On Jan. 30, Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson announced a $1.2 billion military aid package for Ukraine. Around half of the funds will be directed toward producing missiles, drones, and, perhaps most importantly, artillery — an element that remains crucial on the battlefield despite the rise of new weaponry. Kyiv is approaching artillery parity with Moscow, but North Korea’s material support for Russia risks tipping the balance. The Insider’s defense and security columnist Colby Badhwar argues that the most effective way to assist Ukraine is by investing in its domestic ammunition production, an initiative that requires immediate funding.
Some things never really change. The war in Ukraine is simultaneously at the cutting edge of technological innovation and eerily reminiscent of battlefields of the past. Save for the buzzing of drones overhead, the fighting on the frontlines is remarkably similar to the hellscapes of the First World War. Muddy trenches, shell crater scarred fields, and scorched treelines are all common sights in eastern Ukraine.
The most glaring similarity though, is the importance of artillery. While drones have evolved from just simple tools of observation to become lethal weapons in their own right, they have not substantially diminished the role of conventional indirect fire. As the war approaches the start of its fourth year, Ukraine’s success in scaling up production of drones has not diminished their need for tube and rocket artillery. The Russians too have gone to great lengths to maintain their advantage in the weight of fires that can be brought to bear. While there are indications that the scales may be evening, there is risk of Russia’s advantage widening over the next year, rather than shrinking. Now is the time for Ukraine’s supporters to redouble their efforts, so that they can be put into the strongest possible position for inevitable negotiations.
Fragile parity
To begin with the good news, General Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, recently stated in an interview with Ukrainian TV channel TSN that:
“For several months now, the artillery ammunition expenditure rates in the Russian army have practically halved. If previously the figure reached up to 40,000 rounds per day, it is now significantly lower.”
If Russian forces are indeed only firing around 20,000 rounds per day, then Ukrainian forces, which General Syrskyi previously stated were firing approximately 15,000 rounds per day, are rapidly approaching parity. Ukraine has not been able to come close to matching Russia’s volume of indirect fires since the first few months of the war, so this is a potentially significant development. Achieving parity in artillery fire alone will likely not enable any decisive outcome in the war, but it is key to redressing Russia’s advantage in manpower.
The Ukrainian military needs to be inflicting significantly more casualties on the enemy than they are taking themselves. Matching Russia’s artillery fire will do much to further that objective, especially considering the greater lethality of Western-provided systems compared to Soviet and Russian ones.
Ukraine cannot count on Russia’s supply of ammunition suffering further degradation though. In the same assessment provided by General Syrskyi last year, Russia was believed to be firing approximately 70,000 rounds per day during the first 5 months of 2024. Returning to those heights is not something that can be achieved overnight, but Russia has demonstrated the ability to ramp up production and has its own international sources of support as well. Chief among them is North Korea. Reports of North Korean ammunition being supplied to Russian first emerged in October 2023, and by the end of that month open-source analysis from Frontelligence indicated that 500,000 large calibre artillery rounds (122mm and 152mm) had already been delivered.
M-1989 Koksan self-propelled artillery units transferred to Russian forces by North Korea.
By October 2024, South Korea’s Defense Intelligence Agency had assessed that over 9 million artillery rounds had been delivered. By now that figure certainly exceeds 10 million, given that military cooperation between the two countries has only continued to escalate over the last year and a half. In 2024 Pyongyang supplied Moscow with 148 KN-23 short range ballistic missiles, and will deliver another 150 this year, as per General Budanov, the chief of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence.
North Korea has also, of course, gone so far as to send its own combat forces to join the Russians in their war of aggression, and with them they have brought 120 170mm M1989 Koksan self propelled howitzers and 120 M1991 240mm multiple launch rocket systems. General Budanov added that he expected at least that many more of those two systems would be provided in the future, along with more ballistic missiles. The downward trajectory of Russia’s artillery expenditures could accordingly be temporary. While Ukraine has enjoyed some success in disrupting Russia’s defense industrial base with missile and drone strikes, North Korea may be able to offset this with increased material support.
Uninterrupted support
While the latter half of 2024 saw Ukraine’s own international supporters finally begin to come through with increased quantities of ammunition being delivered, 2025 will test their ability to maintain the pace. At the latest meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Ramstein, Germany, Czech Defense Minister Černochová stated that her country’s initiative had delivered approximately 1.5 million large calibre artillery rounds, a third of which were 155mm.
Černochová expressed the desire of the Czech government to continue the initiative this year, but there is trouble on the horizon. Czechs head to the polls in October, and the current government is widely expected to be defeated by the opposition, which intends to cancel the ammunition initiative. Alternative arrangements to continue this vital supply of artillery rounds should be made now in order to ensure there is no disruption.
One option on the same model comes by way of Estonia. In March 2024, Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur revealed that Tallinn has its own contacts among international munitions suppliers. Very little has been written about this since then, but recently, Estonia’s National Armaments Director commented that “other initiatives” are delivering ammunition to Ukraine, referencing Germany’s supply of ammunition, much of which comes via the Czech efforts. This offers a very easy solution: just replace one initiative with another. Procuring ammunition on the international market from non-aligned countries only goes so far though, especially given the reports of quality issues with these rounds.
Ukraine is still counting on a steady supply of artillery ammunition from Europe and the United States. In the latter case, there are still stockpiles available to tap into as well, in addition to what can be produced by America’s ammunition plants. Critically, only the United States can supply certain specialty rounds like the M864 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition and M692/M731 Area Denial Artillery Munition. For the time being, previously promised deliveries of weapons, ammunition, and equipment from the U.S. Department of Defense’s stocks continue. President Trump’s special envoy on the War, General (Ret.) Keith Kellogg, has noted that providing Ukraine with more powerful arms provides important leverage for getting Russia to come to the negotiating table in good faith. An imminent termination of military support currently seems unlikely, but Ukraine’s European supporters should be ready to pick up the slack in any case.
Hesitant Europe
Despite widespread fears that Trump would in fact abandon Ukraine, many European governments continue to proceed with half measures in their own efforts to back Kyiv. At the end of December, EU Commissioner for Defence Andrius Kubilius told Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske that EU member states would produce 2 million artillery rounds in 2025. There are two problems though.
First, the accuracy of such figures from the EU has always been impossible to verify, as most individual countries and defense firms do not disclose their production numbers on a routine basis, if at all. Second, Ukraine does not receive 100% of Europe’s production capacity. The Ukrainian government has raised this issue in the past.
A significant portion of what the EU produces is sold to international customers rather than going to Ukraine. Some EU countries also choose to prioritize replenishing their own national stockpiles over delivering ammunition to Kyiv, meaning that even if the EU does manage to produce 2 million rounds this year, only a fraction of that will end up in Ukraine. We know the United States, by comparison, can currently produce approximately 600,000 155mm rounds per year and will reach their target of 1.2 million per year by the end of 2025. They also have stockpiles to draw on to supplement their production, whereas most European arsenals have been severely depleted.
While the production expansion plan that the U.S. Department of Defense came up with is certainly less ambitious than it should have been, the Pentagon has substantial budget increases to look forward to. Congressional leaders are pushing for an additional $200 billion in defense spending over two years. American defense firms also have much greater access to private capital to finance their endeavors than their counterparts in Europe do.
Admiral Bauer, Chair of NATO’s Military Committee, has condemned the continent’s banks and pension funds as being “stupid” for their aversion to investing in defense firms. Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies are prohibiting many institutional funds from putting money in defense, and the EU’s common budget also prohibits it. General Walker, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army, has raised the same concerns, saying:
“Environmental, social, governance standards view defence investments in the same company as adult entertainment, tobacco, and gambling.”
The EU’s rules on deficit spending are also a significant impediment to increasing investment in the defense industry and weapons procurement. The past three years could have seen a Europe that is far more industrialized and better armed had these policies been changed immediately in the wake of Russia’s invasion. Instead, these changes are only just now even being considered in earnest.
President Trump’s call for the NATO alliance to collectively spend 5% of GDP on defense may finally push the derelict members into action. Countries like Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland are already leading by example, with plans to reach those levels imminently. Those three are not among Europe’s industrial powers though. Even if wealthy western Europe invests more substantially in defense production and procurement, there will not be immediate returns. Ukraine would not see additional ammunition from France’s Nexter or Norway’s Nammo for some time.
Factories, not rounds
In the short term, the best way to increase Ukraine’s firepower is to invest more into the country’s domestic defense industry and to provide more budgetary support to the Ukrainian government. The provision of $50 billion in loans backed by Russia’s frozen assets is a very good first step in this effort, though more will still be needed.
155mm artillery shells in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Photo: Aris Messinis / AFP
Last November. the Wall Street Journal reported that Ukraine’s defense industry was still operating at just 30% of its total possible capacity due to insufficient funding. Bringing that up to 100% would provide a major injection of war material into the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Lower operating costs in Ukraine mean that dollars and euros go a lot further than they do in the U.S. or Europe. Ukraine is already producing approximately two million mortar rounds and 500,000 large caliber howitzer rounds per year, with capacity for more provided that sufficient funding and materials are accessible.
Making Ukraine more self-sufficient in the field of defense requirements is a good investment in the long term, but it is also essential to the country’s survival in the short term. If President Trump’s goal of ending the war as soon as possible cannot be realized, then both the United States and Europe must continue to ensure that they will be better positioned to supply Ukraine as the year goes on. North Korea cannot be allowed to tip the scales back in Russia’s favour though. If Budanov is correct, there are a lot more guns, shells, rockets, and missiles coming. This is a war of industrial production, and the main measure of that for the past three years has been artillery. It is still the King of Battle.