Two peoples, two states: How recognizing Palestinian statehood could help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict

An alternative perspective can be found in the column “Complicity in terror: Why recognizing a Palestinian state will not lead to peace.”

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France, the UK, Canada, Australia, Belgium, and Malta will join 147 other countries in recognizing Palestinian statehood at a UN summit next week. This marks a major foreign policy shift for countries that have held off recognizing Palestine for years, long preferring to see statehood come about as a result of a negotiated process between the parties. But if the prospect of an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians was unlikely before 2023, it became unimaginable in the aftermath of the brutal October 7 attacks and the devastating war in Gaza, which a UN independent commission has just deemed a genocide.

Given the current context, no one expects negotiations on the broader Israel-Palestine conflict anytime soon. However, recognition forces a paradigm shift in the accepted sequence of events for any future peace process, keeping that possibility alive. Rather than setting Palestinian statehood as the potential distant outcome of a process that may or may not take place, recognition takes statehood as a starting premise from which future negotiations can begin.

International support for a two-state solution

The key question regarding such diplomatic moves is whether they serve as an end point in themselves, or as a means to something more substantive. Crucially, the aforementioned states’ recognition of Palestine is occurring against the backdrop of a broader months-long effort, led by France and Saudi Arabia, to reinvigorate international support for a two-state solution.

This model, a long-standing pillar of Western diplomacy in the Middle East, envisions a sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel, roughly along the borders that existed prior to the 1967 war. The question of recognition has thus become intertwined with the broader debate around the viability and desirability of a two-state resolution.

Internationally, support for the two-state solution has perhaps never been stronger. Though garnering less attention than the statehood recognition announcements, the UN General Assembly last week passed a resolution calling for a two-state solution to the conflict with overwhelming support: 142 state votes in favor, 10 opposed (including the United States and Israel), and 12 abstentions. The resolution was based on the so-called New York Declaration, an outcome of a high-level conference on the question of Palestine that was hosted in July by France and Saudi Arabia.

The New York Declaration

The Declaration deserves a closer look, as its content suggests several potential pathways for more substantive policy changes by the regional and international actors endorsing it. For states like France and the UK, which are preparing to recognize Palestinian statehood, the Declaration’s section on “Realising a Sovereign, Unified and Independent Palestinian State” includes recognition, but also outlines dozens of other potentially more meaningful actions that should happen in concert. These include long-standing calls for rejecting Israeli seizure of Palestinian land and resources, along with new avenues for international support, including establishing Palestinian embassies abroad, facilitating Palestinian ownership over taxation through an internationally supported mechanism, expanding Palestinian exports through new trade agreements, and supporting the drafting of a Palestinian Constitution.

Furthemore, the Declaration’s section on “Preserving the Two-State Solution Against Unilateral Measures” includes a series of steps for states to take to reject the “unlawful presence” of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), specifically regarding illegal Israeli settlement outposts in the West Bank. It calls for parties to abstain from economic or trade deals that include goods connected with the settlements and imposes a ban on assisting in the illegal entities’ maintenance or expansion. Under the terms of the Declaration, states are also to abide by their obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty and to cease transfer of arms or related equipment if they are likely to be used in the OPT.

The Declaration in no way advocates for states to boycott or divest from Israel itself, but rather calls on states to distinguish between Israel and the OPT, eschewing treaty relations in which Israel includes any or all of the OPT as part of its territory.

Spain last week announced a ban on importing goods from settlements, and Ireland has introduced legislation to do the same. But the recognition decisions, coupled with the Declaration, will give states like France more grounding to do so.

Restricting settlement goods may also be considered a compromise policy in response to growing calls for the EU to fully suspend its trade agreement with Israel due to human rights violations in Gaza and the West Bank.

What will happen to Hamas?

In addition to endorsing the two-state solution, the Declaration addresses the ongoing war in Gaza by calling for a permanent ceasefire, the release of all hostages, the exchange of Palestinian prisoners, and the resumption of UN-led humanitarian aid delivery. Perhaps most significantly, however, the Declaration excludes Hamas from any future governance structures and calls for the group to disarm, stating: “Hamas must end its role in Gaza, and hand over its weapons to the Palestinian Authority (PA) with possible international engagement and support.”

The inclusion of this line — the only direct reference to Hamas — was likely not without controversy. Regarding governance, even many Palestinians who are critical of Hamas still acknowledge the group’s right to participate in Palestinian politics and would question the legitimacy of a government that excluded their participation outright, especially if dictated by external actors.

Still, Hamas itself has indicated a willingness to relinquish its governing role in Gaza to the PA or a temporary technocratic government as part of a ceasefire, even if the question of disarmament is harder. Hamas, though weakened, does not want to be seen as surrendering, especially as Israel launches a major new offensive in Gaza City. But even on disarmament, some Hamas leaders have signalled openness to gradual decommissioning as part of a broader negotiated process leading to a political solution to the conflict.

Arab states backing the two-state solution

The fact that 22 members of the Arab League endorsed the Declaration calling on Hamas to disarm and relinquish governing power, presumably in concert with a good-faith pathway to a two-state solution, represents a significant shift in the region. While most Arab governments have had little sympathy for Hamas — not wishing to embolden Islamist movements in their own domestic arenas — their direct call for Hamas to step aside and begin a process of disarmament should not be overlooked.

It is also notable that nearly all regional actors (with the exception of Iran) endorsed the call for a two-state solution. While it was expected that most Middle East governments would support the recognition of a Palestinian state, the two-state model also by definition includes de facto recognition of Israel. This marks a major shift from Arab states’ historical stance, articulated in 1967’s Khartoum Resolution, of no peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, and no relations with Israel.

To be sure, this has been a gradual process, as numerous states have developed varying types of relations with Israel over the years, whether through peace treaties (Egypt and Jordan), informal ties (Saudi Arabia and Qatar), or formal relations like the Abraham Accords of 2020, which normalised relations between Israel and four Arab states: Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. (A similar normalisation deal with Saudi Arabia, backed by U.S. incentives, was under negotiation prior to the October 7 attacks, and could still be revived if coupled with a pathway to Palestinian statehood.)

The arguments against

As support for the Declaration demonstrates, there has perhaps never been a broader international and regional governmental consensus around the two-state solution. At the same time, support for the two-state solution amongst Palestinians and Israelis has declined in recent years (though some polls show support rising slightly among Palestinians since October 7), and many analysts and activists have declared the two-state solution dead.

Many objections regard questions of feasibility, largely due to so-called “facts on the ground,” particularly the rapid expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. With over 160 settlements and over 700,000 Israeli residents in the OPT, along with related infrastructure like separate road systems, it has become increasingly difficult to realistically envision a contiguous Palestinian state.

The territorial fragmentation between the West Bank and Gaza, exacerbated by Israeli policies of separation as well as internal rifts in Palestinian politics, also creates challenges for a viable two-state model. And of course, the question of what type of reality will be possible in Gaza looms over any considerations of future resolution models.

Other objections to the two-state solution are ideological. For many Israelis, agreeing to a two-state model would mean giving up “Judea and Samaria” — the biblical names of the areas comprising the West Bank — which represent the heart of the biblical homeland of the Jewish people, as well as an area widely deemed strategically vital for Israel’s security.

Others simply view recognizing a Palestinian state as a reward for Hamas granted in the aftermath of October 7, a position reflected in the Israeli Knesset’s overwhelming vote against Palestinian statehood in 2024.

Yet not everyone shares that view. As one Israeli reservist told me this summer:

“Israel frames the two-state solution as if we are handing Hamas victory. But we’re not. That’s not what Hamas symbolises. We should see the two-state solution as in our interest. The alternatives to a two-state solution are far worse.” He went on to say that the only other options are a one-state solution, in which Israel would cease to be a Jewish state, or a state in which Israel “rules over everyone, which is not a democracy.” He added, “We need to lean into the two-state model and try to shape it…but people aren’t ready to buy into it yet.”

For many Palestinians, agreeing to a two-state solution would mean relinquishing more than half of historic Palestine while also giving up (in practical terms) the right of many refugees to return to their pre-1948 homes.

As one Palestinian activist told me, “a two-state solution doesn’t address the root causes of the conflict. Even if you got this agreement, it would maybe manage the conflict for a bit, but it would resurge.” Many also reject Israel’s likely terms for such a state, one that would be demilitarized, with no role for Hamas, and subject to Israeli security measures. Others, however, acknowledged that if a two-state option was actually offered, most Palestinians would accept it. As another activist said, “most Palestinians would accept any solution at this point — two-state or one-state or whatever — to stop the killing.”

If the main substantive objective of the Western powers in recognizing a Palestinian state is to keep the two-state option alive, it will be necessary for advocates of the model to take those criticisms seriously. Indeed, such critiques have already spurred creative thinking on variations of a two-state solution, such as the confederation model, which calls for two states in one shared homeland. And of course, recognition of Palestinian statehood could encourage other potential models to emerge while also providing the impetus to grapple seriously and substantively with difficult issues like settlements, refugees, and borders.

At the very least, recognition, combined with the endorsement of a two-state solution, commits international actors to upholding the right to self-determination of both peoples at a time when the future of Palestine has never been more threatened.

Some may dismiss the moves toward recognition as symbolic or political grandstanding, and indeed, recognizing Palestinian statehood won’t soon change the reality on the ground in Gaza or the West Bank. But diplomatic pressure is crucial for maintaining any vision for a future resolution, however distant that solution may still be.