The inauguration of Donald Trump has brought a new impetus to the debate about possible Russia-Ukraine peace talks, and public opinion inside Russia itself may play an important role in this process. Despite the absence of functioning democratic institutions in the country, the authorities in Moscow will have to consider the population's sentiments. Society's attitude to any war determines how actively eligible men will try to evade conscription, and if certain other factors come into play, the situation may become explosive — which is exactly what happened in Russia during World War I. Although conventional opinion polls are all but useless in a military dictatorship, sociologists have found ways to gauge public sentiment and its dynamics. They have found that the vast majority of Russians, including those loyal to the government, would like Putin to declare a ceasefire. This demand is one of the most urgent for Russians, and its popularity continues to grow.
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Language matters
No one is willing to fight
A truce of convenience
A Gallup Institute poll conducted in Ukraine in August and October 2024 showed — for the first time since the full-scale invasion began — that most respondents were ready for a ceasefire. 52% favored a stop to the fighting “as soon as possible,” versus 38% who called for continuing the war until complete victory. This does not mean that Ukrainian society — not even 52% of it — is ready for a ceasefire at any price. Neither is President Volodymyr Zelensky, as outright capitulation would only strengthen the position of his political opponents. Still, Ukrainians on the whole are increasingly open to making some concessions that would have been unacceptable to them at earlier stages of the conflict — provided that those concessions actually prove capable of bringing an end to the death and destruction.
Putin, unlike Zelensky, has all but annihilated his domestic political opposition and therefore heeds public opinion considerably less faithfully than his Ukrainian counterpart must. Yet the public attitude inside Russia does still matter to some extent — otherwise, Russia's second wave of mobilization might have already taken place, and YouTube would have been blocked much sooner. What follows is an attempt to summarize what we know at this point about the prevalent attitude toward potential peace talks in Russian society. While opinion polls regularly show dizzying numbers of support for the war in Ukraine — an average of 75% versus 18% against — a deeper examination results in a more nuanced picture of what Russians really want.
Language matters
The question “How many Russians endorse the war?” raises another question: can public opinion polls be trusted under a military dictatorship? And if so, how should they be interpreted?
Wording is critical. Even the small percentage of respondents who agreed to participate in a poll would have provided a drastically different answer had the choice before them been presented in a slightly different manner.
As Elena Koneva, the founder of the ExtremeScan agency, and Kirill Rogov, director of the Re: Russia project, note, Levada Center surveys, which present respondents with a scale of available options, create incentives to express an opinion, even if respondents struggle to articulate that opinion for themselves. When merged, the categories “Definitely yes” and “Probably yes” as answers to the question about support for the war create an illusion of unequivocal approval. However, if the question has fewer response options, and if these options include phrases like “I hesitate to answer” and “I don't want to answer,” then the level of declared support for the war drops to 40%, as shown by Frye, Hale, Reuter, and Rosenfeld.
Moreover, even unambiguously affirmative answers do not necessarily indicate support for military aggression as such. As we learned from a pre-war study by Sam Greene of King's College London and Graeme Robertson of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, support for Putin and his initiatives represents a variant of the “patriotic, communitarian, normal position” for many Russians. Maintaining this stance is perceived as important for those who want to get on well with coworkers, family, and friends. Many people prefer to be on the same page with their social circle, even if that page is riddled with propaganda.
This hypothesis is confirmed by an ethnographic study from the Public Sociology Lab (P.S. Lab), conducted in the fall of 2023 in three Russian regions: Buryatia, Krasnodar Krai, and Sverdlovsk Region. The study revealed that a large proportion of “war supporters” are in fact largely apolitical Russians who live their private lives, stay out of politics, and perceive support for the war in Ukraine as the “social norm”.
No one is willing to fight
Among the modest percentage of Russians who agree to talk to sociologists, only 35% are in favor of continuing military action, but that appears to be an exaggerated figure as well. In response to a September poll from the Levada Center asking whether they would support Putin's decision to end the war “this week,” 72% of respondents said yes and only 20% said no — and this result represents percentages among voluntary respondents, not the general population.
Finding an end to the war appears to be among the Russians' top priorities. According to the Levada Center, the issue of resolving the “special military operation” ranked the highest among questions that willing respondents would have addressed to Vladimir Putin at his Q&A sessions both in 2023 and 2024.
Other poll-based surveys also suggest that Russian society has entered a state of war fatigue. Thus, a joint September 2024 poll by Khroniki and ExtremeScan showed a record-high percentage of Russians who would support withdrawing troops and holding peace talks even without achieving the stated goals of the “special military operation.” A Russian Field poll conducted this past November also showed that a majority are in favor of peace talks and only 13% would be dissatisfied if Putin were to sign a peace agreement.
Only 13% of Russians willing to participate in surveys said they would be dissatisfied if Putin were to sign a peace agreement
War fatigue is further evidenced by the results of qualitative research. The above-mentioned P.S. Lab study convincingly demonstrates that Russians, due to their learned helplessness, treat the war as a natural disaster. They would be happy if it ended soon, but they feel as if they can have no influence on its development. Interestingly, the demand for peace is strongest among those who can barely make ends meet. Poorer Russians are more dissatisfied with the war than their wealthier compatriots, as they suffer more from its consequences, both in the form of inflation and due to a higher probability of being sent to the front.
A truce of convenience
The majority of Russians and Ukrainians alike are tired of war and yearn for a ceasefire. However, it is clear that, as victims of unprovoked military aggression, many in Ukraine want not just an end to hostilities, but also the return of Russian-occupied territory, including Crimea and the city of Sevastopol — along with compensation for the damage caused. Only 9% of Ukrainians would agree to a truce within the borders that existed before the full-scale invasion began, and only a negligible number of residents favor a truce at the cost of territorial losses. Admittedly, although Ukraine is not a dictatorship, the effect of “socially acceptable” public opinion may also play its role, meaning the number of those willing to tolerate territorial losses may in fact be somewhat higher than that indicated by sociological research.
Meanwhile, many Russians say that they would only favor peace if the status quo is preserved — that is, if Russia retains the Ukrainian territories it has captured and continues to occupy. However, the results of qualitative research suggest that the Russian population would be amenable to any ceasefire option so long as Putin's regime presents it as a result consistent with “achieving special military operation goals” — regardless of whether or not any actual objectives have been met.