The return of Europa: Trump’s antagonism towards Ukraine offers EU leaders the chance to decide Kyiv’s fate — and their own

RU

While Trump oscillates between halting and resuming military aid to Ukraine, public attention is being diverted from developments on the front lines. Under these circumstances, eyeball-grabbing events like Ukraine’s recent withdrawal from the Kursk Region often dominate coverage, but such storylines can be misleading. The pace of Russian battlefield advances is now at its lowest level since spring 2024, and in some areas along the front line, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have not only stabilized the situation, but improved their position through active defense and targeted counterattacks. Against this backdrop, the political climate in Europe has become particularly important.

Europe in the Trump era

Even before taking office, Donald Trump had already changed Europe's perspective on the war — at least rhetorically. Under Biden, Ukraine’s key European allies, such as Germany and France, had followed a kind of dual-track strategy.

First, they provided Ukraine with military, financial, political, and humanitarian aid without setting a time limit. In Germany, the prevailing formula was “as long as it takes” — a phrase frequently repeated by Chancellor Olaf Scholz. French President Emmanuel Macron, for his part, pledged Kyiv “full and long-lasting support.” Implicit in this strategy was the West’s collective stance, which included U.S. military aid and the protective “umbrella” of American security over Europe.

At the same time, European leaders largely avoided explicitly defining their vision of a desirable end to the war. Scholz repeatedly said that “Russia must not win, and Ukraine must not lose,” carefully avoiding any direct calls for Russia’s defeat.

Such a scenario would imply at least a partial liberation of Ukraine’s occupied territories, ideally leading to the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. While a Russian defeat in this sense would clearly align with the interests of Brussels — and of most European capitals, provided that the war remained localized and posed no direct threat to the EU — the goal of a Russian defeat was never explicitly stated.

Secondly, there was consistent rhetoric about peace and diplomacy. In 2022, Macron was willing to “maintain contact with Putin and talk to him as long as necessary” for the sake of reaching a peaceful resolution. Two years later, Scholz called for “more diplomacy” and argued that “it is time to discuss how we transition from a state of war to peace.”

However, European leaders failed to present a viable peace plan. Ideas on offer were not acceptable to Ukraine, and they did not align with Europe’s humanitarian and legal principles. Their diplomatic overtures seemed more like gestures aimed at voters rather than concrete policy proposals.

Trump’s desire to radically redefine America’s global role has pushed Europe to correct its own course. The only major diplomatic principle that remains intact is Scholz’s repeated assertion — now echoed by his successor, Friedrich Merz — that there will be “no peace dictated from outside.” This implies that Ukraine must be an active participant in negotiations and that no peace agreement can be reached without its consent. The phrase “Ukraine must not lose,” however, has largely disappeared from European discourse, and as a result, the idea of a peace deal involving Ukrainian territorial concessions is increasingly viewed as an inevitability. There is growing serious discussion about shifting away from a military solution to the conflict. The Franco-British plan for a temporary ceasefire and a halt to attacks on infrastructure, proposed by Macron in early March 2025, was seen as being merely a preliminary phase before a broader peace agreement and the potential deployment of international peacekeeping forces — but it did not specify on what terms hostilities might end.

Although this plan has since lost relevance amid U.S. efforts to broker a deal, such diplomatic maneuvers occur largely independently of developments on the battlefield. The fact that they appear necessary reflects a growing belief that Ukraine cannot achieve victory under current circumstances.

Public opinion as a military factor

European democracies are highly responsive to public sentiment, and not just during election seasons. In ministerial offices and parliamentary chambers, policymakers must consider the views of major media outlets and the results of opinion polls, both of which can influence key political decisions.

Ukraine’s early successes in resisting Russia’s full-scale invasion — including the defense of the country’s capital, Kyiv — directly impacted Europeans’ willingness to offer material assistance. Even in traditionally pacifist Germany, where public opinion had long opposed arms deliveries to conflict zones, support for supplying heavy weapons to Ukraine rose to 51% by mid-April 2022.

A similar trend was observed across the EU. A July 2022 pan-European survey found that 61% of people under 29 supported military aid to Kyiv. This public backing helped European governments maintain and legitimize their pro-Ukraine stance.

However, after Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive failed to make significant territorial gains, and as 2024 ground along with minimal instances of good news from the front (aside from the surprise Kursk operation), support for military aid to Kyiv declined in several key EU states.

By September 2024, 51% of Germans opposed continuing arms supplies to Ukraine, with only 38% in favor. But the first months of 2025 saw unexpected shifts in German public opinion. A combination of battlefield stabilization, the slow pace of Russian advances, and Ukraine’s successful active defense — alongside Trump’s anti-Ukraine policies — caused the number of Germans opposing military aid to Kyiv to drop to 48% by January.

By February, German support for aiding Ukraine had further increased. A new survey allowed respondents to express support for either expanding or maintaining existing aid levels. Ultimately, 27% favored increasing aid, while 40% supported keeping it at current levels.

An opportunity for Europe

Trump has made it abundantly clear to the world that he does not view Ukraine as a political entity in its own right — let alone as an ally. To him, Russia’s ongoing invasion is an annoying obstacle, a problem to be solved — or, at least, one to be made to appear solved in the eyes of his domestic audience. However, Trump’s actions do not actively obstruct European efforts to shape policy east of Poland. Contrary to common belief, he does not demand that U.S. allies unconditionally follow Washington’s lead.

By repeatedly claiming that Ukraine is a European — not an American — problem, Trump is effectively passing the baton to the European Union. It is now evident that the White House has no specific step-by-step plan to end the war or to establish a long-term, effective ceasefire. Importantly, this should not be taken as a sign that Ukraine’s war effort is doomed. Trump’s reactive approach, combined with China’s cautious stance, has opened new opportunities for the EU.

The temporary resumption of U.S. arms deliveries to Ukraine not only allows the AFU to hold the front — but also buys Europe valuable time. The continent is not yet capable of independently supplying Ukraine’s military needs in full, but unlike Trump, European leaders increasingly recognize that Ukraine is not a “burden.” Rather, they see the country as a potentially crucial element of a new collective security framework. This shift is reshaping discussions in European power corridors.

Shared interests are fostering closer ties between France and the UK, a process similar to last year’s rapprochement between Britain and Germany. This is, in some ways, reintegrating post-Brexit Britain into the broader European political landscape. Meanwhile, Macron’s proactive stance — positioning France as a new security guarantor for Europe and even considering challenging Putin by talking openly about deploying European forces in Ukraine without Russia’s consent — serves as a catalyst for Germany’s own engagement.

For the likely leader of Germany’s future governing coalition — Friedrich Merz, whose election campaign prioritized a strong and united Europe — a passive role is unacceptable. Rather than taking a passive approach, Paris, Berlin, and London are cooperating in key areas while engaging in a healthy competition over who will shape Europe’s new security architecture — an issue that cannot be resolved so long as Ukrainian cities remain under attack.

Despite the rising popularity of the far right, with its emphasis on political and economic isolationism, Europeans appear willing to support an assertive EU role in Ukraine — provided that Ukrainians can continue resisting and that leaders articulate clearer goals. Even in Germany, where any foreign military deployment is typically met with strong opposition, February polls show that 59% of Germans now accept the idea of Bundeswehr troops monitoring a ceasefire in Ukraine — the highest level of support since Russia’s full-scale invasion began.

Large segments of the European public are ready to give their leaders the mandate for a more proactive role in shaping a peaceful and strong Europe. The question remains: will Europe’s leaders seize the moment?