Your peace is my command. Why ending the war in Ukraine will be harder than Donald Trump says

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Is there a plan?

Contenders for various posts in Trump's incoming administration have presented a variety of “peace plans” aimed at ending Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Among their authors are future Ukraine and Russia envoy Keith Kellogg, Vice President-elect JD Vance, and former U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell.

With minor variations, all of these plans propose a ceasefire coupled with a demarcation line running roughly along the current frontline. Russia would maintain control over currently occupied Ukrainian territories, and Ukraine would pledge to postpone its NATO accession indefinitely. In addition, mechanisms capable of preventing either side from resuming hostilities would have to be implemented — though at this point, none of the plans on offer present a viable option for achieving that aim.

The suggested mechanisms for enforcing peace involve strengthening the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) with American aid, building a line of fortifications in order to make any potential Russian revanchism more costly, or deploying a European peacekeeping force in the demilitarized zone — as Trump himself proposed when meeting with Emmanuel Macron and Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris. Although Reuters reports that the deployment of outside troops is already being discussed in European capitals, the belligerents themselves have yet to signal a willingness to consider any of the proposed plans.

Kyiv has shown greater flexibility, unsurprising given its dependence on Western military aid, especially from the U.S. On Dec. 18, Zelensky admitted that Ukraine does not possess the necessary resources to bring Crimea or Donbas back under Kyiv’s control by force, and he has expressed a willingness to hold talks with the Kremlin provided that Ukraine’s democratic allies play a role in the process. Essentially, these messages signal that Ukraine is prepared to talk about a peace that does not involve the restoration of its “1991 borders” — a relatively new development.

In addition to Trump's unambiguous calls for Ukraine to give up some of its territories, Zelensky’s leverage is decreasing due to a range of factors: the situation on the battlefield, Ukraine’s ongoing challenges with mobilization, and trends in public opinion that favor an imperfect peace over a continuation of the war. This past fall, for the first time, several polling centers reported that the percentage of Ukrainians who favor peace at the cost of territorial concessions outnumber those demanding a “total victory.”

Nevertheless, the majority of respondents favoring “land for peace” say they do not view these concessions as permanent. As Ukrainian diplomats put it, Kyiv’s plan would be “to return the occupied territories by diplomatic means” — a longer process, but one that does not demand the use of force.

Zelensky's “red line”

This is exactly where President Zelensky's “red line” lies. Accepting the status quo for the time being — maintaining that Ukrainians would never dream of retaking their territories by means other than diplomacy — is as far as Zelensky's voters would allow him to go. And Zelensky is not inclined towards political suicide.

We cannot rule out the possibility that Kyiv does not intend to follow through on any of the possibly concessions up for discussion. What matters now is to convince Washington of Kyiv's openness to negotiations — and when Moscow says no, to request an increase in military aid.

In addition, the Ukrainian president has spoken publicly about the sort of outside security guarantee Kyiv would need to receive before it could sign any peace treaty with Russia — and his preconditions are clearly at odds with what Trump seems willing to provide. “If we want to stop the hot phase of the war, we need to take under the NATO umbrella the territory of Ukraine that we have under our control,” Zelensky said in a Nov. 29 interview.

In other speeches, Zelensky has made it clear that he understands the complexity of the situation: he no longer expects his country to join NATO any time in the near future, as he clearly understands the impossibility of admitting only Kyiv-controlled territory into the alliance; however, he insists on the creation of a mechanism similar to “the fifth article” that would apply specifically to the unoccupied parts of Ukraine. Unless the leadership in Kyiv receives credible assurance that NATO countries would come to Ukraine’s aid in the event of future Russian aggression, they can hardly agree to lay down their arms.

The Kremlin has no negotiating position

Meanwhile, Moscow's official stance has not changed. The Kremlin demands the lifting of international sanctions and the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from four Ukrainian regions — including from areas that are currently under Kyiv’s control — along with a withdrawal from Russia's Kursk Region. According to the Kremlin, Kyiv must also formally recognize those four regions — plus Crimea — as part of the Russian Federation while also abandoning its NATO aspirations and reducing its army in line with the unrealistic laughable parameters described in the drafts of the 2022 Istanbul talks.

Some Russian officials even insist that Ukraine's agreement to fulfill the above set of demands is only a starting point for any peace talks. Russia also has less significant asks, such as establishing the official status of the Russian language in Ukraine.

The idea that Ukraine could be forced to accept such terms appears completely unrealistic — at least for now. Despite problems on the battlefield, the Ukrainian army is relentlessly holding its ground, and Kyiv sees the strength of its military as the key to reaching an acceptable peace. On Dec. 19 in Brussels, Zelensky answered a journalist’s question regarding the preconditions for a sustainable cessation of hostilities by saying: “The best one is a strong army, a large army. The biggest in Europe. We simply do not have the right to limit the strength of our army in any way, even on our way to NATO. As long as we're not in NATO, we're taking a risk.”

Washington is unlikely to strongarm Kyiv into agreeing to the Kremlin's demands — demands that would essentially entail Ukraine's capitulation, the triumph of the aggressor, and a threat to derail the world order.

The Kremlin must realize this, which means that Moscow has not yet begun to bargain in a serious manner, instead insisting on the total acceptance of an opening position that its opponents could not possibly countenance. Figuring out what Vladimir Putin might actually agree to is no simple task. At the moment, buoyed by Russia’s relative military successes, he likely expects to push the front line as far as possible and ultimately claim at least the entire territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the latter of which has been occupied by Moscow’s forces since 2022. Whether Russia is prepared to settle for the Kherson region without Kherson city, and for the Zaporizhzhya region without the city of Zaporizhzhya, remains to be seen. Putin's absolute “red line” is to keep, at minimum, the territory that has been seized in the four regions.

Putin should realize that achieving international recognition of forced border changes is impossible in today's Europe, meaning he will have to put up with the Ukrainian hope for a “return by diplomatic means” even as Russian officials declare that “the issue is closed.” For its part, Russia would only agree to cease its demands for international recognition of the occupied territories in exchange for outside security guarantees — guarantees provided to Moscow, not to Kyiv. After all, if such a peace is struck, the prevailing Ukrainian narrative would be, “Let's wait until Russia weakens or Putin loses power, and we will get everything back diplomatically or in any way we can.”

Paradoxically, the best guarantee of military security for Russia would be Ukraine's accession to NATO — or at least NATO taking the country “under its umbrella,” as Zelensky suggested. Only the North Atlantic architecture of collective security can simultaneously insure both against a resumption of Russian aggression and against a unilateral Ukrainian attempt at revenge. The problem is that the Kremlin seems to genuinely misunderstand the purpose of NATO. It fears the alliance, and therefore will not accept such a mechanism.

The offensive continues

While much remains uncertain, one thing is clear: so long as momentum on the battlefield remains on the side of the aggressor, Putin will not be inclined to make any compromises. Traditionally, only the U.S. has the leverage to put pressure on him, and there are realistic scenarios in which Washington might increase its level of military aid to Ukraine, even under Trump. After the incoming administration’s initial attempts to bring the parties to the negotiating table turn out fruitless, Trump may make the decision to show he is doing “more than Biden” did to effect an end to the fighting. In addition to weapons, there are also further sanctions against Russia's finance and energy sectors that could still be implemented, as well as enhanced cross-border enforcement measures for sanctions already imposed Trump might even have the option of making trade concessions to China in exchange for Beijing reducing its de facto support for Russia.

Like the rest of the world, the Kremlin is not quite sure what to expect from America's once-and-future president. But Trump may be the only American leader the Russians are willing to talk to. Despite yet again winning election to serve as the world's most powerful head of state, Trump effectively remains a “dark horse.” Placing all of its bets on him could easily turn Russia's relatively strong position into a losing one.