No Washington, no problem: How Europe can support Ukraine and ensure its own security without U.S. aid

RU

Throughout his election campaign, Donald Trump repeatedly emphasized his intention to fundamentally rethink the U.S. security relationship with Europe. This also includes support for Ukraine, where Trump and his team have strongly suggested that Europe should bear most — if not all — of the financial burden connected with providing economic and military aid to Kyiv.

Since Trump’s election in November, European leaders have generally appeared willing to accommodate several of his demands regarding European defense spending, including stepping up on support for Ukraine. However, as was seen during Trump’s first presidency, his decisions can be erratic, often disproportionately influenced by the last person in the room — or simply by his own emotions. Many expect these tendencies to be even more pronounced during his second term.

For European leaders, this means that potential worst-case scenarios must be taken seriously. While they may not be the most likely outcomes, these possible developments include the complete withdrawal of the United States from Europe and the formal or de facto end of the U.S. as a NATO ally. Similarly, it is conceivable that the Trump Administration could fully withhold both direct and indirect aid to Ukraine in the coming months or years.

If this happens, European governments and industries will face a critical question: Can they step up to fill the void that the United States would leave in Europe and Ukraine?

Where Europe can step in

Europe’s overall military production capacity remains below where it should be — this after nearly three years of a war on European soil that is, in many ways, existential for the continent’s political order. Nevertheless, there have been notable improvements in certain areas.

One such bright spot is the production of 155mm artillery shells, which has seen substantial investment and expansion efforts in Europe. According to the European Union’s Commissioner for Defense and Space, EU member states are expected to produce a combined 2 million artillery shells in 2025 — a dramatic increase compared to pre-war years.

To be clear, not all of these shells will go to Ukraine. A significant portion will be diverted to EU and NATO member states, which themselves have placed large orders and are, to some extent, competing with Ukraine on the international market. However, the increased production capacity means that more orders could theoretically be redirected in Kyiv’s direction if needed, though this would come at the expense of Europe’s own defensive capabilities.

Europe also maintains a strong industrial base for armored and mobility vehicles, including armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), tanks, light combat vehicles, and logistical support vehicles. In theory, German manufacturers alone could meet a majority of Ukraine’s needs in this area if given sufficient lead time and long-term contracts to support the establishment of robust production lines.

German car and truck manufacturers such as Mercedes-Benz are already supplying hundreds of road and off-road trucks to Ukraine for various logistical tasks. Similarly, Rheinmetall has delivered a large number of heavy support vehicles and continues to operate open production lines.

The situation is more challenging for armored vehicles, particularly tanks. KDNS Germany, which produces the Leopard 2 tank, currently manufactures around 50 units per year. While recent order intake and delivery timelines suggest production will gradually increase in the coming years, no rapid expansion has been planned. That said, the manufacturer has stated that annual Leopard 2 production could be drastically increased with sufficient orders — likely in the hundreds of units and at a total price of around ten billion euros. This indicates that the main bottleneck is not manufacturing capacity, but the political will of decision-makers to initiate an expansion that, from a force posture perspective, is sorely needed.

The same is true for other European manufacturers of armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery guns. For instance, Swedish manufacturer BAE Systems Hägglunds has increased production of the CV90 IFV since the start of the war, with licensed production agreements in several European countries, including the Netherlands. Similarly, French manufacturer Nexter has significantly ramped up production of the CAESAR self-propelled artillery gun by adopting 24/7 production schedules and expanding its workforce. With sufficient orders, further production increases could be achieved for these European land vehicles as well, supporting both European and Ukrainian demand in the future.

There is also untapped potential in direct industrial cooperation with Ukraine and the establishment of production lines inside the country. For example, Rheinmetall’s Fuchs armored personnel carriers have been produced in Ukraine since the summer of 2024. Preparations and discussions are ongoing to manufacture Rheinmetall’s KF-41 Lynx IFVs and KF-51 Panther tanks in Ukraine.

In addition to newly produced vehicles, some stored European equipment may still be available to bridge short-term gaps, though numbers have been declining due to ongoing deliveries. Estimates suggest that 100–150 Leopard 1 tanks may be stored in Germany and Italy, though close to 100 of these are owned by a Swiss company that has so far been prohibited from selling them — whether directly to Ukraine or via a third party. Germany may also have a small number of Marder IFVs, perhaps up to 30, remaining, though most of what could reasonably be delivered has likely already been sent, with the rest being used for spare parts due to their condition. Greece is the only country in Europe that retains a significant stockpile of Western and Soviet Cold War equipment, including several hundred Leopard 1 tanks, but Athens has so far been unwilling to part with its inventory, at least not without direct compensation from NATO allies. Furthermore, refurbishment capacity has been a significant bottleneck, limiting the supply of vehicles to Ukraine. Nevertheless, a small number of additional stored vehicles might be made available to address immediate needs.

The key takeaway is that Europe already has operational production lines for land vehicles and certain munitions, such as artillery shells. While some lines are more robust than others, they could be scaled up relatively quickly with sufficient government investment. With adequate funding, Europe has a strong chance to fill gaps left by a potential American withdrawal in these areas. However, the same cannot be said for certain other critical capabilities.

Where Europe would struggle

In other areas, Europe would face significantly greater challenges in compensating for a lack of U.S. military aid and would likely be unable to replace it, at least in the short term. This is particularly evident in the area of long-range strike weapons.

Since the start of the full-scale war, European states have failed to restart missile production on an appropriate scale. While several European countries possess the technical capability to turn out advanced missile systems, production remains severely limited. Three European states are capable of making high-end land-attack cruise missiles: the United Kingdom and France, which jointly developed the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missile, and Germany, which manufactures the Taurus cruise missile.

According to publicly available information, British and German production lines for Storm Shadow and Taurus remain idle, though both countries are involved in upgrading existing stocks. Since the start of the war, only France has maintained an active production line, initially to fulfill an order for Greece placed in 2020 and later likely to replenish missiles donated to Ukraine. This being said, production of SCALP-EG is not expected to exceed 100 units per year and is likely to come in significantly below triple digits.

The lack of adequate production capacity has left European missile arsenals depleted, greatly restricting the number of systems available for delivery to Ukraine. This is particularly true for the United Kingdom and France, which have already delivered substantial quantities of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles and appear to have reached their limits. France’s latest missile delivery of just 10 SCALP-EG missiles underscores the constraints.

Germany, meanwhile, continues to deploy its prewar stockpile of around 600 Taurus — of which only 300 were considered operational when the war started. Given the sizeable overall number, Germany could provide a non-negligible number of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, provided that the decision to do so were finally taken. Still, Germany’s missile arsenal, much like that of the rest of Europe, is nowhere near large enough to fight a high-intensity war. As such, Germany’s missile supply to Ukraine would likely also be limited in quantity.

Rather than restarting production to meet their own needs and Ukraine’s, European states have leaned heavily on U.S. missile production. The United States retains a significant arsenal of ATACMS and a large inventory of JASSM cruise missiles, as well as strong and expanding production capacity for both cruise and ballistic missiles. However, missile deliveries to Ukraine were already slowing under Biden, and Trump may not restart or expand them. In such a scenario, Europe would be unable to compensate, leaving Ukraine to rely entirely on its own production.

Two other critical areas where Europe would struggle to fill the gap are rocket artillery and missile defense.

Currently, the United States is a critical supplier of rocket artillery launcher systems and munitions to Ukraine. In the event of a U.S. withdrawal — and without continuous efforts to replenish Ukraine’s stockpile from European rocket artillery reserves, which are themselves limited and arguably below where they should be — Ukraine risks exhausting its arsenal with no viable replacements in sight. While rocket artillery proved highly effective in the first year of the war, it has delivered mixed results since. Still, losing this capability, or even just decreasing the scale at which Ukraine can make use of it, would undoubtedly harm Ukraine’s operational effectiveness.

Missile defense is another significant challenge. Although European states have strongly contributed to Ukraine’s missile defense capabilities, the country remains heavily reliant on U.S. systems, particularly for ballistic missile defense. Ukraine’s primary means of countering Russian ballistic missile attacks relies on Patriot missile defense batteries supplied by the United States and European partners. While other systems, such as Soviet-era S-300V systems and the Franco-Italian SAMP/T, are available, their more limited numbers — and, critically, the scarcity of interceptor munitions — make them inadequate substitutes for Patriot. Additionally, compared to the SAMP/T, the Patriot system has a much more robust production line, both for the system itself and for interceptors. Diehl Defense, which builds the IRIS-T missile defense system, is currently planning a new interceptor optimized for ballistic missile defense, but this interceptor is not expected to be operational before 2030.

Without U.S. support, Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure could become much more vulnerable to ballistic missile strikes. Ukraine’s ability to defend against cruise missile and long-range drone attacks would likely also suffer, as NASAMS interceptors would no longer be delivered. However, this impact might be somewhat mitigated by European alternatives such as IRIS-T, which are already in use.

What should be done?

The current state of Europe’s defense industrial base represents a severe policy failure. European states have the technological and industrial capacity to fulfill most, if not all, of their defense needs at the necessary scale through domestic production, while also supplying Ukraine with the resources it requires to defend itself effectively. That Europe — and, by extension, Ukraine — remains highly dependent on the United States three years into the war is almost entirely due to a lack of political will and foresight to mobilize European industries effectively enough.

It is also clear that «Trump-proofing» Europe’s industry is no longer a viable option. Such efforts would have needed to begin years ago, ideally at the onset of the war. At this stage, Europe’s best course of action would be to mitigate the damage that would result from a sudden halt in U.S. assistance.

For industries with existing production lines, such as those for land vehicles, the focus should be on scaling them up as quickly as possible. European states can achieve this if political leaders pursue an ambitious industrial policy agenda. While taking such a step would undoubtedly require substantial financial investment, it could also stimulate economic growth in certain European countries, such as Germany, by boosting investment and employment in the defense sector.

In areas where production capacity is currently lacking, European states must urgently act to reestablish it. This is particularly critical for long-range strike weapons, an area in which continued inaction is indefensible. Fortunately, restarting these industries is entirely feasible. For example, resuming production of modernized Taurus cruise missiles would likely require a multi-year contract worth between two and three billion euros to make the venture economically viable for manufacturers. Germany alone should have no difficulty covering this cost, but other countries, such as Sweden — a potential prime partner in a Taurus program given its existing integration in the supply chain — could join to pool orders, increasing the overall volume and reducing per-unit costs.

To further accelerate the development of missile production capacity and other critical but underdeveloped industries, national governments could directly fund the establishment and expansion of production facilities within their countries. While such funding schemes are common in the United States, they remain underutilized in Europe. For instance, in December of last year alone, the U.S. Department of Defense awarded a $253 million contract to Wilson International to expand cruise missile engine production. Europe should adopt similar initiatives to enable the rapid development of essential production capabilities and bolster its defense readiness.

Finally, Europe should also consider initiating crash programs to rapidly develop key military technologies, such as ballistic missiles, in order to achieve independence from the United States — not just for Ukraine's sake, but for its own security.

In the end, however, the most prudent strategy remains keeping the U.S. engaged for as long as possible, an aim that requires persuading the Trump administration to refrain from fully withdrawing its support.

One potential approach could involve framing continued engagement as a demonstration of strength, appealing to Trump’s aversion to appearing weak. Europe should also prepare to make concessions in its efforts to maintain U.S. involvement. In the worst-case scenario, this might include directly compensating the United States for specific weapons deliveries, potentially at a discounted rate.

It is now clearer than ever that Europe must prepare for all contingencies while striving to strengthen its industrial base and strategic autonomy. Only by reaching these objectives can it safeguard its security while continuing to support Ukraine.