Scholz and Merz to the rescue: How Germany’s political crisis could affect support for Ukraine

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Ukraine or coalition

One indicator of Germany’s emerging political crisis, which ultimately led to the ruling coalition's collapse, was the outcome of the September elections in three federal states: Thuringia, Saxony, and Brandenburg. For the first time in postwar German history, the far-right AfD won a regional election, and in the other two states, the party secured a strong second place.

Equally significant was the success of the far-left Sarah Wagenknecht Bloc (SWB), a party formed only a year ago. Wagenknecht's supporters managed to attract not only its leftist base but also populist-leaning voters who, though unwilling to support the far-right, align with the political extremes on certain domestic and foreign policy issues. SWB scored double-digit results across all three regions.

The distribution of seats in the regional parliaments left legislative bodies at the state level no possibility of forming a majority without a coalition involving either the far-right or the far-left. All democratic parties, however, refused to ally with the AfD, and the conservative CDU has a longstanding policy prohibiting cooperation with leftist parties due to their communist heritage.

Yet the SWB, whose rhetoric is in many ways more radical than that of the Left party, is not formally subject to the same restrictions. As a result, Wagenknecht has gained a crucial lever of influence over other parties. The SWB not only quickly established itself in regional politics but also effectively acquired a “golden share.”

During the election campaign, Wagenknecht deliberately broke an informal taboo long upheld in German politics as a means of guarding against populism: refraining from discussion of problems that could not realistically be addressed. For instance, it was traditionally unheard of for campaigns at the regional level to focus on issues of foreign policy, as this is the federation’s domain — the authority of the states is limited to addressing a narrow range of economic and cultural international activities.

SWB leader Wagenknecht disregarded tradition by placing foreign policy demands into the coalition agenda at the regional level, calling for a “peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ukraine” — read: halting arms supplies to Kyiv — and opposing the deployment of U.S. missiles on German soil.

This deviation from protocol led coalition negotiations in the three states to take dramatically different directions. In Brandenburg, incumbent Social Democratic Party (SPD) Premier Dietmar Woidke, whose party beat out the AfD by a mere 1.5%, faced little resistance from Wagenknecht’s supporters. Their joint preliminary statement included a vague reference to a “diplomatic solution to the Ukrainian conflict” — without specifying what that would entail or how Germany's easternmost state might influence it.

The parties also agreed that “war cannot be ended through arms supplies,” and they shared a mutually “critical stance on U.S. missiles in Germany.” This apparent concession from Woidke displeased many within Brandenburg’s SPD. The party’s leading foreign policy spokesperson, Michael Roth, criticized the development as a “break by Brandenburg’s SPD from the Chancellor’s policy.” Regardless, with early elections on the horizon, such rhetoric may have little impact, and an SPD-SWB government could be in place in Brandenburg before Christmas.

In Saxony, where attempts were made to form a broad coalition with the Christian Democrats (CDU), SWB, and SPD, the negotiations ultimately failed. Wagenknecht’s local faction withdrew, declaring that the conservatives and center-left parties “refused to call for peace and oppose U.S. missiles.” Saxony’s Premier, CDU leader Michael Kretschmer, remarked that Wagenknecht had “tied her party members’ hands.” Early elections in the state now appear likely in February next year.

In Thuringia, a far-right stronghold, negotiations advanced thanks to Katrin Wolf, a former mayor of Eisenach and a prominent Left Party politician who is the head of the SWB’s state branch. Known for her pragmatic approach, Wolf took a solo step toward compromise, accepting a vague phrase on “diplomatic initiatives within European and federal possibilities” and outlining “divergent opinions” on U.S. missiles while stressing the need for a “broad discussion.”

Wagenknecht demanded an end to the negotiations, but Wolf — and, subsequently, a majority of the party’s Thuringia branch — openly disregarded their leader’s directive.

The Social Democrats debate among themselves

The Zeitenwende (“historic turning point“) policy declared by Chancellor Olaf Scholz in the days immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion paved the way for large-scale German arms deliveries to Kyiv, but it is not universally supported domestically — not even within his own SPD. Germany’s Social Democrats have been a broad coalition dating back to the days of West Germany, when the SPD was the dominant political force on the left, albeit one representing constituents with widely varied perspectives.

Those who opposed American foreign policy initiatives in the past — the deployment of U.S. missiles in West Germany in the 1980s, the Bundeswehr’s participation in NATO’s military mission in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the U.S.-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s — still play a prominent role within Germany’s Social Democracy. Many in this group remain fundamentally opposed to supplying German weapons to any conflict zone, they uphold staunchly anti-war views, and they are wary of a direct military confrontation with Russia.

This faction is institutionally represented by the SPD’s left wing, whose most prominent figures include Bundestag faction leader Rolf Mützenich and senior party politician Ralf Stegner. In October 2024, this wing gained significant reinforcement when Matthias Miersch, a left-wing Social Democrat, became its new general secretary — the party’s second-highest internal position.

These politicians may not wield decisive influence, but they are certainly capable of pressuring Scholz. This year, Mützenich repeatedly called for a “freeze” on the war in Ukraine. He also proposed forming a peace contact group including China, India, Turkey, and Brazil, and suggested that territorial issues could become part of future negotiations between Ukraine and Russia.

Miersch has tried to publicly rehabilitate former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who faced ostracism for his support of Vladimir Putin and his years of work in Russian state entities. The SPD general secretary stated that Schröder remains “part of the party.” Formally at least, there is little to dispute here: last year, the SPD’s internal court dismissed a lawsuit from 17 party branches seeking Schröder’s expulsion.

Miersch’s statement coincided with Schröder’s appearance at an event organized by a right-wing populist publication, where he shared the stage with Viktor Orbán. Miersch was the only high-ranking Social Democrat to attend Schröder’s reception celebrating his party membership anniversary.

This context sheds light on Scholz’s occasional remarks about the “priority of diplomacy” and the “search for a peace formula.” Facing a significant decline in the SPD’s ratings, an unpopular government, and the prospect of early elections, the chancellor needs unity within his own party.

At the same time, supporters within the party who advocate for maintaining or even expanding military aid to Ukraine have influential backers. Chief among them is Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who has consistently topped popularity polls in Germany and is even seen as a possible alternative to Scholz in the 2025 election. Pistorius not only publicly distances himself from his fellow SPD members’ statements but also calls Russia’s war against Ukraine “Europe’s final wake-up call” and insists that “for Putin, the war against Ukraine is only the beginning.”

Pistorius makes a point of visiting NATO’s coordination center for military aid to Kyiv in Wiesbaden, Germany, and persistently advocates for expanded arms supplies to Ukraine. Although the Bundestag never approves the full sums he requests, the allocated funds still allow for substantial support to continue at a high level.

Pressure on the party’s leadership also comes from other prominent Social Democrats. This year saw several open letters from well-known SPD members, including a collective letter from leading historians criticizing the party leadership for its insufficient solidarity with Ukraine.

New government, new approaches

From the start, the “traffic light” coalition of the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP (the Free Democrats, representing German liberals and business interests) was an exceptionally challenging political alliance. The left-center bloc had fundamentally different views from the liberals on budget formation, priority projects, and fiscal policy, which ultimately led to the coalition’s collapse.

When Finance Minister and FDP leader Christian Lindner unveiled his economic development plan in October, which came across to the rest of the government as an ultimatum, it became clear that the coalition’s days were numbered. On November 7, Scholz announced Lindner’s dismissal from the post of Finance Minister.

In a rare emotional speech, the Chancellor accused his former colleague of obstructive behavior and bluntly declared that further cooperation was impossible. The following day, Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier accepted the resignations of Lindner and the other FDP ministers (with the exception of Volker Wissing, Minister of Transport, who opposed the party leadership’s stance, chose to leave the FDP, and retained his position). From that moment, the “traffic light” coalition was effectively dissolved, and early Bundestag elections became inevitable.

At the time, the voting date remained undetermined. Scholz aimed to proceed through the standard process leading to new elections, announcing that in January he would put a confidence vote before the Bundestag. This procedure is not particularly rare — five previous chancellors had previously used it — including Schröder, who did so twice. However, the Christian Democrats, led by polling frontrunner Friedrich Merz, demanded an immediate vote on the Chancellor's confidence. To enforce this, they threatened on November 12 to block Bundestag proceedings, leaving Scholz no choice but to comply. The confidence vote is set for December.

The lower house of the German parliament will now be dissolved, and new elections will take place on February 23, 2025. Earlier dates, proposed by some politicians, proved inconvenient. Neither the campaign period nor election day should overlap with holidays or school breaks, and both parties and election committees require time for preparations, limiting the range of available options.

The date has been agreed upon by leaders of the SPD and CDU (along with its Bavarian counterpart, the Christian Social Union), as well as representatives from the coalition partner, the Alliance 90/The Greens. Approval from German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier remains to be granted, though this is merely a formality.

For the next few months, the government — now composed only of the SPD, the Greens, and a few independent ministers — will continue operating as a parliamentary minority. The success of any legislation will depend on support from members of other factions.

In his speech on the coalition’s dissolution, Scholz listed aid to Ukraine as being among top priorities, alongside social welfare and pensions, underscoring that both foreign and domestic budget items are strategically crucial for Germany and that one cannot be prioritized over the other. He later accused Lindner of attempting to divert pension funds to Ukraine, while Lindner, in turn, charged Scholz with manipulating the budget, allegedly using “Ukrainian” funds as a stopgap to maintain financial stability until the elections.

Until recently, support for Ukraine had been one of the few budgetary items that saw little opposition. The Greens remain firmly committed, and Merz — the CDU leader of the parliamentary opposition and a strong candidate for chancellor in the upcoming elections — advocates for an even stronger pro-Ukrainian position than Scholz does.

Merz calls for disregarding Putin’s threats, confronting Russia from a position of strength, and lifting all restrictions on Western arms use against targets deep inside Russian territory. The CDU/CSU faction even proposed supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine, though they lacked the votes to pass it.

The degree of support for Ukraine in parliament may vary, but overall, Berlin remains firmly in favor of backing Kyiv. At the very least, pragmatism has convinced most Bundestag members that it is better to invest in Ukraine’s defense today than to face bigger issues tomorrow. With the SPD, CDU/CSU, Greens, and FDP supporting continued aid, the Bundestag’s current absolute majority — 611 out of 733 seats — favors Ukraine. The left-leaning Social Democrats also follow party lines on the question of Ukraine, and while this balance may shift after elections, most votes are expected to shift toward the Christian Democrats rather than the radicals.

A faction of Left Party deputies, independents, and unaffiliated deputies (currently 35 seats) are considered “swing votes,” while the AfD, a former member, and the BSW group (87 seats combined) firmly oppose arms supplies. Though not a significant force at present, these two groups are likely to gain influence in parliament after early elections — but they are still unlikely to end up in a position to form a majority.

Thuringia’s example shows that some of Wagenknecht’s supporters are willing to overlook her strong anti-Ukrainian stance for the sake of political pragmatism. This indicates that both the current balance in the Bundestag and early election forecasts point to Germany continuing its support for Ukraine.