As should have been expected, Vladimir Putin did not show up for the peace talks in Turkey, and the direct discussions themselves were delayed for at least 24 hours. Putin continues to pursue the strategy he adopted from the very start for his dealings with Trump: lie, but don’t refuse. Meanwhile, Ukraine avoided the trap of forced negotiations thanks to Zelensky's maneuver of demanding a personal meeting between the warring countries’ presidents, while Trump continues seeking to convince his voters that they should ignore Russia and Ukraine entirely. He may have failed to make peace in Europe, but he has nevertheless hauled in $4 trillion from the Middle East.
Who will Trump believe?
Putin shot himself in the foot in early May, setting off a chain of events that nearly forced him to meet with Donald Trump — and, even worse, with Volodymyr Zelensky — long before the Russian dictator himself had planned to hold a summit with the American president. Pretending to yield to U.S. pressure, the Kremlin decided to imitate a goodwill gesture, declaring a cease-fire around the Victory Day festivities in Russia (May 8-10), thereby guaranteeing the safety of foreign dignitaries invited to the May 9 parade.
The manipulative and deceitful nature of this gesture was obvious enough that it angered even Trump. Subsequently, the leaders of the UK, Germany, Poland, and France met with the Ukrainian president in Kyiv and decided to leverage the situation to present Russia with an ultimatum: either extend the ceasefire for 30 days, as previously proposed, or face new sanctions — not only European, but possibly American as well. They made a point of coordinating their steps with Trump over the phone, gathering around a coffee table for a photo.
New U.S. sanctions would shatter the Kremlin’s strategy, which sought to trade non-binding promises and verbal renunciations of unfulfilled ambitions for tangible gains, such as the potential recognition of Crimea as Russian territory, or reconnecting Gazprombank to SWIFT, which would allow Russia to receive payments for gas from Hungary and Slovakia and potentially help circumvent some of the financial sanctions imposed on Moscow.
After a full day of meetings (if one were to believe the Kremlin's media leaks), the Russian leadership came up with a response that imitated readiness for compromise In the early morning hours of May 10-11, as part of a red eye “press conference” at which journalists were forbidden from asking Putin questions, the Russian dictator unilaterally announced that he would begin talks with Ukraine in Istanbul on May 15. Putin ignored the demand that negotiations begin only after a ceasefire agreement had come into force.
The next morning, Trump wrote in capital letters on his Truth Social account that Ukraine had to “immediately” agree to meet with the Russian side. It appeared that the Kremlin had found an excellent opportunity to impose on the Ukrainians a series of long, pointless, sham negotiations — exactly the sorts of talks that cannot end in anything concrete, that cannot so much as pause the war, but that could still be presented to Trump as yet another “goodwill gesture.” For example, Russia could push for the fabled de-Nazification of Ukraine — an exceptionally vague concept given the absence of Nazis in Ukraine's leadership.
Zelensky, however, found a worthy response to this manipulation: metaphorically falling on the grenade. He said he would attend the talks in Istanbul in person, and that he expected to see Vladimir Putin there. Notably, Trump supported the idea, saying that in theory he could stop by Turkey as part of his Middle East tour “if it makes sense.”
Humiliate or honor?
The decision presented the Kremlin — and Putin personally — with a dilemma. The Russian dictator had to avoid facing Zelensky at all costs. Putin would only agree to be in the same room with the Ukrainian president if the Russian dictator were sincerely looking to end the war. But what if the American president himself came to Turkey? Trump would likely take offense if Putin failed to show up.
Of course, Putin feared for his safety, which was reason enough to stay at home. For him, sitting at the table opposite Zelensky would be like a hitman confronting a target who had survived the assassination attempt — manageable, but hardly pleasant. This was the second argument for not going.
The third factor was Trump's anticipated presence. If the American president had suddenly arrived in Istanbul, he could have demanded that some kind of agreement, as empty and meaningless as it may have been, be signed in his presence. Putin could have opted to refuse — but he would be facing Trump's temper, with unpredictable consequences. Given that the two have not even held a second phone call, a face-to-face meeting seemed rushed.
The Kremlin's answer was thus predictable: Putin could not possibly go to Istanbul. But then the road forked — in one direction, the Kremlin could have opted to make a meaningful contribution to the negotiations that Putin himself had contrived, or it could go another way and humiliate Zelensky by sending a few minor cronies in place of the mighty Russian ruler.
The Kremlin could not be sure about Trump’s eventual course of action, and while the American commander-in-chief’s presence remained a possibility, rumors persisted that Russia would be represented by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Presidential Aide for Foreign Policy Yury Ushakov — two relative heavyweights. However, as soon as it became known that the American president, given Putin’s uncertain status, would not be in Turkey either, less-than-influential presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky was sent to pick up where the two sides had left off in the round of failed talks that had been abandoned way back in the spring of 2022. The most substantive figure in the Russian delegation was probably Igor Kostyukov, head of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff, a fact that only demonstrates just how inconsequential the Kremlin’s representatives in Turkey really were. Zelensky, who sent along respected First Deputy Foreign Minister Sergiy Kyslytsya, had good reason to doubt whether Medinsky and Co. had Putin’s permission to negotiate anything at all.
In retrospect, the Ukrainian president guessed right. Even before the talks began, Vladimir Medinsky announced several times that the Russian side would proceed from the draft agreement that, according to the Kremlin's version of events, had been on the table in 2022 — that document implied Ukraine's de facto capitulation, and it was as much of a non-starter today as it was three years ago. Furthermore, Putin spoke about the supposed “fundamental” drivers of the conflict, which in Moscow traditionally mean Ukraine's de-Nazification and demilitarization, as well as Zelensky's resignation. Such rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin immediately placed any potential for a compromise out of reach. Trump, realizing that the talks were once again doomed to failure, urged the American side to prioritize talks with Middle Eastern partners who were proposing an estimated $4 trillion in contracts and investments. In effect, the lackluster composition of the Russian delegation persuaded Trump to ignore the talks in Turkey, as the American president seems convinced that the only way to break the impasse between Russia and Ukraine would require that he and Putin meet personally.
The war behind the scenes
Given that Ukraine was forced to take part in the Potemkin negotiations imposed by Russia, one has to acknowledge the Kremlin's obvious, if marginal, success. While the ornamental Istanbul meetings continue, the Russian army is advancing. And when negotiations almost inevitably fail, both sides will blame each other for the failure. Some may not even remember that the Kremlin's behavior was characterized by manipulation from the very start.
Nevertheless, the peace talks debacle may yet lead to one important practical outcome. Trump will have to decide whose version of the failed negotiations process he will publicly endorse. Even if he opts to endorse Zelensky's version, the U.S. still may not restore aid to the same levels seen under the Biden administration, but in that case Washington will at least likely join the new European sanctions against Russia, will start selling more arms to Kyiv for European money, and most importantly, will abandon any hopes of reaching a “grand bargain” with the Kremlin.