First Blood: 10 takeaways from Andrei Belousov’s first six months as Russia’s Defense Minister

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“Rambovich”

It would be an overstatement to claim that, prior to his appointment as Defense Minister in May 2024, Andrei Belousov had no connection to Russia’s war in Ukraine. In early February 2022, the independent Russian publication The Bell reported that Vice Premier Belousov had chaired meetings following stress tests (“drills”) for systemically important companies in the Russian economy — a clear sign that the country’s leadership was anticipating the possibility of new sanctions resulting from the “escalation in Ukraine.” The Dossier Center investigative outlet, citing Belousov's personal correspondence and sources, claimed that he “had been involved in various military issues” related to logistics since 2013, and that he was also in charge of overseeing the activities of the late Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Despite the unexpected nature of Vladimir Putin’s personnel swap at the top of the MoD, Belousov quickly found enthusiastic supporters within the pro-war community. The new minister was compared to storied Russian military commander Alexander Suvorov (based on his perceived physical resemblance), to the Russian Imperial statesman and reformer Pyotr Stolypin (for his managerial approach), and — due to his patronymic, “Removich” — even to John Rambo, the protagonist of the 1980s action franchise starring Sylvester Stallone.

Self-styled “military correspondent” Alexander Sladkov claimed that Belousov had earned a popular “callsign” online — “Rambovich” (whatever that might mean). Television propaganda quickly followed suit: for a time, the appointment of a “civilian economist” to the Defense Ministry became a central topic in Kremlin-controlled broadcasts.

The purge of the MoD

One of the main hopes pinned on Belousov in his new post was his potential to fight corruption, a failing closely associated with Sergei Shoigu's team at the MoD. The purge of the Ministry began even before Shoigu’s dismissal, with the arrest of his deputy Timur Ivanov in April 2024. As of late November 2024, the number of individuals from Shoigu’s former team facing criminal charges has approached twenty.

These include former deputy defense ministers Pavel Popov and Dmitry Bulgakov, head of the Defense Ministry's Main Personnel Directorate Yuri Kuznetsov, and Lieutenant General Vadim Shamarin, deputy chief of Russia’s General Staff.

However, right from the start, Belousov’s own appointees seemed equally controversial. Oleg Saveliev became Deputy Defense Minister and the MoD’s Chief of Staff, even though an investigation by The Insider found that the former Accounts Chamber auditor hides his de facto wife from his income declaration — and with her, their expensive property holdings.

Anna Tsivileva, a distant cousin of Vladimir Putin, was appointed Deputy Minister and State Secretary — effectively the ministry's top administrative official. Tsivilyova owns stakes in major companies involved in coal mining and tourism. From April 2023 until her move to the MoD, she led the state-run “Defenders of the Fatherland” fund, created by Vladimir Putin to assist participants in the so-called “Special Military Operation.” The fund has faced repeated criticism from veterans of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and their families.

As for the minister himself, the aforementioned investigation by the Dossier Center published emails — allegedly from Belousov's personal archive — regarding the urgent sale of a villa in Italy in 2018 and the transfer of €600,000 to his account in a Malta-based bank. At the time, this amounted to slightly less than his entire declared income from 2012 to 2017.

In 2020, the publication Metla (lit. “Broom”) noted that Belousov’s son Pavel owned the company Claire & Clarté, which specializes in consulting and digitalization in the engineering sector. The firm secured contracts with Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade, as well as with state corporations Rostec, Rosatom, and Roscosmos. Pavel Belousov’s father curiously served on the supervisory boards of Rosatom and Roscosmos at the time the contracts were awarded.

“You can make mistakes, but you can’t lie”

Andrei Belousov made a strong impression on Russia's patriotic circles and war hawks with the principle he declared upon his appointment. Portraying himself as a man of integrity, he told MPs: “You can make mistakes, but you can’t lie.” This was interpreted as a signal that the practice of providing “false reports” about the actual situation on the frontlines was set to come to an end. At the time, censorship within pro-war circles significantly limited discussions about issues in the Russian military, making his statement appear as a call to break the “regime of silence.” For a while, the phrase was widely quoted on social media — but it later began to be used sarcastically, eventually being inverted into its direct opposite: “You can lie, but you can’t make mistakes.”

The original phrase recently reappeared in a photo of a “complaint bomb” published by well-known Russian military blogger Fighterbomber. Russian pilots had used it as a means to highlight the issue of systematic non-payment of their bonuses.

The photo’s impact, however, led only to investigations aimed at the soldiers involved — and the apparent dismissal of their unit commander, who took responsibility for the act. In response, the pro-war community began sharing the inverted version of the phrase — “You can lie, but you can’t make mistakes” — alongside the photo.

Meanwhile, the issue of “false reports” persisted. This became particularly evident in October 2024, when several major pro-war channels, including Rybar, started exposing the fact that Russian state propaganda was spreading exaggerated claims of success in the Siversk salient.

Similarly, heavy losses during the Russian army’s ongoing offensive in the Kursk Region were linked to commanders claiming areas as “captured in advance” — i.e. lying about territorial gains in reports to their superiors, which then resulted in orders for actual assaults based on these false claims.

From suit to uniform

At the beginning of his tenure as Defense Minister, Andrei Belousov was notably seen in public wearing a formal suit. This “civilian image” was emphasized in Kremlin media and contrasted sharply with the persona of the “cardboard marshal” Sergei Shoigu, whose uniform often drew mockery — even within Russia’s pro-war community. The figure of a man in an “office suit” inspired certain hopes among pro-war activists that technocratic efficiency would soon characterize the management of the country’s armed forces.

When Belousov appeared in uniform at a Security Council meeting in June 2024, the state-run TASS information agency even felt compelled to clarify that he had not been promoted to general — contrary to false reports from other outlets. Instead, the new minister’s uniform, though resembling a general’s, merely reflected his civilian rank of First Class State Counselor — a civil service position roughly equivalent to the military rank of Army General.

Strikes against his own family

In the summer of 2024, reports surfaced revealing that close relatives of Russia’s new Defense Minister live in Kyiv, which is also home to the grave of his grandfather, Major General Alexander Belousov. While the minister had reportedly lost contact with his Ukrainian relatives years ago, his position has directly tied him to missile and drone strikes targeting their place of residence.

The Insider interviewed Belousov's niece, Natalia Vertinskaya, about the situation. Her testimony — “my uncle is launching missiles at my father” — featured in the headline of the resulting report.

Record-setting, but questionable, gains

Under Andrei Belousov's leadership, the Russian Armed Forces achieved their largest territorial gains since the spring of 2022.

The pace of Russian advances in late October and early November have measured, on average, over 150 square kilometers per week. However, it is worth noting that Moscow’s overall tactical approach, which heavily relies on “meat-grinder assaults,” has not changed with the arrival of the new minister. Meanwhile, the position of Chief of the General Staff is still held by Valery Gerasimov.

Russian casualties — both killed and wounded — were estimated to have reached a daily rate of 1,500. Obituaries published in open sources confirmed approximately 2,000 deaths per week, though journalists compiling these figures admitted struggling to keep up with the surge in reported fatalities. The backlog of unverified obituaries grew from 4,000 to over 6,000 in just one month, though up to 40% were likely duplicates.

The ability to sustain an offensive despite such high losses relied on a steady influx of new contract soldiers, who were often rushed to the front lines with minimal preparation. Upon taking office, Belousov had stressed troop replenishment as a key issue for Russia’s army — but he rejected the idea of calling a new wave of mobilization.

The race for “volunteers”

Despite the ongoing challenge of replenishing frontline losses, the official strength of the Russian Armed Forces has increased by 180,000 people under Belousov, meaning the need to recruit ever-growing numbers of “volunteers” has only grown more pressing. The issue is being addressed by expanding and refining recruitment practices that were established before Belousov’s tenure.

These methods have focused on targeting socially and legally vulnerable groups, including not only prisoners and detainees, but also individuals awaiting trial, Russian men burdened with credit or alimony debts, pensioners, people struggling with drug or alcohol addiction, and African immigrants — among multiple others.

Recruitment efforts were further strengthened by continuous increases in financial incentives. In the summer of 2024, federal signing bonuses for military contracts were raised, and government directives for regional bonuses were adjusted upward. Later, a centralized interdepartmental commission for army recruitment was established, with Belousov as a member. Although these measures were intended to end inter-agency competition for recruits and to enhance regional performance in attracting new soldiers, the changes only intensified the “race for volunteers.”

For example, volunteers signing contracts in the Belgorod Region were offered a one-time payment of 3 million rubles, which included the federal bonus for contracts signed before December 31, 2024. This surpassed the previous record of 2.75 million rubles set in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. Under Belousov’s leadership, the average regional bonus has increased by roughly 2.5 times. According to estimates from the independent open-source intelligence project CIT, the Russian Armed Forces have managed to recruit around 30,000 new soldiers per month — but only through a combination of financial incentives and coercive measures.

Failure in Kursk

Alongside record territorial advances — mainly in Donbas — Belousov’s tenure also saw the largest frontline setback since the collapse of Russian defenses near Kharkiv and the retreat from Kherson in the fall of 2022. In early August 2024, Ukrainian forces broke through and captured a 1,000-square-kilometer bridgehead in the Kursk Region, within internationally recognized Russian territory.

While the minister's personal responsibility for this defeat is likely minimal, footage of hundreds of captured Russian soldiers — including conscripts — along with the complete loss of command and control in the early stages of Ukraine’s offensive, damaged the Defense Ministry’s reputation. Belousov is also undoubtedly accountable for numerous cases of looting by Russian troops in Kursk Oblast.

Commander-in-Budget

It remains unclear to what extent Belousov is involved in planning and conducting military operations in Ukraine — very likely, he is not involved at all. However, he is undoubtedly now the most powerful figure in Russia when it comes to managing the state’s financial resources.

In September 2024, the State Duma received a budget that, for the first time in modern Russian history, saw defense spending exceed social spending. Military expenditures for 2025 under the “National Defense” line were projected at 13.5 trillion rubles, equivalent to 6.3% of Russia’s GDP, or over 30% of its total budget spending. After factoring in “National Security” — which covers the police and other security agencies — Russia allocates 8% of its GDP, or 40% of its total budget, to defense and law enforcement.