OPINION
On May 28, the German government announced €5 billion in new military aid for Ukraine. Part of the funds will support Ukrainian efforts to manufacture long-range weapons. Among the top priorities are the BARS missile-drone and the Liutyi UAV, dubbed Ukraine’s answer to the Iranian-designed Shahed, which is widely used by Russia. Some of the money may also go toward developing heavier arms. Still unresolved, however, is the issue of supplying Ukraine with Taurus missiles — long-range precision weapons that became a symbol of the previous German government's fear of escalation. Fabian Hoffmann, a defense policy researcher at the University of Oslo, argues that while the military urgency for Taurus has somewhat faded, delivering them now may offer more political benefit to Germany than strategic value to Ukraine.
During President Zelensky’s visit to Berlin on May 28, German Chancellor Merz announced that Germany would finance the production of “long-range weapons” manufactured inside Ukraine. Later that day, the German and Ukrainian Defense Ministers signed a memorandum of understanding to formalize the agreement. A press release from the German Ministry of Defense states:
“The defense ministers of Germany and Ukraine have signed a declaration providing for the financing of long-range weapons production in Ukraine. This marks a step toward Germany’s plan to increase direct investment in Ukrainian defense manufacturing. A significant number of these weapons are expected to be produced within this year. The first systems can be deployed by the Ukrainian armed forces within weeks. As they are already in use, no additional training will be required.”
This episode is the latest in what seems to be a never-ending dispute over the delivery of German long-range strike weapons to Ukraine. This article outlines what will and what may be financed by Germany, as well as what this deal means for potential Taurus deliveries.
What will be financed?
Ukraine currently produces a wide array of long-range strike systems, including various types of drones and cruise missiles. It is also developing short- and potentially medium-range ballistic missiles, though these are not yet known to have entered serial production.
Exclusive reporting by the German outlet Die Welt indicates that Ukraine has requested funding for the BARS and AN-196 Liutyi systems. Financial support for these systems will reportedly amount to 400 million Euros.
According to Ukrainian sources, the BARS has a range of 700 to 800 km and shares key specifications with the Pekklo mini cruise missile. The AN-196 Liutyi — sometimes called the Ukrainian Shahed — is a long-range drone that is now reportedly equipped with a 75 kg warhead. It is capable of striking targets at up to 1,000-2,000 km and has been credited with multiple successful strikes on Russian oil refining infrastructure.
An AN-196 Liutyi long-range drone being prepared for launch.
German funding will likely support both the expansion of production capacity within Ukrainian factories and the procurement of drone and missile components from abroad. While Ukrainian manufacturing is characterized by a high degree of independence from external suppliers, certain areas still rely on imported components. One such area is mini-jet engine production for long-range drones and cruise missiles. For example, the Palianytsia long-range drone is manufactured by a Ukrainian company inside Ukraine, but its propulsion system — the AI-PBS-350 turbojet engine — is produced in the Czech Republic as part of a joint development between the Czech firm PBS Velká Bíteš and Ukraine’s Ivchenko-Progress SE.
It is also possible that the funding will be used to scale up production of some of Ukraine’s “heavier” missile projects, which despite some notable successes have struggled to gain momentum. A prime example is the Neptune cruise missile, an anti-ship system that was credited with the sinking of the Moskva cruiser but which was later adapted for land-attack missions. Ukraine is also officially developing at least one ballistic missile, the Hrim-2 short-range ballistic missile system, which could benefit from German financial support.
The Neptune cruise missile is credited with the sinking of the Moskva cruiser in April 2022.
Financial assistance could, in theory, also include technology transfers from German missile manufacturers, though this seems unlikely.
First, Ukrainian technologies, whether domestically developed or sourced externally, are already tailored to Ukraine’s operational requirements, whereas German systems may not be. There is also the issue of whether German manufacturers would be willing to part with intellectual property, even in the event that they were given government compensation.
Second, Ukraine’s most pressing need is likely in the area of missile propulsion, and here German firms have limited expertise to offer. For instance, the Taurus KEPD 350 cruise missile’s turbofan engine is sourced from the United States, and German manufacturers do not currently build solid-fuel missile engines for use in ballistic missiles (though German defense contractor Rheinmetall plans to do so from 2027 to 2028 onwards as part of a joint venture with American defense contractor Lockheed Martin).
The fact that German missile producers themselves depend on foreign suppliers for key components also means that Germany could not simply share the Taurus blueprints with Kyiv and have Ukrainian engineers build the missile in Ukraine.
Does the financing deal mean Taurus will not be delivered?
The future of Taurus deliveries remains uncertain. In 2025 the need for Taurus is arguably lower than it would have been earlier on in the full-scale war, even if plenty of good reasons to supply the missile remain.
In principle, Ukraine should now be able to service around 80 to 90 percent of relevant Russian targets with its own long-range strike weapons. This means that in contrast to the situation that prevailed in 2022, Ukraine is no longer dependent on Western assistance to deploy a credible long-range strike capability.
In addition, while the Taurus has a longer range than the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG (700–800 km vs. 560 km), it does not exceed the reach of several Ukrainian missile and drone systems (including the missiles and long-range drones which are reported to be included in the financing package). In fact, some of Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities significantly outrange the Taurus. With or without a Taurus delivery, Ukraine therefore retains the ability to hold at risk most high-value Russian targets located at both operational and strategic depth.
However, there are targets Ukrainian systems struggle to strike effectively, mainly due to payload limitations. Most Ukrainian long-range weapons carry relatively small warheads — typically between 20 and 100 kg — whereas the Taurus carries a 450 kg multi-effect warhead, combining a primary shaped charge with a follow-on penetrator. This makes it capable of targeting heavily hardened and deeply buried sites that Ukraine’s domestically-built systems cannot effectively engage.
In addition, the damage inflicted on soft targets, such as oil refineries, by a single Taurus missile would be significantly more severe and harder to repair than that caused by a lighter Ukrainian cruise missile or long-range drone.
Moreover, the Taurus is uniquely suited to strike bridge targets thanks to its advanced fuse, which can detect and count distinct layers and void spaces penetrated by the penetrator. This allows the warhead to detonate at the optimal point to maximize damage — typically after penetrating the bridge deck (first layer) and exploding within a supporting pillar (second layer). If the objective is to destroy the Kerch Bridge with minimal missile expenditure, Taurus is the most capable system in Western arsenals for that task.
The aftermath of the explosion on the Kerch Strait Bridge in October 2022.
Photo: AFP
Lastly, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the Taurus missile. Like Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG, it is a relatively old system (albeit slightly more modern than its British and French counterparts). Russian air and missile defenses, which have recently demonstrated improved effectiveness against Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG, may achieve a reasonable intercept rate against Taurus as well. Moreover, it remains unclear how the German-Swedish missile might perform against Russia’s advanced electronic warfare capabilities.
Combined with the relatively limited number of Taurus missiles Germany could provide without constraining its own operational planning too much — likely in the range of 50 to 100 — the overall impact could be fairly limited.
Overall, there remains a clear military rationale for delivering Taurus in 2025, but it is no longer as compelling as it was in 2022 or 2023. It is understandable that President Zelensky still seeks access to the missile and that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would certainly accept it if offered, though it likely no longer ranks as a top priority.
Due to inaction by the previous German government of Olaf Scholz, the Taurus cruise missile would still need to be integrated onto Ukrainian aircraft before it could be used, and personnel would require training. This process would likely take at least three months —and possibly up to twelve, with six months being a realistic estimate.
Lastly, given that Merz has recently stated no further details will be shared on the scope or timing of future weapons deliveries, any Taurus transfer would likely become public only once the missiles arrive in Ukraine. This means that even if Taurus deliveries were quietly included in the financing package, confirmation would likely still be several months away.
Does this mean we can stop discussing the Taurus missile?
Although the military rationale for delivery has diminished in significance, the political rationale remains as strong as ever. In fact, Germany may now stand to gain more from delivering the missile to Ukraine than Ukraine itself does from receiving it. There are two reasons for this:
First, Taurus has arguably become the strongest symbol of German risk aversion and escalation angst. The previous government’s refusal to deliver the system, while explicitly linking this decision to Russian nuclear threats, has undermined perceptions of German resolve and highlighted the vulnerability of German society to nuclear coercion.
There is therefore an urgent need for the German government to address these perceptions. Failing to do so risks further eroding Germany’s and Europe’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia, potentially increasing the risk of a Russian attack. Reversing the previous decision and delivering Taurus may be seen as a necessary first step to solving the problem.
Second, the credibility of the new government, particularly that of Chancellor Friedrich Merz himself, is directly linked to the delivery of Taurus. Before taking office, Merz consistently called for providing the cruise missile to Ukraine. Now that he holds power, failing to act on that initiative may undermine his credibility — domestically, in Europe, and internationally. This is all the more pressing following his poorly handled ceasefire ultimatum last month, which expired without any apparent consequences for Russia.
If Taurus is ultimately not delivered, Germany would need to offer something of comparable political weight. One option could be to provide substantial financial and technical support — where feasible — for Ukraine’s ballistic missile program, with the aim of accelerating development and rapidly scaling up production of this critical capability. Such a move would send a clear signal that Germany will no longer allow Russian nuclear threats to dictate the terms of its support for a country defending itself from an unjustifiable war of aggression.
As noted above, this type of support may be part of the current plan, but there is no public indication that it is — at least not yet.