

For UAN, Russia only exported 1.8 million tons in 2025, which means the U.S. represented 69% of their overall export destinations. [Russia’s] UAN production and export has fallen in recent years due to a lack of destinations.

Australia, Canada, and large parts of Europe have all blocked trade with Russia. That means the U.S. is one of the last major destinations remaining for Russia. If they could send more here, they would have already been doing so, but they have slowed in favor of urea.

I think it’s just politics, plain and simple. The market is already bringing Russian tons in a way that is seen as ‘market normal.’ Any increase would take a heavier hand from on high in order to improve government relations.”

The UK coast guard is coordinating assistance to the vessel, which maritime monitors say departed the Russian port of Ust-Luga and sailed around the northern coast of the United Kingdom, bypassing the English Channel.

According to Ukrainian military intelligence, the tanker is linked to the shipping network of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, the son of Ali Shamkhani, a former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and an adviser to the country’s supreme leader.

A distress signal and a storm in the Atlantic

Maritime monitoring project SeaNews reported that the distress signal was transmitted through the Inmarsat-C satellite system at 12:38 p.m. UTC, or 3:38 p.m. Moscow time.

The tanker was at 56°18′ north latitude and 15°25′ west longitude. The British coast guard asked nearby vessels to contact authorities if they were able to provide assistance. According to SeaNews, the tanker continued moving at about 9 knots, roughly 17 kilometers per hour, despite extreme weather conditions.

Waves in the area reached 8.8 meters, while wind gusts reached 70 knots (about 130 kilometers per hour). The vessel was approximately 188 nautical miles from the coast.

The Insider reviewed Myra’s route and weather conditions in the area using the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship tracking system. According to the platform, the tanker traveled from the Baltic Sea through the North Sea, rounded the northern tip of the United Kingdom and entered the Atlantic Ocean without passing through the English Channel.

It is unclear whether the route was chosen in an effort to avoid scrutiny by European countries. Many tankers belonging to Russia’s “shadow fleet” use the same route (1, 2).

Starboard’s weather map showed the ship near a broad area of strong winds in the North Atlantic. A pronounced cyclonic circulation was visible farther west. According to the platform, at 4:20 p.m. on Oct. 24, wind speed in the tanker’s immediate area was 45.6 kilometers per hour, blowing from the southwest. That corresponds to Force 6 on the Beaufort scale, classified as a strong breeze.

Starboard’s reading was lower than SeaNews’ report of gusts reaching 130 kilometers per hour. The figures are not necessarily contradictory: Starboard may have been showing sustained wind speeds, while SeaNews reported maximum gusts. The readings may also have been taken at different times.

The reason for the distress signal remains unknown. There is also no confirmed information about possible damage to the tanker, the condition of its crew, the nature of its cargo, or any possible leak of petroleum products.

Suspected false flag and sanctions from six jurisdictions

Myra is a 228-meter oil products tanker built in 2006. It has a deadweight capacity of 74,999 metric tons and a gross tonnage of 41,021.

According to the vessel’s records, its registered owner is Fleet Armada Pvt Ltd.

In GISIS, the International Maritime Organization’s shipping information system, its flag is listed as “Cameroon False,” indicating suspected fraudulent use of the Cameroonian flag. In the Ukrainian intelligence database, the vessel’s current flag is listed as unknown.

According to the War & Sanctions database maintained by Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (HUR), Myra has been used to export Russian oil and petroleum products to third countries while the G7 and EU oil embargoes and the price cap on Russian crude were in effect.

The tanker is under sanctions from six jurisdictions. The United States sanctioned it on July 30, 2025, followed by the European Union on Oct. 24, 2025, and Switzerland and Ukraine on Dec. 13, 2025. The United Kingdom added the vessel to its sanctions list on Feb. 24, 2026, and Canada followed on March 25.

According to HUR, Myra has repeatedly called at the Russian ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk and has also visited ports in Turkey, Brazil, Senegal, Estonia, and Denmark.

Ukrainian intelligence has also recorded instances in which the vessel switched off its Automatic Identification System (AIS) which allows ships’ positions and movements to be tracked.

Links to the shipping empire of an Iranian official’s son

Ukrainian intelligence links Myra to Fractal Marine DMCC, a company registered in the United Arab Emirates.

According to HUR, in early 2023 the company was one of the three largest international operators transporting Russian oil and petroleum products, alongside Radiating World Shipping Services and Gatik Ship Management. Britain sanctioned Fractal Marine DMCC in February 2024 for activity in Russia’s energy sector.

Ukrainian intelligence says the company operated a fleet of 28 tankers, acting as an intermediary between shipowners and charterers. After sanctions were imposed, management of the vessels was transferred to other affiliated entities.

HUR says Myra is part of a shipping network controlled by Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, the son of Ali Shamkhani, a former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader. 

According to Ukrainian intelligence, the younger Shamkhani controls an extensive network of tankers, shipping operators and shell companies used to transport Russian and Iranian oil, including to buyers in China. HUR says the network generates billions of dollars in revenue from oil trading and takes steps to conceal its links to Russia, Iran, and the Shamkhani family.

Among the companies Ukrainian intelligence links to Myra are BPT Shipping Co LLC, Fractal Marine DMCC, Wanta Shipping LLC-FZ, and The Zulu Ships Management and Operation — Sole Proprietorship LLC. All are registered in the United Arab Emirates.

Despite the sanctions against Myra, the British coast guard is coordinating the response to the tanker’s distress signal. International maritime search-and-rescue rules require assistance to people in danger at sea regardless of a vessel’s sanctions status.

According to data from ship tracking platform Starboard Maritime Intelligence reviewed by The Insider, Agioi Fanendes (IMO 9798375) left the Russian port of Primorsk at 10:58 p.m. GMT on Oct. 22. As of the morning of Oct. 23, the vessel was in the Gulf of Finland between the Finnish and Estonian coasts, traveling west at about 12 knots per hour (23 kilometers per hour). The crew listed New York as its destination, with an estimated arrival date of Nov. 7.

Starboard Maritime Intelligence data showed that after leaving Primorsk, the tanker’s reported draft increased from 7.8 meters to 11 meters, consistent with the vessel having taken on cargo. Agioi Fanendes is 183 meters long and 32 meters wide. Its registered owner is Maltatankers Shipping Ltd., and its operator is Greece-based Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. The tanker is carrying ultra-low-sulfur diesel.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, the United States banned imports of Russian energy products, including refined petroleum products. However, on Oct. 9, Trump announced an agreement with Putin under which Russia would supply 4.8 million metric tons of diesel to the U.S. and global markets.

Under the announced plan, Russia was to export the first 300,000 metric tons in October and another 500,000 metric tons in November, to be followed by larger volumes at later stages. The current 40,000-ton shipment amounts to about 13% of the volume initially promised for October.

The open-source intelligence project TankerTrackers later reported that it had identified three tankers carrying Russian diesel to the United States. According to the project, all three vessels loaded at Russian fuel terminals and openly listed U.S. ports as their destinations.

On the same day Trump announced the agreement, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License No. 135, authorizing transactions involving the sale, delivery, unloading, and import of Russian diesel, including direct imports into the United States. The authorization is valid through April 7, 2027. In response, Russian authorities lifted restrictions on diesel exports ahead of schedule. The restrictions had been introduced due to domestic fuel shortages following Ukraine’s sustained campaign of strikes on Russian oil refineries.

Speculation regarding Trump’s motivation for striking the deal has focused on the idea that he is hoping Russian supplies will help reduce domestic diesel prices, thereby providing his Republican party with a popularity boost ahead of the upcoming midterm elections. The first tanker, however, is not expected to reach the U.S. coast until after voting concludes on Nov. 3, and the physical arrival of a cargo does not necessarily coincide with the timing of its effect on futures or wholesale market prices.

As previously reported by Reuters, Russian fuel began returning to other traditional markets after the restrictions were lifted. Tankers leaving Primorsk headed to Turkey and Brazil, and deliveries to Morocco also resumed. Overall Russian diesel exports since the start of 2026, however, have fallen 41% year-on-year — to an average of 345,000 barrels a day.

Sanctions expert George Voloshin previously told The Insider that Russia could realistically meet its initial commitments to export 300,000 to 500,000 metric tons, but that increasing deliveries to between 1 million and 3 million metric tons a month was more doubtful. He said Russian oil companies would have to restore damaged refinery capacity and increase exports at the expense of rebuilding strategic fuel reserves at home.

The Trump-Putin agreement has drawn criticism from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and U.S. lawmakers. Zelensky called Washington’s decision “weak,” while a group of Democratic senators described it as a betrayal of Ukraine  and a threat to U.S. national security. They argued that renewed U.S. purchases of Russian energy products would provide Moscow with additional revenue to continue its war.

In an Oct. 22 letter, FSIN said Kynev’s conditions of detention complied with Russian law and that it had found no threats to his life or health. The agency also said it had found no violations of Kynev’s rights or treatment degrading to his human dignity. The published response, however, says nothing about the circumstances of Kynev’s arrest, during which he says he suffered his injuries.

The FSIN review concerned Kynev’s detention at Moscow’s Pretrial Detention Center No. 1 (SIZO-1), known as Matrosskaya Tishina, even though he had already been transferred on Oct. 14 to another facility, Pretrial Detention Center No. 4 (SIZO-4), known as Medved (lit. “The Bear”). As The Insider previously reported, Kynev was placed in the prison hospital at Matrosskaya Tishina after his detention with two fractures of the tibia.

A source for Slovo Zashchite in the FSIN medical service said the injuries were the result of torture. Kynev’s leg was put in a cast, and his condition was assessed as moderately serious. At the time, it was already reported that the Moscow branch of FSIN had opened an internal review.

On Oct. 22, Kynev told the Moscow City Court personally that he had been injured during his arrest. He said the officers did not identify themselves and that the force they used caused a serious double fracture of his right leg, along with multiple bruises.

Kynev said that he remembered little of what happened after officers forced him to the floor. He also complained that he was not receiving necessary medical care and was having difficulty moving around the detention center.

A medical discharge summary reviewed by the court showed that Kynev was treated in a surgical ward from Sept. 25 through Oct. 8 for a closed fracture. He was discharged in satisfactory condition with a note saying he was able to move with the support of a cane. His lawyers, however, warned that without the necessary medical treatment, he risked being left permanently disabled.

Lawyer Mikhail Biryukov had previously said that materials concerning bodily injuries allegedly inflicted on Kynev during his arrest by unidentified people had been separated into a distinct proceeding. The FSIN response does not indicate what decision was made regarding those materials or whether investigators directly examined the actions of the officers who carried out Kynev’s arrest.

Alexander Kynev was detained on Sept. 25, 2026. Moscow’s Perovo District Court ordered him held in pretrial detention the same day on charges of attempted large-scale drug trafficking. He denies the accusation.

On Oct. 22, the Moscow City Court rejected appeals filed by Kynev’s lawyers and ordered him to remain in custody through Nov. 24 despite his health condition.

Alexander Kynev holds a doctorate-equivalent degree in political science and is an expert on Russian elections and regional politics. He previously taught at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He has monitored regional and federal election campaigns, including Russia’s recent State Duma elections in September 2026.

In February, Russia’s Justice Ministry added Kynev to the register of so-called “foreign agents.”

The Nobel Peace Prize-winning human rights organization Memorial has recognized Kynev as a political prisoner.

Russia’s September 2026 State Duma elections ended with a landslide official victory for the ruling United Russia party, which retained a constitutional majority. Independent monitors and statistical analysts, however, reported widespread irregularities, including ballot stuffing, inflation of turnout, voter coercion, and manipulation of vote counts, with reliable estimates putting United Russia’s actual support at around 34% — rather than the official 57.8% declared by the Central Election Commission.

The European Parliament subsequently declared the September vote illegitimate and undemocratic and refused to recognize the newly elected State Duma as Russia’s legitimate legislative body. The resolution passed by 482 votes to 41, with 39 abstentions. Many of the MEPs that voted against it, such as Slovak politician Luboš Blaha, German MEP Petr Bystron, and Czech MEP Ondřej Dostál, have documented ties to Russia and have traveled to Moscow since the start of the full-scale invasion to meet with Kremlin officials.

The diplomats, whose names have not been disclosed, are suspected of espionage.

Three of them are known to have worked at the Russian embassy in Vienna, and the fourth worked at Russia’s mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the Austrian capital.

Profil cites data from the RuPEP database of public figures, which the independent outlet Agentstvo analyzed this past August to determine that at least 20 of the 117 officially listed employees of Russian diplomatic missions in Austria had ties to Moscow’s intelligence services — the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), and the Federal Security Service (FSB). Of the 22 employees of the Russian mission to the OSCE, seven were found to have likely ties to Moscow’s intelligence services.

The Austrian newspaper notes that the competent authorities have since been studying the list in detail, but they needed more specific and legally significant information to justify expulsion, delaying the process.

Vienna remains one of the most important centers of Russian intelligence activity in Europe. In May 2026, Austria expelled three Russian diplomats, accusing them of gathering intelligence. The authorities did not disclose their names in that case either.

At around 10 a.m. local time, the coast guard received a report of a fire on the vessel, which was located approximately 13 nautical miles (roughly 24 km) from the port of Constanța.

The Starboard Maritime Intelligence service map shows several rescue vessels heading toward the ship at the time of the distress signal. 

The cargo ship had 13 people on board when the fire broke out. Nine were picked up by another commercial vessel that was in the vicinity (apparently the Norwegian SARTOR). One person was killed, and three are still listed as missing.

The KHORYV was sailing from the Turkish port of Ereğli, also on the Black Sea. Its destination was listed as the Romanian port of Sulina at the mouth of the Danube — the main shipping route that connects the Black Sea with Ukrainian ports on the river. At the end of September, KHORYV had already traveled this route to reach the port of Galați, one of the most important shipment points for exporting Ukrainian grain.  

Romanian President Nicușor Dan writes that the vessel was hit by a drone and calls the incident “an example of the tragic consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.”

In recent weeks, at least six civilian vessels have been attacked off the coast of Romania and neighboring Bulgaria. Against this backdrop, Romania proposed creating a joint command for Black Sea NATO countries to defend against drones. This week, NATO spokesperson Allison Hart said that the alliance will strengthen its grouping of maritime patrol aircraft and drones in the region.

The incident occurred at approximately 7 p.m. local time on Oct. 22. Videos posted online show a small flame beneath one of the aircraft’s wings.

Some aviation bloggers suggested that the aircraft’s auxiliary power unit may have caught fire.

Local broadcaster NHK reported that the fire was quickly extinguished and that the runway was closed for only about 15 minutes. Authorities are investigating the cause of the incident. No injuries have been reported.

In August, a drone carrying explosives was found near a Ukrainian cargo plane at Leipzig/Halle Airport in Germany. One of the An-124 aircraft was believed to have been the intended target. German authorities believe Russia was behind that incident.

The homepage of ibi.institute began featuring a piece titled “The Boxer Sovereignty Index, 2026 Edition.” Illustrations showed a man with Gambashidze’s face modeling underwear against backdrops of European cities, in a library, and in front of a classroom blackboard.

The International Burke Institute itself was renamed the “Ilya Boxer Institute,” preserving the initials IBI.

From a sovereignty index to a boxer-shorts index

Those behind the changes did more than simply replace photographs. They turned the website into a parody underwear catalog while preserving the pseudo-academic tone of the original institute. Instead of assessing the sovereignty of countries, the IBI now analyzes different types of boxer shorts using the language of policy reports, diplomacy, and official documents. Each model comes with descriptions of its fabric, sizing charts, care instructions, shipping information, and return conditions.

One model, “The Index,” is presented as the benchmark against which the institute intends to compare all others. Its description says the “waistband keeps the garment in place rather than starting a discussion.” Customers are also advised not to use bleach, with the clarification: “The Institute has nothing further to say about bleach.”

“The Field Standard” is described as the control sample used for testing. Its creators say the underwear was deliberately designed without decoration so as not to influence comparison results. Its specifications list 100% cotton, manufacturing in Portugal, and a 35 mm waistband.

Another model, “The Quorum,” is intended for meetings: “The Quorum does not hold a vote. It waits until those present reach agreement,” the description says. The authors add that the institute does not claim the underwear improves decision-making and clarifies that some decisions are simply better made after everyone has left the table.

“The Backchannel” is advertised as close-fitting underwear for travel, long meetings, and situations requiring confidentiality. The description stresses that the underwear has no conspicuous logos or other attention-grabbing details. “Discretion is a form of precision,” the authors explain. The model, they say, is designed not for the beach but for a work schedule.

The range also includes “The Reading Room,” a pair of lounge pants intended for reading and rereading documents: “The Institute has observed that important proposals are usually read twice, while trousers are rarely designed with a second reading in mind.” Customers are advised to empty their pockets before washing. The institute disclaims responsibility for any receipts discovered inside.

Another model, “The Protocol,” is intended for closed-door events and informal meetings. Its description says the underwear should be put on after the tie has come off and there is no longer an audience in the room. “The Institute recommends ‘The Protocol’ for events that end without photographs,” the authors say. The model is also intended “for the transition between a long evening and a short night.”

At the bottom of the page is an advertisement showing Gambashidze seated in a leather armchair with a book. In front of him are three packages of boxer shorts bearing the IBI logo. The slogan reads: “A brief study in relaxation. Make yourself comfortable.”

“Rotten Reliable News”: A reference to the Kremlin-linked RRN network

Every post ends with the signature: “With love, made by RRN.world — Rotten Reliable News.” This is clearly a joke aimed at the Kremlin-linked disinformation operation.

Recent Reliable News, or RRN, is a pro-Kremlin propaganda outlet associated with the Doppelgänger campaign. The network used the rrn.world domain to distribute material promoting narratives favorable to the Kremlin.

How the Kremlin created pseudo-expert centers in Israel

On Oct. 22, The Insider published an investigation into the activities of a Kremlin-linked disinformation operation in Israel — including the creation of the ”International Burke Institute,” which was formally registered as a nonprofit organization in Israel in July 2025.

Internal documents from the Russian Presidential Administration’s Social Design Agency (SDA), reviewed by The Insider showed, that Russian political consultants planned to create organizations abroad that would present themselves as independent research centers, using them to spread narratives favorable to the Kremlin.

The institute also falsely listed the United Nations, UNICEF, UNESCO, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the World Bank as partners. All of those organizations told The Insider they had never worked with IBI.

In August 2026, OpenAI reported that material published by the institute had been created using ChatGPT by operators in Russia. The company blocked accounts linked to the activity.

The Insider identified links between IBI leadership and other organizations that promoted pro-Russian narratives, as well as ties to political activists, rabbis and members of the Knesset.

However, the participation of those politicians and public figures in events with the organizations does not by itself mean they knew of any connection to a Kremlin-linked disinformation campaign.

Ilya Gambashidze heads the Social Design Agency.

His work has been linked to the Doppelgänger campaign, whose operators create fake versions of well-known media websites and circulate fabricated stories disguised as legitimate news.

Three lower courts had previously ordered Yermakov to return the girl, whom he took to Russia without her mother’s consent.

French lawyer Ilona Shipkov of the law firm Villard Cornec & Associé told The Insider that rulings of this kind could serve to encourage further acts of international parental child abduction.

The girl’s mother, Veronika Tishkova, is a Ukrainian citizen. After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, she moved to France with her daughter.

Tishkova’s former husband, Alexei Yermakov, agreed in 2024 that the girl could live in France. He later asked for permission to take the child on vacation to Turkey and Slovakia, promising to return her. Instead, he took her to Russia.

Tishkova went to court in Russia and won an order for the child’s return. The ruling was upheld on appeal and by a cassation court.

The Supreme Court, however, overturned those decisions, saying the girl had acquired Russian citizenship, had become accustomed to life in Russia, and that France was on Russia’s list of “unfriendly states.”

The mother appealed. Her complaint is now being reviewed by the Presidium of the Supreme Court.

How abducting a child can become an advantage for a parent

Shipkov said one of the main problems in Russian court practice is that judges often assess a child’s living conditions after the removal has already taken place — including assessments of housing, school, family surroundings, and attachment to the parent with whom the child is living. As a result, a parent who unlawfully removes a child can gain an advantage in court based on a situation they created themselves — while court proceedings continue, the child becomes accustomed to the new country, and that adaptation can later be used as an argument against returning the child.

“This creates a situation in which the unlawful removal of a child risks becoming a way to gain an advantage in a dispute between parents,” Shipkov told The Insider.

That is precisely the risk the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is meant to prevent. The treaty establishes a mechanism for the prompt return of children who have been wrongfully removed from or retained outside the country of their habitual residence. Russia joined the convention in 2011.

Shipkov stressed that a court in the country to which a child has been taken is not supposed to decide which parent would be better for the child to live with. Instead, its task is to determine whether the removal was unlawful and whether any of the limited exceptions under the convention apply. Under the convention, the dispute over custody and parental rights should be decided by the competent court in the child’s country of habitual residence.

For example, a return may be refused if it would expose the child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm, if the other parent agreed to the removal, or if a sufficiently mature child independently objects to returning. Shipkov said those exceptions must be applied narrowly, however, or else the return mechanism loses its purpose.

Russian courts pointed to children’s citizenship and adaptation even before the full-scale war

Shipkov said the Supreme Court’s current ruling does not constitute an entirely new practice. In 2019, the St. Petersburg City Court refused a father’s request to return a child whom the mother had taken from France to Russia. Among the court’s arguments were the child’s Russian citizenship, the absence of any ban on entering Russia, and the absence of an earlier court ruling determining where the child should live.

The court also cited the child’s adaptation to life in Russia and what it called the “inadmissibility of separating a young child from the mother.” Shipkov said, however, that a Russian citizen’s right to enter Russia and the lawfulness of a child’s removal under the Hague Convention are entirely different questions.

“A child can cross the border legally and still be wrongfully removed within the meaning of the convention if the other parent’s custody rights were violated,” she explained, adding that Russian courts sometimes approach such disputes primarily through the lens of Russian family law, even though the Hague Convention requires courts to consider the child’s habitual residence before the removal and the custody rights that existed there.

A Russian prosecutor cited France’s “unfriendly” status and lack of direct flights

Political arguments in such cases also appeared long before the Supreme Court’s latest ruling. In 2022, a court in Chelyabinsk heard a case involving the return of children to France. Shipkov’s law firm represented their French father.

The mother, who was keeping the children in Russia, argued that returning them to France given the political situation could negatively affect their psychological well-being. The prosecutor also cited strained relations between Russia and France, possible difficulties protecting Russian citizens abroad, and the lack of direct air service between the two countries.

Shipkov said arguments like these show how a dispute over returning a child can turn into an assessment of political relations between states rather than an examination of the circumstances of the child’s removal. The Hague Convention, however, does not allow a court to refuse a child’s return simply because the country of habitual residence has been designated “unfriendly.”

“From the standpoint of the 1980 Hague Convention, France’s designation as an ‘unfriendly state’ cannot in itself serve as a legal basis for refusing to return a child.”

She noted that France was already a member of NATO and the European Union when Russia joined the convention, and that those facts were known to both countries before the convention began applying between them. A court may assess specific risks to the child, Shipkov said, but those risks must be established and substantiated rather than automatically inferred from political relations between governments.

In Belarus, a father kept one child and separated siblings

Shipkov also cited a recent case in Belarus, where her firm also handles international child abduction cases. In September 2026, a dispute there involved two children with French and Belarusian citizenship.

Both had been living permanently in France and attending school there. The father, however, unlawfully retained one of the children in Belarus, while the other remained with their mother in France. Despite lengthy court proceedings, the mother was unable to secure the child’s return.

According to Shipkov, the Belarusian court considered, among other things, the child’s citizenship and alleged risks associated with returning to France. The lawyer said cases like these illustrate the danger of replacing the Hague Convention’s criteria with arguments about citizenship, political conditions, or whether life in one country is supposedly preferable to life in another.

Shipkov also said she fears that the use of political arguments could spread to other categories of civil and family disputes.

“I think the risk of this logic spreading to other cases is quite real. Moreover, political considerations had already appeared in child-return proceedings long before the Russian Supreme Court’s current ruling.”

Cybersecurity researchers at ESET found that two hacking groups linked to Russian interests were behind the attack. They included Sandworm, which Western intelligence agencies have identified as a unit of Russia’s GRU military intelligence service.

The breach began on July 16, 2025. According to ESET, initial access was obtained by the group UAC-0099, which sent an employee a phishing email containing a malicious attachment.

After the file was opened, a loader called MATCHBOIL and a remote-access tool called MATCHWOK were installed on the computer. The next day, July 17, the hackers deployed another program that had not previously been known to cybersecurity researchers.

The researchers named the new malware “MythicRatatoskr.” It allowed the attackers to execute commands on infected computers, browse files, take screenshots, transfer documents, and redirect network connections.

Unlike conventional malware that communicates with servers using publicly accessible internet addresses, MythicRatatoskr connected to its command-and-control server inside Yggdrasil, an experimental decentralized network in which devices exchange encrypted data without a central coordinating authority.

The setup makes it more difficult to identify a command-and-control server and disrupt the attackers’ infrastructure. ESET said this was the first case it had documented of a state-linked hacking group using Yggdrasil in this way.

Yggdrasil itself, however, is not designed to provide anonymity, as its developers note. Even so, researchers had difficulty determining the server’s physical location.

On Sept. 17, 2025, two months after the initial intrusion, the hackers destroyed data on the company’s systems using the SDelete utility, launched through a mechanism that allows commands to be executed centrally across computers on a corporate network. ESET attributed this part of the operation to Sandworm with high confidence.

Researchers also said with high confidence that UAC-0099 had handed the compromised access over to Sandworm. They were unable, however, to determine which of the two groups operated MythicRatatoskr. The name of the affected company and the extent of the damage have not been disclosed.

ESET had already reported attacks by Sandworm against Ukraine’s grain sector in November 2025. At the time, the company said the group had deployed data-wiping malware against Ukrainian government organizations, energy and logistics companies, and businesses in the grain industry. Researchers said those operations appeared to be intended to weaken the Ukrainian economy.

Sandworm has been linked to Military Unit 74455 of Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate, better known as the GRU. In 2020, the U.S. Justice Department charged six officers from the unit over a range of cyber operations, including the development of the NotPetya malware, attacks on Ukraine’s power grid, and attacks targeting computer systems used by the 2018 Winter Olympics.

The Insider subsequently identified additional information about members of the hacking group and confirmed that several of those charged were connected to Military Unit 74455.

In May 2026, in an investigation into the training of GRU hackers at Bauman Moscow State Technical University, The Insider identified two more graduates of the university’s military training center who had served in Military Unit 74455: Alexei Kondrashov and Ilya Boikov.

Elections 2.0

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah party first officially announced new elections in 2021, but they never took place. Abbas said he had postponed the vote indefinitely because Israeli authorities had refused to allow polling stations to open in East Jerusalem, home to around 400,000 Palestinians. Abbas’s critics argued at the time that the president was simply afraid his party would suffer a crushing defeat to Hamas even if the moderates' allies in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) remained on side.

Nevertheless, even after more than two decades in power, not even Mahmoud Abbas can postpone elections indefinitely. The longer voting has been delayed, the more questions Palestine's foreign partners and donors have raised about the legitimacy of Abbas and his cabinet. Fatah was thus forced to announce parliamentary elections, to be followed several months later by a presidential vote.

The latest attempt to hold elections to choose a new Palestinian Legislative Council was scheduled for Nov. 28, 2026. The veteran Palestinian president appeared to have chosen an almost ideal moment for himself and his party: Hamas had been severely weakened by years of war with Israel in Gaza, and against this backdrop, support for the Islamist group plunged so far that Fatah had its first chance in years of winning a majority. Moreover, the local council elections held in April 2026, including in one municipality in the Gaza Strip, ended in a decisive victory for Fatah candidates. That big win, however, was made possible by the fact that the vote was held under rules devised by Fatah itself and approved by Abbas and his associates.

Against the backdrop of the war in Gaza, support for Hamas has collapsed, giving Fatah its first chance in years to win a majority of the Palestinian vote.

One condition for parties and blocs to participate in local elections was their formal endorsement of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) official positions when it came to a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict involving the “coexistence” of two states side by side. Hamas and other Islamist groups have never accepted these terms and were therefore barred from participating in the elections. Fatah can certainly claim its victory as an achievement, but it is difficult to call it either fair or convincing.

The rules governing local elections were established by the Palestinian election commission, which is controlled by Abbas, and its judgements apply to all elections. In principle, then, Hamas and similar parties and groups could simply have been barred from the 2026 parliamentary vote as well. 

Hamas is working on its own electoral list

However, Palestine’s foreign partners and donors — the United States, the Arab monarchies, and the European Union — repeatedly stressed that only elections involving all significant political forces can restore their confidence in the legitimacy of the Palestinian authorities. At the same time though, foreign governments openly say that Hamas must renounce violence and pursue Palestinian statehood exclusively through peaceful means if it is to return to mainstream politics, leaving Fatah some room to maneuver.

Formally, Hamas has become less radical since 2017, when its new charter declared the group's goal to be the establishment of an independent Arab state not across “all of historic Palestine,” but only within the borders of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which the UN recognizes as Palestinian territories. Yet the idea of seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict with Israel— has still not become the dominant position among the radicals.

A shift to exclusively political methods of pursuing Palestinian independence is being discussed within Hamas as one way to save an organization severely weakened by the war, but no final decision has been made. This appeared to give Abbas's election commission a way to keep Hamas off of the ballot without losing the support of its foreign patrons, who also do not want to see militant thugs in parliament. 

Hamas’s strange allies

Yet it seems the "Palestinian street" was less susceptible to such arguments as to why Hamas ought to be kept off the ballot, and the cautious, seasoned Abbas was unwilling to risk mass anti-government protests that could strip Fatah of its remaining levers of power. And so instead of holding pseudo-elections that excluded the most popular party, he chose to postpone the vote once again. The likely reason is that Hamas was already working hard to build a broad coalition of parties and movements willing to run on a joint list.

Cautious Abbas is unlikely to risk barring Hamas from the elections in the face of mass anti-government protests, and the radicals are working precisely toward that scenario

Foremost among the groups ready to back Hamas was Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Although the group isHamas’s closest ideological counterpart, it had never participated in elections and had shown utter contempt for attempts to negotiate a political settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, regarding Israel’s destruction as the only possible path to an independent Palestine. True to its motto — “Islam, jihad, and Palestine” — Islamic Jihad had operated since its founding in the 1980s exclusively as a militant organization, not a political one.

But after a long, exhausting war in Gaza that destroyed the core forces and most of the arsenals of both Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the latter now risks losing its influence altogether. Thousands of its fighters have been killed or fled abroad, along with many of its most experienced commanders and ideologues. In short, Islamic Jihad faced a choice: cling to its longstanding refusal to engage in politics and risk almost certain oblivion, or try to enter parliament, help form the Palestinian cabinet, and thereby survive. 

Islamic Jihad is at least a logical ally for Hamas, given the two groups’ closely aligned militant Islamist ideologies. However, the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a virtually atheistic organization, is a different matter altogether. For the Front’s members, the war against Israel is not religious, but rather part of a global struggle between imperialism and the nations resisting it. Inspired by Mao Zedong and the Vietnamese communists, PFLP members have never dismissed the importance of political means, but have regarded them as secondary to armed struggle.

Ideologically, PFLP was once much closer to secular Fatah, with which it remains affiliated through the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Inside the contentious tent of the PLO, however, the Front is the main opponent of Abbas’s party. The Marxists interpret the PLO's commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict differently from their Fatah partners, believing that armed struggle can work hand in hand with diplomacy. In this regard, at least, they are indeed closer to Hamas.

The Marxists believe that peace with Israel can be pursued alongside armed struggle for Palestinian independence, bringing them closer to the Islamists

The Islamist-Marxist bloc may have differing visions for Palestine’s future, but its members agree that Israel is the main obstacle to the creation of a truly independent Palestinian state. Fatah, meanwhile, is viewed as an outdated organization that abandoned violence and bet on a “peace process” that has demonstrably failed to deliver genuine Palestinian independence. A joint electoral list, had negotiations to form one succeeded, would therefore have been a natural extension of the longstanding cooperation between the leading Palestinian Marxist and Islamist factions.

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) takes a similar position — it remains a member of the PLO but favors Hamas’s methods over Fatah’s. Also Marxist, the DFLP spent years wavering between Fatah and Hamas before ultimately siding with the jihadists. It was reportedly among Hamas’s likely allies in the parliamentary elections.

Particularly noteworthy are potential coalition members that not only share Fatah’s ideological or historical roots but actually emerged from Palestine’s main party of compromise before switching sides to join its principal rival. One such group is the Popular Resistance Committees, founded by Fatah officials who became disillusioned with their party’s commitment to peaceful solutions and turned to radical Islam.

Hamas’s allies include former Fatah officials who grew disillusioned with the party’s pacifism and turned to radical Islam

The most revealing case, however, is that of the Democratic Reform Bloc, led by former Fatah Central Committee member Mohammed Dahlan. In the 1990s, he belonged to the inner circle of Fatah founder Yasser Arafat and headed the party’s branch in the Gaza Strip. He ran it like his personal fiefdom, earning the region the nickname “Dahlanistan.”

In 2007, Hamas seized control of Gaza and drove Dahlan out. He held various posts in the Palestinian government under Abbas for several more years, but Abbas eventually ousted him too, accusing him of murdering Arafat, whose death is officially considered to have been the result of natural causes. Dahlan now divides his time between the United Arab Emirates and Serbia, where he became a citizen in the 2010s. He remains popular in Gaza and is so eager to return to Palestinian politics that he is prepared to forge an alliance with Hamas, which until relatively recently was his chief enemy.

Dahlan’s bloc, incidentally, is the only one of the groups mentioned above that does not appear on the lists of terrorist organizations maintained by Israel, the United States, or the European Union. 

What about Israel?

This raises an obvious question: why would Israel, which controls virtually all lawful political activity in the Palestinian territories, allow a bloc of parties and organizations designated as terrorists to participate in elections? Why not simply block the vote if Abbas changes the rules to allow the Hamas-led coalition onto the ballot? Alternatively, why not prevent the elected parliament from functioning properly by arresting or otherwise removing the most notorious Palestinian lawmakers?

There were surely people in the Israeli government who considered these options. But they could hardly ignore the fact that Israel’s rejection of the previous Palestinian elections, held in 2006, had contributed to the current war in Gaza. At the time, Israel did everything it could to prevent a parliament dominated by Hamas from exercising its legislative powers, and the radicals responded by discarding parliamentary norms and simply seizing power in Gaza, killing or driving out hundreds of their opponents. One obvious way to prevent a repeat of this scenario is to bring Islamists into nonviolent politics and demonstrate that parliamentary methods can deliver better results than bombs and guns.

One obvious way to prevent a repeat of the massacre Hamas carried out in Gaza is to bring Islamists into nonviolent politics

Arab countries, too, expected both Abbas and Israel to allow the broad opposition coalition to participate in the elections. Abbas quite literally depends on these Arab partners for his survival, as without their financial backing and diplomatic support, his administration is doomed. Israel, of course, is in a stronger position, but Donald Trump has already included the Israel-Hamas conflict on his list of wars he claims to have personally ended. He could threaten the Israeli government by withholding military and financial aid unless it made certain concessions.

In short, had these disparate forces been allowed to contest the Palestinian elections, a broad coalition of Islamists, Marxists, and defectors might well have taken power. Its members would have been ready to set aside their longstanding grievances against one another simply to oust the thoroughly discredited Fatah and its long-serving leader, Mahmoud Abbas.

With time running out, Abbas decided not to take the risk. Most likely, he secured at least Israel’s agreement regarding the postponement. But although much can change between now and next September, it is hard to imagine Fatah's electoral prospects dramatically improving anytime soon.

At 3:32 p.m., a vehicle with diplomatic license plates pulled into the parking area outside the main compound of Africa House. Out of it stepped a white man of medium build with short hair, dressed in a button-down shirt and tie. He waited until a car transporting Youssouf’s university-aged daughter entered the premises via an opened security gate and then snuck in on foot before the gate closed behind him. The intruder entered the residence and proceeded directly to the bedroom where Youssouf was staying, remaining inside the building for 4 minutes and 24 seconds. At some point, the unknown intruder ran into the daughter (The Insider is withholding her name) inside the house. A stationed private security detail met the man as he exited the residence at 3:37. They tried to question him, but the detail worried he might have been a VIP who’d gotten lost or entered without the proper checks. Amid the confusion, the intruder drove off at 3:38.

The exterior moments of this brief and seemingly uneventful trespass were captured on CCTV images, which The Insider has exclusively obtained. Facial recognition software confirms that the break-in artist was Major Aleksandr Dubikov, the assistant to Nikita Zayats, Russia’s military attaché in Ethiopia.

The footage of the break-in is available in our video below.

Zayats was reportedly expelled from Portugal in 2022 over alleged links to the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency. As it happens, Dubikov, a 36-year-old Moscow resident, is also a GRU officer, meaning his illicit entry into a diplomatic residence in Addis Ababa was almost certainly an intelligence operation.

The Insider is publicly revealing his identity as the break-in artist for the first time. It is unclear if the African Union or the Ethiopian government knew of Dubikov's role in this incident, or his work for the GRU.

Records show that he was registered to a well-known dormitory of the GRU Academy at 52 Narodnogo Opolcheniya Street in Moscow. On his VK profile, last updated in May 2008, Dubikov says that he is a student of the Peter the Great Military Academy of the Strategic Missile Forces, a premier defense institution now based in Balashikha, Moscow region, where he studied computer science and information technologies in control systems. “Like everyone else,” he writes, “I study — but in my own way, combining usefulness with pleasure… Just a cadet.”

He described himself as “[v]ery kind and cuddly. I’m a well-rounded person interested in many things,” and was a fan of Rihanna, Chris Brown, the Mafia and Max Payne video games.

An Insider analysis of Dubikov’s phone data found several numbers belonging to GRU officers. His second-most frequently called number belongs to 37-year-old Vladislav Popov, a known GRU hacker linked to “Sandworm,” or GRU’s Unit 74455, responsible for launching a series of destructive and costly cyberattacks — including one in 2017 shutting down operations by Danish shipping company Maersk and U.S. pharmaceutical giant Merck, and mission-critical hospital computers in Pennsylvania. NotPetya, malware developed and deployed by “Sandworm” that initially infected Ukrainian computer systems, caused more than an estimated $10 billion in damages globally.

Following the 2025 incident in Addis Ababa, a source familiar with the matter told The Insider on the condition of anonymity that the African Union’s Security Directorate had strengthened security measures around Africa House. However, the breach raises concerns that Dubikov may have tried to steal files, data, or electronic devices belonging to Youssouf, or to install surveillance equipment to gather information about the chairman. Dubikov’s closeness to Popov and Sandworm only adds to that suspicion.

The breach raises concerns that Dubikov may have tried to steal files, data, or electronic devices belonging to Youssouf

According to flight records, Dubikov is still in the country—which means that either the Ethiopian authorities failed to identify him prior to this report, or they simply chose to ignore the scandal. The latter cannot be ruled out; judging by the frequent travel of GRU operatives — as analyzed by The Insider — Ethiopia has become a key hub for Russian intelligence activity in recent years.

“Ethiopia has long been an important operating base for Russian intelligence in East Africa,” according to Philip Obaji, a Nigerian Russia expert and investigative journalist who has extensively reported on Russia’s covert operations in Africa. “Senior GRU officials Anton Papshev and Yury Mikheyev, who play key roles in coordinating Russian intelligence activities across the continent, were based there for years.”

A spokesperson for Youssouf did not respond to a request for comment.

The disclosure of a Russian spy’s break-in of a diplomatic compound in East Africa comes at an awkward moment. On October 28-29, the third Russia-Africa summit is set to take place in Moscow, with Yuri Ushakov, Vladimir Putin’s adviser, heading its organizing committee. The second summit, held in 2023, aimed to “bolster comprehensive ties between the Russian Federation and African states, while establishing fresh frameworks for bilateral and multilateral collaboration,” according to its official website.

The co-chairs for the upcoming summit will be Vladimir Putin and Évariste Ndayishimiye, the Burundi president who this year holds the African Union’s rotating chairmanship.

“While Russia continues to establish relations with many African Union member states, the GRU break-in reveals its twofold game,” a Western security official told The Insider. “While it officially engages in cooperation with African Union members, it does not hesitate to use manipulation and lies to achieve its aims.”

Russia’s role in Africa is both expansive and fraught. Much of its military presence was established by the Wagner Group, formerly headed by catering magnate-cum-mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, who died in a plane bombing in August 2023, two months after attempting an abortive mutiny against the Russian government. From 2017 until its demise, Wagner acted as a plausibly deniable arm of the Kremlin in multiple African theatres — Mali, Libya, Sudan and the Central African Republic. The mercenaries have acted as bodyguards and protection squads to help coup-proof regimes (they were the praetorian guard for CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra for over half a decade) and as combat forces to wage war against jihadist and rebel groups.

From 2017 until its demise, Wagner acted as a plausibly deniable arm of the Kremlin in multiple African theatres — Mali, Libya, Sudan and the Central African Republic

Wagner’s political technologists have also overseen information operations similar to the troll farm campaigns Prigozhin’s employees ran out of St. Petersburg to interfere in Western elections. Using the front organization AFRIC, they imported European neo-Nazis and white supremacists to act as ”election monitors” in several African countries, though their real purpose was to act as agents of influence to promote certain candidates and drum up anti-Western sentiment. (That white racists were at times pushing a pan-Africanist agenda at the expense of the bitter legacies of British and French colonialism was an irony Prigozhin may have relished privately.) Quite often, in fact, Wagner armed and funded opposing sides or a multiplicity of political actors vying for control of the same government — especially in Libya, where it worked on behalf of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of slain dictator Col. Muammar Gaddafi, and also of Gen. Khalifa Haftar, a Libyan warlord once beholden to the CIA.

“Russia’s broader approach in Africa is highly opportunistic,” Obaji told The Insider. “It deals with sitting governments while quietly maintaining relationships with opposition figures working against them. Rather than showing consistent loyalty to any one side, Moscow runs a dual-track strategy designed to protect and advance its own interests no matter which way the political winds blow.”

Wagner has enriched itself by extracting natural resources where it operated, running gold and diamond mines. In late 2021, Wagner usurped the French military in Mali at the invitation of the country’s ruling junta to defend the Bamako regime against Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the al-Qaeda affiliate, and Tuareg rebels. Both groups routed Wagner in Tinzaouatène, Mali, in 2024, precipitating the group’s withdrawal in 2025.

The UN Panel of Experts for Mali stated in an August 2023 report that Wagner, which was credibly accused of gross human rights abuses such as torture, beheadings, and summary executions, has hardly been a successful counterterrorist force in the country, allowing the ISIS franchise in Mali to nearly double its territorial control in under a year. Wagner has, however, tried to pass off its atrocities as the work of the French military, including the on-camera burial of bodies in a mass grave near a Malian military base Wagner was using in April 2022.

Wagner has hardly been a successful counterterrorist force in Mali, allowing the ISIS franchise to nearly double its territorial control in under a year

Since Prigozhin’s death, Wagner’s operations have largely been incorporated into Africa Corps, a Russian state-run expeditionary force headed by Gen. Andrey Averyanov, now the deputy director of the GRU but formerly the founding commander of Unit 29155, the service’s black ops team responsible for poisoning the Skripals in Salisbury, staging a failed coup in Montenegro, and blowing up a series of weapons and ammunition storage facilities across NATO territory, where materiel destined for Georgia, Ukraine and Syrian rebels were being stockpiled. Averyanov, in fact, took Prigozhin’s place at a roundtable discussion on the last day of the second Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg in July 2023. Seventy to eighty percent of Africa Corps’ forces are ex-Wagner mercenaries, according to an investigation by Reuters.

Moscow’s hard power projection in Africa, meanwhile, competes with soft power initiatives that are often masquerades for intelligence operations. Rossotrudnichestvo, the Foreign Ministry’s cultural arm, which doubles as a conspicuous clearinghouse for the SVR, has plans to open new “Russian Houses,” or educational and cultural centers, in Egypt , Zambia, Tanzania, South Africa, and Ethiopia. In 2025, Russia granted 5,000 state-funded places at Russian universities to African students, mainly from Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, and Chad.

The man was arrested in the Oder-Spree district of Brandenburg, where he lived in the city of Eisenhüttenstadt. He allegedly maintained contact with Russian intelligence services through an intermediary.

Authorities suspect he gathered sensitive military information, including data on Germany’s production of armored vehicles, ammunition, and explosives, as well as information about NATO personnel and military facilities.

Der Spiegel also reported that the suspect had shown interest in the German army’s 45th Panzer Brigade, commonly known as the Lithuania Brigade — the 5,000-member unit is due to be deployed to Lithuania next year.

A day earlier, Russian security forces detained a German citizen who was said to have fought on the Ukrainian side in the war. Russian authorities claimed the man had deserted because he did not receive a promised payment of 100,000 hryvnias (less than 2,000 euros).

Additionally, last week Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) reported detaining a Swedish citizen whom they accused of illegally crossing the border. He, too, had served under contract in the Ukrainian military — as the commander of a drone unit in the Aidar Battalion. His relatives later confirmed that account to Swedish media.

After unloading, the uranium will be delivered to Lingen by truck. Mikhail Dudin was scheduled to arrive at the port on Oct. 21 but was delayed by a day for unknown reasons. Ecodefense also believes that, for the first time, Rosatom has sent fuel rods in order to start producing fuel for Soviet-design reactors operating in Europe.

“This would significantly save Framatome time on fuel production, but it would also raise the risk that Russia carried out dangerous manipulations on the fuel rods. In addition, all work in Lingen will be executed using Russian equipment and, most likely, with the involvement of Rosatom experts at various stages. In 2024, 20 Rosatom employees already worked in Lingen and could move freely around the site and establish personal contacts. In effect, Framatome ensures that EU certification is obtained for Russian nuclear fuel protected from sanctions,” the group’s statement says.

On Sept. 21, activists from AgiEL, SOFA, .ausgestrahlt, and Ecodefense held a protest near the plant in Lingen, demanding an end to cooperation with Rosatom.

“Rosatom is taking part in the war against Ukraine: its employees, together with the army, operate the seized Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Rosatom also supplies weapons companies with high-tech components for producing missiles, tanks, and other weapons,” Ecodefense co-chair Vladimir Slivyak told The Insider.

“After German authorities approved the plan for cooperation with Rosatom in July, the arrival of Rosatom employees to ‘consult’ the French Framatome, which owns the plant in Lingen, can be expected at any moment. From the environmental groups’ perspective, such a development is nothing short of a security catastrophe. Therefore, environmentalists demand that the permit issued to the Kremlin-controlled Rosatom be revoked to prevent colossal damage to domestic and foreign security,” the eco-activists’ statement read.

The Lingen plant itself belongs to Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF), a subsidiary of France’s Framatome. At the end of July, the authorities in Lower Saxony issued the company a permit to expand production. As reported, ANF and TVEL will partner to produce hexagonal fuel assemblies for Soviet-designed VVER water-water power reactors, which are common in Eastern Europe.

Lower Saxony Environment Minister Christian Meyer spoke out against the decision but stressed that state authorities have no legal grounds to refuse the permit given the fact that the European Union has not imposed sanctions on Rosatom.

After the permit for Rosatom’s participation in nuclear fuel production on German territory was issued, BUND Lower Saxony and .ausgestrahlt turned to the Higher Administrative Court in Lüneburg, demanding that the permit be suspended. The court is currently considering the motion.

The Israeli social media space has been polluted by a range of anti-Ukrainian narratives — “NATO weapons supplied to Ukraine are ending up with Hamas!” and “Ukraine is forcibly conscripting Israeli citizens!” — which appear alongside posts from fake Ukrainian personas mocking Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and claiming Ukraine had “brought the Israeli prime minister to heel” during a dispute over grain. As it turns out, the Moscow-based Social Design Agency was responsible for their creation and dissemination.

The SDA has been targeting Israel since at least early 2023. The country has a large Russian-speaking immigrant population, but the campaign was clearly intended to reach audiences beyond that community alone. Internal SDA documents connected with the international Doppelgänger campaign outlined four broad lines of messaging:

• “The war is over. The world after the war”
• “Change of government in Ukraine” — #OutgoingZelensky
• “Get America out of Europe!” — #GetAmericaOutofEurope
• “Sanctions against Russia are sanctions against the whole world. The end of the dream”

For obvious reasons, only the first two were deployed in Israel.

The SDA team was given specific performance targets, including the objective that after two months of work from the Russian side, mainstream Israeli media and online platforms would begin discussing possible postwar settlements for Ukraine, along with potential alternatives to Volodymyr Zelensky as president. 

In June 2023, suggested SDA-driven article topics included:

• Undermining trust in the United States as a guarantor of Israel’s security.
• Arguing that several people in Zelensky’s circle could become Ukraine’s next president, including Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Kyrylo Budanov, Oleksii Arestovych, and even Olena Zelenska (but that only Zaluzhnyi would serve U.S. interests).
• Forecasts and parallels for Israel in the event that it supplied weapons or other aid to Kyiv.

Fake websites

The campaign did not go unnoticed. By July of 2023, intelligence officials had begun warning about Russian influence operations. Around the same time, cybersecurity company Cybereason determined that Russian propaganda and disinformation in Israel had initially been spread through X (then still known as Twitter) and Telegram.

“We uncovered the Russian government’s fake infrastructure in Israel, aimed at influencing public opinion by impersonating news websites,” Cybereason researcher Ilan Sokol said at the time. “As part of the campaign, well-known Israeli media outlets were forged. For example, the layout and content of the Walla website was copied. This was done to confuse visitors and make them believe they were on the real website.”

Impersonating legitimate media websites became a hallmark of the Doppelgänger campaign in 2022 and 2023, with Cybereason finding that websites imitating N12 and mako.co.il had also been created. Judging by the documents, in June 2023 the project was once again pitched to its client — i.e. the Kremlin — in an effort to secure an extension and increased funding.

By August, campaign planners were considering spreading graffiti and leaflets in Israel, and in September 2023, a report seeking another round of funding proposed highlighting the Israel campaign as an example of the effectiveness of the SDA’s “factory of augmented reality” — its internal term for producing fabricated content.

Then came Oct. 7, and the team developed new ideas and assignments.

How the Kremlin exploited the Oct. 7 attack

As a document dated Oct. 17, 2023 began: “There are currently several emerging trends that can be proactively developed into new and effective lines of attack. The United States is losing the remnants of its influence in the Middle East. The situation around Israel is heating up. And there is no guarantee that U.S. warnings to ‘leave Israel alone’ will be heeded. It is one thing to launch a massive missile strike and impose sanctions on two or three countries. But if the entire Arab and Muslim world is drawn into the war, this will become an extremely serious existential challenge from the Global South to the collective West. At the same time, it is obvious that the United States will leave the EU to deal with the problem on its own while taking shelter on its own continent.”

At an Oct. 20 meeting with Alexander Kharichev — a senior Kremlin official who has been linked in investigations to domestic political management and influence operations — participants proposed exploiting a statement by U.S. President Joe Biden about aid to Ukraine.

“$60 billion for Ukraine, $12 billion for Israel. We have nothing to argue with here. Talk about the shells transferred to Israel! As AXIOS writes! Push it! + they are sending 4,000 troops,” read notes from the meeting reviewed by The Insider.

The propaganda plan targeting Ukraine was adjusted at the same time.

“The U.S. redirected 155 mm shells to Israel instead of Ukraine. ‘Our’ 155 mm shells from the U.S. went to ‘them,’” one set of instructions read.

“Add examples involving aerial bombs and other weapons supplied to Israel. Emphasize the theme: ‘Why them and not us?’ They will get money/we won’t. All world leaders went to Israel, not Ukraine. Israel refused Zelensky entry, while Biden and Scholz entered the country without any problem. Western leaders are already redirecting all aid from us to the Jews, sending another aircraft carrier to Israel with more than 4,000 Marines aboard.”

Prompts intended for the authors of artificial social media comments added that the “first three narratives” should be pushed more heavily in western Ukraine “using traditional antisemitism.” Operatives were also instructed to spread rumors in Ukraine that Muslim units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine would leave to defend Palestine, as well as claims that Jewish troops were being released from the Ukrainian military to defend Israel.

When Readovka founder Alexei Kostylev joined meetings focused on disinformation in Ukraine, he suggested “planting among the Nazis” the idea that they should “go after Ze[lensky] for supporting the Jews.”

Project staff continued posting fake comments on social media.

Examples of AI prompts from April 2024 included:

“Talking points: The country is exhausted by military operations. Burnout and overwork among medical personnel are only one sign that the war has dragged on for too long. If the government had acted more decisively and wisely, and if the United States had really helped us, we would have won by now.

Write a 400-character comment from the perspective of a 38-year-old Israeli woman who believes Israel is overburdened by military spending. Medical workers are now under pressure and stress, as they were during the pandemic. The war is dragging on, and the United States is criticizing the methods used to conduct it. If the government had acted more decisively and wisely, and if the United States had truly helped us, we would have won by now.

Talking points: The government understands that it cannot solve the hostage problem and that the war is gradually reaching a dead end. The minister fled a meeting with evacuated citizens because he had nothing to tell them.

Write a 400-character comment from the perspective of a 45-year-old Israeli woman who thinks the minister is simply a coward. Instead of listening to the problems of people in need and trying to support them, he ran away! The Israeli government understands that it cannot solve the hostage problem and that the war is gradually reaching a dead end. The minister fled the meeting with evacuated citizens because he had nothing to tell them, but rushed to accuse them and call them a ‘loud minority’!”

Kremlin-sponsored content in legitimate media

In late 2023, articles that were also apparently commissioned as part of the project began appearing in genuine news outlets. Starting in November of that year, journalist Nick Kolyohin began putting out interviews in Walla with Israeli politicians, political scientists, and security experts, as well as with former hostage Roni Krivoi, who was said to have been released as a gesture of Hamas’ respect for Vladimir Putin.

Kolyohin presented the series as a joint Walla-Jerusalem Post project titled “The World on Fire,” but in violation of the outlets’ rules, he failed to disclose that the articles themselves had been sponsored by a Russian organization.

As Israeli media watchdog The Seventh Eye noted in its own investigation, the pieces were edited to emphasize themes of interest to the Kremlin, often by taking interviewees’ statements out of context.

For example, an interview with Likud lawmaker Hanoch Milwidsky was headlined: “Israel should focus on domestic affairs and avoid involvement in the Ukraine conflict.” However, in the video version of the interview, Milwidsky criticized Russia’s friendly relationship with Hamas — remarks that were omitted entirely from the published article.

The pieces were edited to emphasize themes of interest to the Kremlin

An interview with Tel Aviv University lecturer Yevgeny Klauber was edited in a similar way. In the video, viewers can hear Klauber criticizing Putin’s “disgusting statements” and even his “antisemitism.” Yet in the written version, only his criticism of the Ukrainian government remained.

The Seventh Eye’s investigation found that Kolyohin was paid for the series by an anonymous organization called the Russia-EU Communication Platform. Its website is now offline, but it previously published poorly formatted articles in Russian and English featuring experts criticizing sanctions, Ukraine, and NATO while praising Russian foreign policy. The Insider found that some of those experts were also part of the Social Design Agency’s pool of commentators.

Kolyohin, also known as Nikita Kulyukhin, was an obvious choice for promoting Russian narratives in Israel. His family moved there from St. Petersburg in 1992, when he was 9, and he speaks Hebrew, Russian, and English fluently.

A decade ago, Kolyohin worked as a special correspondent for Israel’s Channel 10, but his career there later ran into trouble when he produced an investigation into the Israeli Center for Cult Victims, eventually ending up in court after failing to disclose that it had been commissioned by Gilad But, the director of the right-wing organization Ad Kan.

In 2025, Kolyohin and a colleague were ordered to pay 755,000 shekels in damages (nearly 218,000 euros).

Kolyohin is known for more than commissioned articles. Since leaving Channel 10, he has worked mainly as a freelance reporter and regularly appears as a correspondent or “expert” in pro-Kremlin media, including on RT, Channel One, and Channel Five. Channel Five is controlled by National Media Group, whose board is chaired by Alina Kabaeva, widely reported to be Putin’s romantic partner and the mother of two of his children.

Kolyohin’s funding was most likely arranged with the help of the Social Design Agency, which actively involved him in its work. In leaked SDA correspondence, The Insider found a January 2025 proposal to bring “American Gen. Paul Vallely” into the project. As a campaign employee reported to the Kremlin:

“The speech by American Gen. Paul Vallely is ready. Script and screenshot are in the chat. Topic in brief: NATO is losing, Russia is winning. Important: Vallely is close to Trump and is perceived accordingly. Preliminary agreements have been reached with major Israeli media outlets for Vallely to publish ‘his’ experts through them. We are now preparing a letter from Vallely’s organization, the Stand Up U.S. Foundation, to the media and working out the financial arrangements. Probability of success: 90%.”

At the end of February 2025, an interview with Paul Vallely was indeed published by the Israeli radio station Galey Israel. It was summarized by none other than Nick Kolyohin, and the piece was edited much like the earlier interviews with Israeli experts — with an emphasis on narratives favored by the client.

The publication of the Hebrew-language interview then gave Russia’s state news agency TASS an opportunity to republish it less than a week later, saying that “a transcript was obtained by TASS” — without explaining where it had come from. Vallely himself later reposted the TASS text on his foundation’s website.

The main talking points argued that Trump would work with Putin to end the conflict, that “Russia will retain Ukraine’s four eastern regions,” that Zelensky would be replaced by another leader as early as 2025, that NATO would undergo fundamental changes due to the unpopularity of its policies, that the United States would sharply reduce its support for the alliance if Ukraine continued to be pushed toward membership, and that Europe would undergo a “shift to the right” that would see more leaders like Viktor Orbán come to power.

In a later conversation with OCCRP, Vallely said he did not remember giving any interview to Israeli media that he had no ties to Russia. Whether Vallely knew that his remarks would be used for Kolyohin’s Galey Israel publication remains unclear.

In 1980, Vallely, then commander of the U.S. Army’s 7th Psychological Operations Group, co-authored a paper titled “From PSYOP to MindWar: The Psychology of Victory” with his subordinate Michael Aquino, a psychological operations analyst and founder of the Satanist organization Temple of Set. In a preface to a 2003 reissue, Aquino noted that the paper had become a popular subject of conspiracy theories.

In 2005, Vallely founded the conservative organization Stand Up America US. It advocates for a strong national defense, secure borders, state sovereignty, support for the armed forces, limited government, and the protection of Americans’ First and Second Amendment rights. According to the organization’s co-founder, retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney, its purpose is to defend the United States and explain the dangers of radical Islam and global jihad.

In 2010, Vallely was one of three retired generals who supported U.S. Army Lt. Col. Terrence Lakin, who refused deployment to Afghanistan on the grounds that Barack Obama was not a legitimate commander in chief. Vallely said at the time that many military personnel and civilians doubted Obama had been born in the United States, describing him as “a Muslim by nature” while refusing to rule out the possibility of a “civil uprising” against a president he accused of helping spread radical Islam.

Vallely has also voiced support for the QAnon movement, describing it as a “white hat” operation linked to a group of more than 800 military intelligence specialists advising the president. He has called Q posts a credible source of intelligence.

In 2020, Vallely was among 235 senior military figures who endorsed Donald Trump’s reelection.

Vallely has also visited Russia. He traveled there for Victory Day celebrations in 2014 and was in Moscow again in February and March 2017.

Who was behind the Israeli disinformation campaign

The project was led by Ilya Gambashidze, with Andrei Perla and Alexei Ulyanov serving as ideologues. Both also work for the Tsargrad media group, a Russian ultraconservative, pro-Kremlin media organization.

In the early 2010s, Perla worked as an aide to Igor Kholmanskikh, then the Russian president’s envoy to the Urals Federal District. In 2016, he became head of the Sevastopol government’s public communications department, but he did not remain in the position for long. After dismissing Gambashidze, Sevastopol’s acting governor tasked his successor with “correcting the mistakes accumulated by the department.” Despite that episode, the political consultant still describes himself as “the smart Jew at the governor’s side.”

Perla now works on ideological messaging for fake-content campaigns around the world. In November 2023, the U.S. State Department accused him of involvement in influence operations as far away as South America. Within the Doppelgänger campaign, he produces analysis and sociological material and supervises several staff members.

Alexei Ulyanov is an “advertising and PR specialist” from Tver. He once worked at a creative studio called “The Secret of the Selling Word,” was later declared wanted over unpaid child support, and then began working with the Social Design Agency as head of its writing team. That work led to his inclusion on a British sanctions list in 2025.

Alexander Balakshin handled operational planning and studied social media in Israel and other countries. Anastasia Kazakova served as head of social media operations. And Oleg Perelman translated texts into Hebrew. (Material was also translated into Arabic, but that translator’s identity is unknown.)

For the project, the SDA compiled a list of Israeli media outlets and experts through whom its preferred narratives might be promoted. It is not known with certainty how the list was used or whether any of the outlets or channels received payment for publications. The list is reproduced below:

Russian-language Israeli media targeted for work, including publication placements, comments, and expert opinions

• Novosti Israel — https://nikk.agency/
• Moskovsky Komsomolets — Israel — https://mkisrael.co.il/
• Novosti Izrailya — https://news.israelinfo.co.il/
• Isroil Information Center — https://isroil.info/
• ISRAland — Israeli News — https://isra.land/

Inauthentic comments were posted under messages in Telegram channels such as “Voice of Israel. Israel Now,” “Israel in Russian,” “Israeli Working Days,” and “Intellinews — Israel and the Middle East,” as well as channels run by political analysts Mikhail Pellivert, Mark Kotlyarsky, and David Eidelman.

As in SDA campaigns targeting Ukraine and various EU countries, for reporting purposes operators saved links to each posted comment and stored screenshots in a separate folder on Yandex Disk.

Russian émigrés in Israel as an influence target

The project produced several pitches aimed at shaping opinion among Russian émigrés who had left the country after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Many of the proposals were likely approved, although perhaps not with full funding.

Particular attention was paid to the Russian diaspora in Israel. One internal proposal read:

“A significant group of émigrés settled in Israel. It is the only country where the number of ‘relocants’ can be reliably estimated on the basis of local official statistics.

Israel has received more than 60,000 Russian citizens since the start of the ‘special military operation.’ All these people now already have dual citizenship because, having Jewish roots, they exercised their right of return.

It is important to note that in Israel, new émigrés immediately found themselves in a specific environment with diverse political views.

The total number of Russian-speaking Israeli citizens is approximately 2 million to 2.5 million people, or more than 20% of the country’s population. This population has its own media, including several Russian-language television channels, radio stations, online media outlets, new media and Telegram channels.

Not all of these media can be considered anti-Russian. On the contrary, pro-Russian sentiment is quite widespread in Israel. According to a recent Pew Research Center poll, at least 16% of respondents in Israel trust Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Clearly, the goals of informational influence on the émigré community should be structured as follows:

1. Shift the attitudes of the majority of émigrés in a pro-Russian direction

• create a pro-Russian diaspora capable of influencing public opinion in host countries;
• increase the number of ‘frightened patriots’ who want and are prepared to return to the Motherland.

2. Discredit active anti-Russian émigrés in the eyes of the broader community of ‘relocated citizens,’ including by

• provoking divisions among the most active anti-Russian figures.

It appears that the best way to achieve these goals would be to create a group of media outlets aimed at émigré audiences.

These media outlets should not be formally connected to Russian state structures. Some of their representatives should themselves live in emigration and participate in events organized by émigré centers, conferences and so on.

Some of these media outlets should target Russian-speaking diasporas as a whole, while others should be geographically focused, above all on Israel, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan.”

How the Kremlin created fake “expert centers”

Participants in the Doppelgänger project proposed setting up nonprofit organizations in different countries that would resemble research institutes. The idea was to use them to recruit international experts and promote narratives useful to the campaign.

For example, the SDA requested $80,000 to launch a nonprofit in Israel, plus about 3 million rubles a month ($36,500) “for content creation, work with opinion leaders, and promotion.” It requested even more for an “Institute of Anti-Globalism, writing that “This project costs 5 million rubles a month” — upwards of $61,000.

Nikolai Tupikin also drafted what he called “a justification for strengthening and expanding the project with Israeli colonels from various intelligence services,” presenting the initiative as a form of Russian soft power.

In an apparent effort to justify the project to the Kremlin, the document stated: “Russian information warfare, through interference campaigns, helps Russia preserve its image as a superpower in a cost-effective way. The more Russia participates in active interference campaigns around the world, the stronger its image as a global power.”

An expanded presentation for the proposed Israeli institute said that “our narratives lack a legitimate source of information and a news hook,” but that “in Europe and other Western countries, the narratives we need already exist and enjoy sustained popularity.”

The project appears to have been approved by the Kremlin. In February 2025, someone acquired the domain ibi.institute (which had previously belonged to Instituto Iberoamericano), and used it to create a website for an entity called the International Burke Institute — IBI.

The website listed the United Nations office, UNICEF, UNESCO, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the World Bank as partners. All of them told The Insider in response to inquiries that they were not and had never been partners of IBI.

The website, unsurprisingly, contained no reference to any connection between IBI and Russian experts. Nor did it provide an official address, information about its founders, or details about its financing.

As the disinformation specialists had promised in their pitch to the Kremlin, the site published “economic and political reviews of the country of the month.” In practice, however, reviews were produced for all countries at once in the form of a “sovereignty index.”

Judging by their style and language, the articles were generated using large language models and were almost certainly translated into English from Russian. They contained mistakes characteristic of machine translation or careless Russian-to-English work.

For example, an article about Russia referred to “Lugovoy’s Law (2020),” describing how “he consolidated…” — in English, unlike in Russian, a law would be referred to as “it,” not “he.”

Additionally, an article about the United States used the phrase “guerrilla struggle” where the intended meaning was “partisan struggle” — in the political sense of conflict between parties. The error reflects the fact that the Russian word partizansky can refer both to partisan politics and guerrilla warfare.

The reports also contained signs of AI-generated hallucinations, citing nonexistent UNESCO heritage sites such as “Gerngut” in Germany and “Imbargo” in the United States. Neither exists.

The IBI also claimed that Russia ranked 27th in a 2023 PISA study, even though no such PISA assessment was conducted that year. (The latest study available when the reports were prepared was conducted in 2022, and Russia did not participate.)

In August 2026, OpenAI published the results of an internal investigation showing that IBI content had in fact been produced using the company’s systems and that the operation was run by users in Russia. OpenAI blocked the group of ChatGPT accounts involved.

Although the IBI website was filled with generated content and false claims about institutional partners, the organization itself was indeed registered in Israel in July 2025. Its founders were Igor Kaminnik and Gabriel Mart, and board members with signing authority were Alexei Vilents and Roy Yaakov Yankelovich. The Insider has copies of the organization’s founding documents.

Igor Semyonovich Kaminnik is an Israeli citizen originally from Odesa, Ukraine. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, he was part of a circle of Odesa conceptual artists and belonged to the P. Fomsky collective, along with artist Pavel Fomenko. In the early 2000s, Kaminnik was involved in various civic organizations in Ukraine. In recent years, however, he has adopted a sharply pro-Russian position. “When he talks about Ukraine, it is nothing but Russian propaganda clichés,” a person who knows him personally told The Insider.

Kaminnik is listed as an expert with the Institute of the Newest States, a Russian organization founded by political analysts Modest Kolerov and Alexei Martynov.

Kolerov was the first head of the Kremlin’s Directorate for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, created in 2005 as part of an effort to counter so-called “velvet revolutions,” the peaceful pro-democracy uprisings that had taken place across parts of the former Soviet bloc.

Martynov has spent about two decades in positions connected with Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a grouping of former Soviet republics. During that time, he has been declared persona non grata in Azerbaijan and Moldova.

Kolerov, meanwhile, has been barred for more than a decade from entering Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Georgia.

In 2023, Kaminnik made repeated trips to Russia, including with his wife, Yulia Vasilyeva, and their daughter Tatyana.

Gabriel Mart sits on IBI’s audit committee and also serves with another organization, the Sholem Schwartzbard Memorial Foundation, named in honor of the Jewish writer and anarchist who assassinated Ukrainian political leader Symon Petliura in Paris in May 1926. In 2024, Mart participated in an IBI roundtable titled “The Heuristic Potential of Schizoanalysis,” where he was presented as a researcher at the Catholic University of the West. In one publication listing him as an employee of the university, The Insider found Mart’s other name: Innokenty Martynov.

Notably, Alexei Martynov’s real-life son — Innokenty Martynov — also works with Kaminnik. He travels frequently to Israel and has published several articles on psychoanalysis at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography under his Russian name.

Kaminnik also sits on the board of Israeli nonprofit Dor Moriah. The organization takes its name from a small street in Haifa near Kaminnik’s home and is registered at his residential address.

Dor Moriah also presents itself as a research center. Even its Russian-language website has a section labeled in English as a “think tank.” It contains articles with titles such as “Turkey is waging cognitive warfare against Israel in a format described in the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s communications strategy” and “How the opposition constructs a rejection of election results.”

Dor Moriah also publishes polling and sociological research, including on issues not obviously central to Israeli domestic politics, such as the Putin-Trump meeting in Anchorage.

Dor Moriah was founded in 2017, but it only began receiving substantial income — nearly 200,000 shekels annually ($64,000) — in 2023, the same year the SDA’s campaign in Israel began.

Its annual revenue in 2025 was almost 195,000 shekels, all of it from foreign donations. Israeli law requires disclosure only of donors who contribute at least 50,000 shekels during a reporting period.

In 2023, there were two such donors: Panagiotis Glazko, a Cyprus-based businessman with Greek citizenship, and a U.S. donor named Alan Licht.

In 2024, the only major donor was Israeli citizen Dan Piotkin. In other organizational documents, Piotkin is also listed as a member of Dor Moriah’s supervisory board and a co-author of its research.

Notably, Dor Moriah’s annual budgets vary substantially when measured in shekels. Converted into rubles at the exchange rate for each respective year, however, they come to roughly the same amount: 4.5 million rubles.

The governing party’s leading Russian-speaking rabbi

In April 2024, Dor Moriah announced the creation of a movement called Derech Eretz.

According to the official account, it was co-founded by Dor Moriah, the Sholem Schwartzbard Foundation, and an association called Turei Zahav, which has since been dissolved. Turei Zahav was headed by Rabbi Alexander Hayat, who in April 2024 became head of Derech Eretz.

Around the same time, Hayat posted several photographs with Kaminnik on Facebook.

Among Russian-speaking Israelis, Hayat is known primarily as head of the Russian-speaking branch of United Torah Judaism, one of Israel’s two ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties in the governing coalition. It is in that capacity that he gives interviews and participates in election events.

In Hebrew-language political circles, however, Hayat has been described as “the rabbi for immigrants from Russia in Likud,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s party. In September 2025, the bar mitzvah of Hayat’s son was attended by Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana, Justice Minister Yariv Levin, Environmental Protection Minister Idit Silman, coalition chairman Ofir Katz, Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee chairman Boaz Bismuth, and lawmakers Ariel Kallner and Osher Shkalim. Silman’s presence was not incidental: Hayat also serves as one of her advisers.

Meluhadim News, a Telegram channel close to Likud, regularly reports on Hayat’s work with the Russian-speaking community. In January 2026, he organized the enrollment of 100 Russian-speaking immigrants into the party. In the summer of 2025, he ran a campaign to recruit dozens of Russian speakers to Likud.

By May 2026, Hayat was being described as head of Likud’s Russian-speaking campaign headquarters. He led a meeting between Russian-speaking opinion leaders and Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana, along with ministers Yariv Levin, Eli Cohen, Shlomo Karhi, and Zeev Elkin, and coalition chairman Ofir Katz.

Notably, by November 2025, Hayat was no longer attending internal Likud conferences in his personal capacity alone. By then, a group called Derech Eretz — “Russian Mobilization,” headed by Hayat — was participating in at least one such party conference.

Several independent sources confirmed Hayat’s cooperation with Igor Kaminnik to The Insider. One source said Kaminnik had claimed he paid Hayat a salary, an assertion that is indirectly supported by Dor Moriah’s reporting, which lists Derech Eretz activities among the organization’s work.

Dor Moriah’s 2025 annual report lists its areas of activity. In addition to conducting eight sociological studies, writing 15 analytical reports, and publishing 30 media pieces, the organisation also reported that “three open sessions and five working meetings were held in the Knesset devoted to promoting legislation regulating the activities of neighborhood councils in Israeli cities,” and it was also involved in ”development of the Derech Eretz movement, bringing together secular and religious Russian-speaking Israelis: eight working meetings with activists were held and recommendations were prepared for implementing projects at the local community level.”

In other words, work with the movement headed by Likud-linked Rabbi Hayat was listed as one of Dor Moriah’s core activities.

Both Kaminnik and the Burke Institute have also promoted Hayat’s work. Roy Yankelovich, head of the “institute” — and, in his day job, an Israeli sports journalist — wrote an opinion column about Hayat and Derech Eretz for TheJ.ca. Kaminnik, meanwhile, wrote about the movement in the Jerusalem Post, where he described his Dor Moriah nonprofit as Derech Eretz’s research center.

In the summer of 2025, businessman Yossi Prisman, from Samaria, helped Hayat establish a Derech Eretz youth organization. The two later fell out and are now suing each other. Prisman immediately recognized Kaminnik in a photograph.

“Hayat wasn’t paying his coordinators. When one of them asked him about the money, he pointed at Igor [Kaminnik] and said Igor would pay,” Prisman said.

One employee hired for the project has accused Hayat of failing to pay his wages. He told The Insider that the goal of the project was to create a nationwide Israeli political organization for young people with Russian roots. According to the source, Kaminnik attended one of the meetings. Another Dor Moriah representative, Alexei Vilents, a former municipal lawmaker in Moscow, also participated in events.

As part of the youth project, Derech Eretz organized a tour of Samaria for about 50 young people. It also held a wine evening with Russian-speaking businesspeople.

Lobbyists in the Knesset

Dor Moriah also works with sitting members of Israel’s parliament. In March 2025, the organization held a conference titled “Israel as an object of geopolitical confrontation.” Participants included Likud lawmaker Amit Halevi, Shas lawmaker Simon Moshiashvili, and Knesset Deputy Speaker Moshe Solomon of the Religious Zionism party. All three were members of the governing coalition at the time.

Lawmakers and other participants were told that “among world leaders capable of influencing the development of the Abraham Accords, aside from Donald Trump, Israelis primarily named representatives of BRICS countries: 28.9% named Vladimir Putin, 17% Xi Jinping, and 13.9% Narendra Modi.” They were also told that “70% of Israelis see a connection between the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the global confrontation between the West and the South.”

Coalition lawmakers even skipped a Knesset plenary session at which Netanyahu was speaking in order to attend the event. “The fact that these lawmakers left an important plenary meeting attended by the prime minister in order to attend a lobby meeting convincingly demonstrates the importance of the issues under discussion and the relevance of the initiatives being proposed,” Dor Moriah wrote.

The parliamentary lobby was registered by Amit Halevi. It is intended to promote three largely unrelated issues: creating neighborhood councils in Israeli citie, halachic banking (a system of financial services structured to comply with Jewish religious law, broadly analogous in concept to Islamic banking), and the idea of Israel’s future as “a bridge between the collective West and the Global South.”

The three open sessions and five working meetings in the Knesset mentioned in Dor Moriah’s annual report apparently referred to these initiatives.

Satellite images confirming the vessels’ locations were published by the open-source intelligence projects GeoInsider and SONARROW_OSINT.

At least three ships were involved in the operation: Ascalon (IMO 9198226), Lady D (IMO 9349289), and Anastasiia (IMO 9349291). The loading took place Oct. 15-16 at the port of Kaliningrad.

The operation could be tracked only through satellite imagery because the vessels’ crews had switched off transmission of their location data, making them impossible to follow through conventional ship-tracking services. Ascalon and Lady D had last transmitted signals from the vicinity of the Kaliningrad Region.

Satellite images show military equipment including infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), armored personnel carriers (APCs), mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAPs), and logistics vehicles.

Analysts said there may have been additional cargo ship rotations in October that could not be tracked because of heavy cloud cover. Some convoys may already be underway, but their destinations are unknown.

All three vessels have previously been linked to Russian military shipments outside Russia.

Last month, the Anastasiia was tracked delivering cargo to the Libyan port of Tobruk. Satellite images taken during unloading also showed large quantities of equipment, including Ural military trucks.

The cargo may have been intended for Russia’s Africa Corps, which operates in the region. The formation, which took over many of the overseas roles previously associated with the Wagner mercenary group, is backed by the Russian Ministry of Defense. 

Ascalon was previously used in the so-called “Syrian Express” that supplied Russia’s military contingent in the country before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024.

Lady D, for its part, has previously been linked to deliveries of Russian weapons to India.

All three vessels are under U.S. sanctions.

The operation, code-named “Veles,” allowed Ukrainian forces to break out of a positional stalemate on the Kupiansk axis, according to a Khartiia statement obtained by The Insider.

Khartiia said Russian forces lost about 100 troops killed and another 30 captured during the operation. The brigade also said the assault prevented Russian troops from reaching the rear of Kupiansk.

“We watched how the enemy was operating underground. The Russians intended to use gas pipelines to infiltrate the rear of our forces. So we went underground ourselves. We got ahead of the enemy and mastered the tactics of underground combat,”  said Khartiia commander Brig. Gen. Ihor Obolensky.

At the same time as the underground advance, brigade units also moved forward above ground, striking Russian forces on two levels simultaneously.

Drones from the Achilles Unmanned Systems Brigade also took part in the operation.

Underground, Ukrainian troops operated without GPS, reliable radio communications, or natural light. Before the mission, the soldiers underwent physical and psychological preparation for working in confined spaces.

Combat engineers, sappers, and the brigade’s support battalion prepared the underground route.

The operation was named after Veles, a deity from Slavic mythology associated with the underworld.

According to the decision, dated Sept. 7, 2026, Makarov was granted refugee status and a permanent residence permit in Sweden on June 30, 2011. He was issued refugee travel documents in 2014 and 2019, with the latter being valid until Sept. 26, 2024. He applied for a new document on Dec. 17, 2024.

On Feb. 6, 2026, Säpo submitted an assessment to the Migration Agency recommending that Makarov be denied a travel document “on security grounds.” The decision states that some of the information underlying the security service’s assessment is classified. As the decision states: 

“In view of the information contained in the Swedish Security Service’s assessment, the Migration Agency considers that there are sufficiently compelling grounds relating to national security to reject your application for a travel document.”

The Migration Agency also says it gave Makarov an opportunity to respond to Säpo’s assessment. He challenged the security service’s conclusions, but the agency found that his arguments did not refute its assessment. Makarov appealed the decision, but his appeal has yet to be considered.

Alexey Makarov told The Insider that Swedish authorities had deemed some of his activity carried out in a foreign country to be a threat to national security. He also said he could face criminal prosecution for disclosing the grounds for the refusal:

“At the Migration Agency, they read me Säpo’s assessment: I had allegedly engaged in activities abroad that threatened Sweden’s security, and if I received a travel document, I would be able to continue those activities. They did not name a specific country, but the only country outside Sweden where I spent an extended period and engaged in any kind of activity was Ukraine. Essentially, I take this to mean that the Swedish security services are prohibiting me from continuing my fight against the Russian state.

I’m not even allowed to show this decision to anyone. That’s a criminal offense, and I could be jailed for disclosing classified information. But I decided to take the risk anyway. In this case, going public works against them. Swedes I don’t even know are already messaging me on Facebook, outraged by what’s happening: 'how can this possibly happen in Sweden?' The overwhelming majority of Swedes support Ukraine, and many simply cannot imagine that something like this is possible.

I feel like a serf in Sweden: I can’t travel anywhere because I have no official documents allowing me to leave the country.”

Makarov believes the authorities’ decision is linked to his participation in combat on Ukraine’s side after Russia launched its full-scale invasion. 

In August 2025, Makarov was also denied Swedish citizenship, with the refusal citing Säpo’s assessment of the national security risk. He appealed that decision and, he says, has been waiting for a response for more than a year.

Makarov became involved in opposition activities in Russia in 2004. In 2009, persecution forced him to leave Russia for Ukraine. In 2011, he was granted refugee status and a permanent residence permit in Sweden.

In June 2022, Makarov went to Ukraine. He initially volunteered as a machine gunner in an assault unit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ 95th Separate Air Assault Brigade, serving without a contract or pay. In the summer of 2023, he joined the International Legion and later the Siberian Battalion, established at the initiative of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate and consisting primarily of Russian citizens.

In November 2023, Makarov was wounded while fighting near Avdiivka. After receiving treatment, he returned to the front, and in February 2024 he helped cover the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the city. In March of that year, he took part in a raid into Russia’s border regions and sustained a severe arm injury. Makarov reported that he had been seriously wounded twice while serving with the Siberian Battalion. After the second injury, he never fully regained movement in the fingers of his right hand. “I am now, in effect, a person with a physical disability.”

What we know about the project

Roscosmos first spoke about building the “Lunar Power Unit” in 2024. Last summer, Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov described the project, and in late 2025 specifics began to emerge. Roscosmos’s press service then officially reported that it had signed a contract with the Lavochkin Research and Production Association to develop the power unit.

On April 12 — Cosmonautics Day — Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev shared technical details of the project: a power unit with an output of up to 10 kW, a mass of no more than 1,200 kg, and a failure-free service life exceeding 10 years. The unit is expected to withstand launch loads, vacuum conditions, radiation, and a lunar night that sees temperatures fall to −150°C (−238°F).

“This is not theory. Our radioisotope sources worked autonomously for decades at lighthouses on the Northern Sea Route, and in 2019 they supplied heat to China’s Yutu lunar rover on the far side of the Moon. For scientific equipment and mobile modules, we are offering solutions that have proven their worth,” Rosatom head Likhachev said.

However, Rosatom had already acknowledged that this power output would not be sufficient for mining metals or obtaining oxygen and rocket fuel from ice. Instead, the project was called a “first step,” and it was promised that a lunar nuclear power plant “an order of magnitude more powerful” would be presented later. 

The purpose of the project is to supply power to future Russian infrastructure on the Moon. At Roscosmos, it was hailed as the “foundation for future lunar bases.”

Importantly, Russia is not carrying out the project alone — it was stated from the start that the power plant will serve the Russian-Chinese lunar station project. Delivery and installation of the unit on the Moon is also part of a joint mission with China. According to Roscosmos, the completion of the project is anticipated in 2036, by which time the power unit should be up and running.

Is that even possible?

The short answer is yes, although in the case of the lunar power unit, it will take a minimum of a few more years.

Small reactors already exist — and not only in one-off tests. Compact and mobile small modular reactors (SMRs), which can be installed where there is no room for large nuclear power plants, already enjoy widespread use. However, their output is far lower than the planned lunar variant — in the vicinity of 300 MW (compared to at least 700 MW per unit in large conventional reactors).

There have been real examples of nuclear reactors on spacecraft. The U.S. launched one in 1965, and it operated in orbit for 43 days. The Soviet Union launched its first reactor in 1970, but the reactor core of the BES-5 Buk began to melt after less than two hours. A successful case in the late 1980s involved the Topaz-1 reactor, as the first unit operated for six months and the second for almost a year. 

These older concepts have gained a new impetus mainly because new lunar missions (and other even more ambitious space-focused projects) require more power than solar panels and batteries can offer. The lunar night lasts about two weeks, and the craters at the moon’s poles — where sunlight does not reach at all — may be of scientific interest.

The Russian-Chinese project is not the first of its kind. Back in January 2024, NASA presented a concept of a small nuclear reactor that could potentially operate on the surface of the Moon. 

This work was preceded by the Kilopower project — another small ground-based power unit that generates energy through nuclear fission. Its successful tests at a site in Nevada ended in the spring of 2018. 

Such a reactor can generate up to 10 kW of power for 10 years, and NASA has stated that it is working with the U.S. Department of Energy to increase that output.  

A new lunar race

Similar projects had been discussed since the 2000s. One of the concepts proposed partially burying the reactor.

A power unit without a concept

While NASA has already presented several concepts and visualizations for its American designs, the Russian Lunar Power Unit so far exists only on paper and in media articles. The latter use AI-generated images as illustrations, meaning it remains unknown what the nuclear plant might look like.

Nevertheless, on Oct. 21, Roscosmos head Dmitry Bakanov said in an interview that the infrastructure and launch vehicles to deliver the station to the Moon already exist, but that the power source itself still needs to be manufactured. However, rocket launch analyst and popularizer of space and rocketry Georgy Trishkin remains skeptical:

“For some reason, Bakanov is prematurely reporting on a future event that is not planned until the middle of the next decade. It is a bit early to declare readiness, especially when no visible progress has been shown publicly… The base itself is a real project, but the Russian side has nothing at all to show for it. Behind closed doors, the negotiations are progressing with great difficulty. At the same time, China shows a lot on its part for the first landings. This is visible in the ship, the lander, and the rocket. The spacesuits leave many questions, but they are a work in progress. As for the Russian part, there is complete silence — nothing other than a roadmap for small missions, all of them uncrewed.”

Even more importantly, the Roscosmos head left the main question unanswered: when and how the reactor core itself will be manufactured. Until that critical step is at least in the works, it remains too early to speak of the project being anywhere close to the degree of “readiness” that was described. 

Since the spring, several towers made of concrete have been built for the placement of air defense systems in the area, along with new platforms designed for Pantsir air defense systems and Tor surface-to-air missile systems.

Alabuga is now one of the most heavily protected sites in Russia against aerial attacks. By comparison, Vladimir Putin’s residence in Valdai is surrounded by 31 known towers for air defense systems and two positions for S-300 or S-400 surface-to-air missile systems.

In August, the Institute for Science and International Security reported that a large-scale anti-drone defense complex was under construction at Alabuga in Russia’s Tatarstan. Satellite images from July and August showed large lattice towers under construction around production sites in the special economic zone, which includes facilities that assemble Geran attack drones and the Alabuga-Volokno plant, which makes carbon fiber used in drone production.

The last Ukrainian drone attack on Alabuga that caused documented damage on the ground took place in June 2025.