Kooks, antisemites, and scammers: Fringe figures are driving the narrative around Poland’s presidential runoff

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The war in Ukraine has turned Poland into a major focal point in European politics. The country, which has taken in millions of refugees, has become a critical logistics hub for nearly all aid flowing to Ukraine and a key architect and ideological driver of sanctions against the Kremlin.

Unsurprisingly, all of Europe watched closely as Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections radically reshaped its domestic political landscape. After eight years of unchallenged rule by the right-wing populist Law and Justice party — under Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and President Andrzej Duda — a new ruling coalition came to power. It included liberals from the Civic Coalition led by Donald Tusk, centrist conservatives from Szymon Hołownia’s Third Way, and left-wing parties including Lewica (“The Left”) and Razem (“Together”).

This alliance, which branded itself the “15 October Coalition,” was necessary for former European Council President Donald Tusk to reclaim the role of prime minister for a third time. From 2015 to 2023, conservatives held complete control: the PiS-affiliated Morawiecki served as prime minister, while Duda, from the same camp, remained president.

A backlash eventually arrived, driven largely by accusations of rampant institutional corruption and cronyism within PiS. The number of scandals involving ministers and officials from the nationalist-populist camp defies easy counting.

The migration agency, operating under a government that publicly opposed immigration, was accused of illegally selling visas. Prosecutor General Zbigniew Ziobro, head of the anti-corruption police Mariusz Kamiński, and his deputy Maciej Wąsik faced allegations of using the intelligence services for political ends, spying on opponents, and later embezzling money from the Justice Fund, which is intended to support victims of crime. The defense minister was accused of having ties to Russia and of undermining NATO. And the list goes on.

Although Poland is a parliamentary republic where the prime minister is the most powerful figure, there is a widespread but misleading belief that the presidency is purely ceremonial. In reality, the president holds significant sway over foreign policy.

“At the very least, the president confirms or rejects ambassadors, hosts foreign leaders, and makes international visits,” said political scientist Łukasz Jasina, a former spokesperson for the Polish Foreign Ministry. “So who becomes president is a critical question for Poland’s foreign policy.”

Domestically, the presidency is also influential. Since 2023, President Andrzej Duda has remained the last figure in power from the Law and Justice party. He has used his presidential authority to pardon former security officials convicted of corruption — even sheltering them in the presidential palace — and, more consequentially, vetoed nearly every initiative from the new parliamentary majority and Prime Minister Tusk’s government. His use of the veto has demoralized lawmakers and anti-corruption advocates within the 15 October Coalition.

Why propose legislation if the president is just going to block it? That is why this presidential election is a pivotal battle for both PiS and the coalition opposed to it. A win for Trzaskowski would finally allow the coalition to advance key reforms. A win for Nawrocki would preserve the current political gridlock, in which the parliamentary majority lacks the votes to override presidential vetoes.

Although the coalition is united in parliament, its members chose to run separately in the presidential election. The liberal Civic Coalition nominated Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski. PiS put forward Karol Nawrocki, the head of the Institute of National Remembrance. The left could not agree on a single candidate — not with Tusk, nor among themselves — and ended up fielding three: Magdalena Biejat, the young deputy speaker of the Senate from The Left; Adrian Zandberg, a Sejm deputy from Together, which split from The Left; and Joanna Senyszyn, an older figure who in the days of the Polish People’s Republic managed to be a member of both the communist United Workers' Party and the dissident movement Solidarity.

The centrist Third Way and the Polish People's Party nominated Sejm Speaker Szymon Hołownia. In the third tier of candidates were a motley crew of independents with no parliamentary support: journalist Maciej Maczak, video blogger Krzysztof Stanowski, local government official Marek Woch, economist Artur Bartoszewicz, and entrepreneur Marcin Jakubiak.

Maczak twice expressed sympathy for Vladimir Putin during the campaign over the “amount of hate” directed at him over the war in Ukraine. Jakubiak advocated limiting aid to Ukraine and reinstating military conscription. The most radical figure among them was Grzegorz Braun, a far-right monarchist and outspoken antisemite. Along with fellow right-wing populist Sławomir Mentzen, Braun achieved notable success, even managing to force institutional candidates to engage with their agenda.

Big kook, little kook

“This is a citizen’s arrest! A citizen’s arrest! Please do not run away!” shouted a large elderly man in expensive glasses with a neatly trimmed beard as he chased an obstetrician down a hospital corridor in the town of Oleśnica. Days earlier, the doctor had performed a late-term abortion due to risks to the mother’s health.

The doctor eventually managed to lock herself in an office, where her pursuer shut her in. Police were called to the scene but did not detain him — his identity was unmistakable. The “citizen’s arrest” had been carried out by none other than Sejm Deputy Grzegorz Braun.

Braun uses his parliamentary status in highly unorthodox ways. A few years ago, inside the Sejm, he doused a Hanukkah menorah — installed by Poland’s Jewish community to mark the holiday — using a fire extinguisher. The incident in Oleśnica wasn’t his first clash with healthcare professionals either. In 2022, he assaulted the head of the Cardiology Center, Łukasz Szumowski, accusing him of “sanitary segregation” and physically fighting him while again invoking a “citizen’s arrest.”

The political beliefs of Grzegorz Braun — Poland’s modern-day version of Anton Chekhov’s authoritarian caricature Sergeant Prishibeyev — are evident from his actions: he is an anti-vaxxer, an antisemite, a staunch anti-abortion activist, and a monarchist. The electoral alliance he leads is even named the Confederation of the Polish Crown. During his presidential campaign, Braun focused heavily on Ukraine, calling for an end to aid to Kyiv — and to aid for refugees fleeing Ukraine’s eastern regions.

Fringe figures like Braun — though not always as flamboyant or aggressive — exist in nearly every EU country. The problem is that, in Poland’s recent election, Braun placed fourth, securing 6.34% of the vote — which is a number no serious candidate can afford to ignore or dismiss. As a result, both remaining contenders are being forced to walk a tightrope, weighing which parts of Braun’s rhetoric they can adopt without tarnishing their reputations — especially on the broader EU stage.

But the real political minefield has been laid by Sławomir Mentzen, the breakout star among the underdog candidates in Poland’s first-round vote. The youthful-looking contender, known for his stoic demeanor and soccer-fan haircut, secured an impressive 14.8% of the vote, placing third overall. Among young voters, according to aggregated exit polls, he actually came in first.

Mentzen leads yet another party named “Confederation” — a group with a title similar to Braun’s monarchists, but nonetheless ideologically distinct, bringing together right-wing nationalists and right-wing libertarians, a synthesis he laid out clearly as far back as 2019: “We don't want Jews, gays, abortion, taxes and the EU.” Like his older political ally Grzegorz Braun, Mentzen opposes aid to Ukraine and to Ukrainian refugees in Poland, supports blocking Ukraine’s NATO membership, and advocates for a sharply reduced role of the state in society. The once-marginal figure has emerged as the potential kingmaker in Poland’s presidential runoff.

Mentzen poses a major challenge for the ruling coalition of liberals, centrists, and the left. First, his rhetoric and platform clearly align more closely with the nationalist-populist Law and Justice party than with their liberal or leftist rivals. That means, if their candidate wants to attract Mentzen’s voters, he may need to adopt radical — and potentially toxic — positions. The second challenge lies in Mentzen’s voter base itself: polls show his supporters are overwhelmingly young people aged 18 to 29. In that demographic, he received 36.8% of the vote. This is the same group the Civic Coalition has traditionally relied on to beat Law and Justice, and often lost when it failed to turn them out.

Unsurprisingly, after the first-round results were finalized, Mentzen turned up the pressure with what amounted to political blackmail: he demanded that both second-round candidates appear on his YouTube channel for an interview and, live on air, sign the “Mentzen Declaration.” The document calls for the next president to pledge not to endorse any legislation that restricts constitutional rights, limits gun access, cedes Polish sovereignty to the EU, or weakens the national currency, the złoty. It also calls for vetoes of any bills sending Polish troops to Ukraine or raising taxes.

“I won’t sign anything, but we’ll talk honestly,” responded Trzaskowski, who — besides being a presidential candidate — is also the sitting mayor of Warsaw, no stranger to high-stakes political maneuvering. For many of his voters, even meeting Mentzen over a beer would be scandalous. But avoiding the interview was not an option.

Nawrocki, on the other hand, who is ideologically closer to Mentzen, went a step further and signed the declaration on May 22. During the discussion, Nawrocki appeared even more Mentzen-like than Mentzen himself, and more “Confederate” than the Confederation, according to Katarzyna Przyborska, a columnist for Krytyka Polityczna, who called the entire interview “lubricated” in tone while speaking on TVN.

Left-wing politician Adrian Zandberg, a Sejm member from the Together party and one of the top youth vote-getters in the election, had scathing words for Nawrocki’s performance.

“I watched Karol Nawrocki completely grovel before Sławomir Mentzen — saying ‘yes’ before the questions were even finished, signing everything no matter how much it contradicted what his own political camp had stood for over the years,” Zandberg said on Polsat News.

Political analyst Łukasz Jasina, a former spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry during the Law and Justice administration and a supporter of Nawrocki in this election, had a different impression. “To be honest, the conversation didn’t strike me as particularly consequential — it was very soft and non-confrontational,” he told The Insider. “Both candidates were extremely cautious, clearly aiming not to damage themselves or each other. Probably because polls show that around 70% of Mentzen’s voters already plan to back Nawrocki.”

Trzaskowski also appeared in Mentzen’s studio, staying relaxed and choosing to agree with four out of the declaration’s eight points. He endorsed maintaining current gun rights and cash circulation, promised not to introduce new taxes, and pledged not to send Polish troops to Ukraine. But he firmly committed to supporting Ukraine’s bids for NATO and EU membership.

“I want Putin to break his teeth in Ukraine, not in Poland,” Trzaskowski declared. “He only understands the language of force, and there will be no peace without security guarantees — especially from the United States.” As for signing any document, the liberal candidate declined, saying that the 600,000 viewers of Mentzen’s channel were already witnesses to his words.

Real estate scammer or president?

Karol Nawrocki’s unconditional signing of the Mentzen Declaration was no accident. Though officially an independent candidate, Nawrocki — head of the Institute of National Remembrance — is widely recognized as the proxy of the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (PiS). After its defeat in the 2023 elections, PiS hesitated for months before announcing a candidate, ultimately deciding against putting forward party chairman Jarosław Kaczyński, whose age and overexposure had worn thin with the electorate.

Instead, the presidential bid was handed to a younger figure — the director of the Institute of National Remembrance, a key Polish institution that not only functions as a state archive but also nominates individuals for lustration, the vetting process applied in Poland to former officials and security service personnel who served under the communist regime. Like the heads of many other institutions, he was appointed during the Law and Justice government.

But as The Insider previously reported, Nawrocki hardly resembles a deskbound academic or an “archive worm.” He often schedules interviews with journalists in the gym — a space he clearly frequents more than the library. In his younger years, the Gdańsk native worked as a nightclub bouncer and reportedly had ties with members of the local criminal underworld — including one nicknamed “Big Bu” (“Wielki Bu”). Contacting Bu today is difficult; he now resides in Dubai, evading Polish justice over a kidnapping charge. Still, a photograph of Nawrocki with “Bu” recently made the rounds online.

That wasn’t Nawrocki’s only scandal. Just ahead of the election, reports emerged about a 2010 contract he signed with a financially desperate man named Jerzy S. The agreement was structured as a life annuity secured by the elderly man’s apartment, formalized as a 20% interest loan. Under the agreement, Nawrocki was obligated to provide financial support to the elderly man and make him a one-time payment of 120,000 złoty. Multiple journalists have reported that the trail of that money quickly became murky.

Jerzy S. is now living in a shelter, and the apartment in question has reportedly been sold by Nawrocki to a new owner. Nawrocki’s political opponents seized on the scandal. During a presidential debate, Rafał Trzaskowski handed his rival an envelope containing Jerzy S.’s bank account number — where the money, he said, should be sent.

Unlike Trzaskowski — the popular mayor of Warsaw and a prominent leader in the Civic Coalition — Nawrocki had no political experience prior to this campaign.

Trzaskowski, who resembles an American-style yuppie, appears to be crafting both his image and his platform in deliberate contrast to the political eccentrics who dominated the first round. He rarely attacks Law and Justice (PiS) directly, instead calling for national unity in the face of shared challenges — unlike his own party, which has declared all-out war on the former ruling bloc, and employing state security services, prosecutors, and anti-corruption agencies in the fight. Still, he hasn't held back against his opponent: the live handover of Jerzy S.’s bank details was a powerful moment, but not the only blow aimed at Karol Nawrocki. After Nawrocki's interview with Mentzen, the Warsaw mayor branded him “a chameleon who is coming to power to further divide us.”

Trzaskowski’s platform emphasizes “economic patriotism” — cutting red tape for small and medium businesses, boosting the defense industry, and investing in regional development. However, it also contains several positions more commonly associated with the right — like his proposal to end welfare payments to unemployed Ukrainian refugees, a policy that could disproportionately affect single mothers with young children.

Trzaskowski has also called for limiting immigration — a position that, paradoxically, places the Civic Coalition to the right of even its radical opponents. After taking office, Donald Tusk’s government quickly moved to shut down the Poland Business Harbor program, which had allowed skilled foreign workers to obtain visas and residency at relatively low cost.

A probe has also been launched into 27 diplomats suspected of involvement in a visa-for-cash scheme. Various estimates suggest that hundreds of thousands of migrants — including from the Middle East and Asia — entered Poland under these arrangements, allegedly with the knowledge of the Foreign Ministry.

For his part, the PiS-backed candidate Nawrocki is offering a “dam” (a guarantee of his veto, in his words) against any tax hikes for Polish citizens, along with proposals to give Poles priority access to social benefits, cut VAT to 22%, and eliminate income taxes for families with two or more children — though he has offered little explanation of how he would fund such measures.

There are also several headline-grabbing elements in Trzaskowski’s platform that set him apart and make him a target for conservative critics: support for legalizing same-sex marriage, easing abortion laws to the point of full legalization, a strong emphasis on gender equality, and a commitment to protecting women’s rights. On foreign policy, he backs Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

Nawrocki, on the other hand, wants to further tighten Poland’s already strict abortion laws and does not recognize members of the LGBT+ community as legitimate participants in public life. The PiS candidate is calling for a legal ban on adoption by same-sex couples — even though no such right currently exists in Poland — and has pledged to scrap “equality lessons” in schools, introduced under the current liberal government. That part of his platform is labeled “No to Ideology in Schools.”

Despite leading in the first round, Trzaskowski is finding himself boxed in by far-right talking points. Much of his campaign has been spent responding to issues framed by fringe candidates: limits on immigration, reduced aid to Ukraine, and guarantees that Polish troops will not be deployed in the Russia-Ukraine war. With the margin between the two candidates razor-thin, Trzaskowski is reluctant to directly confront these views, wary of alienating potential swing voters — especially disillusioned conservatives who may be tempted to support him simply out of frustration with PiS.

“As polls show, about a quarter of Mentzen’s voters—roughly 3.7% of the electorate—could back Trzaskowski in the runoff,” political analyst Łukasz Jasina told The Insider. “These are people who withdrew their support from PiS after the pandemic [either due to the measures that were taken or the ones that weren’t].”

Both candidates have complicated relationships with their respective political camps. For much of the campaign, Civic Coalition leader and Prime Minister Donald Tusk remained silent about his deputy’s run. But following the first-round results, he unleashed a blistering attack on the previous PiS-led government and its current Sejm faction: “Your only principle is that you have no principles! It’s all about money — you see nothing but złotys. You’ll sell out Poland! You will end up [in prison]!”

Meanwhile, Jarosław Kaczyński has been distancing himself from Nawrocki. “Nawrocki is a citizen candidate. He’s not a PiS candidate — he’s a candidate supported by PiS,” he told voters at a campaign event. In one particularly telling moment, Kaczyński even conceded that Trzaskowski had an advantage in foreign affairs due to his connections with former U.S. President Donald Trump — although on May 1, Nawrocki made his own trip to Washington and secured a meeting with the current U.S. president.

Kaczyński understands that he has had to back a candidate who questions many of PiS’s defining policies — especially its support for Ukraine and its commitment to defending Poland’s eastern flank in the event of a Russian advance. His real fear is not public accusations of hypocrisy, but the possibility that this relatively unknown candidate could evolve into an unpredictable political force, deviating from the PiS line and siphoning off its voter base.

And yet, it may be precisely Nawrocki’s willingness to meet the demands of Poland’s radical right fringe that allows him to secure their support — and deal Trzaskowski an electoral defeat.

Friends, left and center

Rafał Trzaskowski and his Civic Coalition may have one last ace up their sleeve: their partners in the ruling parliamentary alliance, with whom they chose to part ways for the first round of the presidential election and run separately. Chief among these allies are the moderate conservatives of the Third Way. Their leader, Sejm Speaker and charismatic orator Szymon Hołownia, outperformed polling expectations, winning 6.6% of the vote. He has since formally endorsed Trzaskowski.

Magdalena Biejat, the youthful left-wing leader and deputy speaker of the Senate, also decided to support the liberal candidate. She earned 4.23% of the vote and now calls on her voters to back Trzaskowski. The Left shares Civic Coalition’s broadly “European” agenda — the liberalization of Poland’s abortion laws, gender equality, and a focus on women’s rights — while adding left-wing policies such as increased social spending on healthcare and a state-funded housing initiative.

But not all on the left have fallen in line. Biejat’s leftist counterpart and rival Adrian Zandberg, who won slightly more votes — 4.86% — was far more hesitant. Like Sławomir Mentzen, he first demanded a public conversation with Trzaskowski, though not in a livestream format. Ultimately, he declined to endorse either candidate.

“Zandberg isn’t a fringe figure, to be fair,” says political analyst Łukasz Jasina. “He’s a very consistent politician: he says the same things he did ten years ago, holds the same views, and achieves about the same result.”

Zandberg and Mentzen share more than their status as potential kingmakers — they appeal to a similar demographic: young voters. According to an Ipsos poll, 18% of voters aged 18 to 29 supported Zandberg. For a politician who split from a mainstream, albeit left-wing, party, this marks a significant achievement. He emerged as the frontrunner among left-wing candidates — though only narrowly ahead of Magdalena Biejat, who received 4.23% compared to his 4.86%.

Within government circles, discussions have already begun about offering Zandberg a role — perhaps as deputy PM or head of a proposed new Ministry of Housing Policy. But right now, what Trzaskowski needs most are votes, particularly from the left. Securing support from the voters of all three allied candidates — especially those on the left — will be crucial. Because the backers of Mentzen and Braun are all but certain to gravitate toward the more ideologically aligned Karol Nawrocki.

Looking at the first-round results, it’s clear that the Polish right currently holds more electoral capital. Turnout, however, will be the decisive factor. The higher it climbs, the better the odds for the liberals. Nevertheless, political analyst Łukasz Jasina believes that, heading into the runoff, Karol Nawrocki has the momentum.

“Nawrocki has overcome more challenges than his opponent and has stepped into the role of frontrunner — a position Rafał Trzaskowski held until just before the second round,” Jasina told The Insider.

An “Alternative” for Poland?

Regardless of the actual outcome of Poland’s presidential runoff, one thing has become clear: Europe’s surprise at Poland’s deviation from the continental trend was short-lived. When Polish voters backed liberals and the left in 2023 — at a time when the far right was surging in France, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, the Netherlands, and elsewhere — it looked like a break from the pattern. But now, the rightward shift appears to have caught up with Poland too.

“I think it’s the same mechanism we’re seeing across Europe. Poland is not different — it’s not unique in this,” said political analyst and commentator Grzegorz Ślubowski. In his view, even the 2023 election shouldn't be seen as a major liberal triumph. “I wouldn’t call that election a huge success for Civic Platform. The coalition wasn’t a conquest — it all hung by a thread,” he told The Insider, noting that Donald Tusk had to cobble together every possible faction to form a government capable of opposing Law and Justice (PiS).

By nominating a politically unknown candidate, Karol Nawrocki, PiS tapped into a real public demand for new faces. That same impulse explains the success of Sławomir Mentzen, the strong numbers for far-right provocateur Grzegorz Braun, and even the relatively good showing by the “non-mainstream” leftist Adrian Zandberg.

Ślubowski says the current political moment marks a true breakthrough for the right, which has now taken on the traditional role of protest parties. “The main issue driving voters toward these new right-wing forces, as opposed to traditional conservatives, is migration,” he explained. “It’s not about personalities — it’s about a new approach. Mainstream parties [both liberal and nationalist] have reached a consensus on the issue. Their positions have become indistinguishable. So people are voting for something new, for something completely different.”

“Whether that’s a good idea is a whole other discussion,” Ślubowski added. “It’s easy to criticize or make demands when you're not the one in power. Making decisions is a lot harder than pointing out problems.”

So how have these new parties managed to connect so effectively with voters? Ślubowski points to the role of social media. Traditional media, he argues, no longer carries the same weight, while platforms like YouTube and Facebook allow candidates to speak directly to their audiences.

“Mentzen simply invites rivals to his studio, and suddenly everyone is quoting and reposting clips from his YouTube channel, not the other way around,” Ślubowski said. “In my view, Braun, Zandberg, and Mentzen have all succeeded thanks to social media.” According to Ślubowski, social platforms have given a boost specifically to those candidates with a strong base among younger voters.

Statistics back that up: Facebook alone has nearly 30 million users in Poland, a country with a population of about 38.5 million. Among young Poles, social media usage is virtually universal — nearly every young person uses at least one platform.

Today, these three figures are driving the conversation for the leading candidates. But tomorrow, they could be the ones in power. If that happens, even Law and Justice might be remembered by its current opponents as a relatively tame and manageable sparring partner. After all, it was the PiS government and presidency that, in 2022, took in five million refugees, coordinated military aid to Ukraine, and placed Poland’s armed forces on high alert. A new generation of politicians appears to be stepping forward — one that, instead of offering support, tells Ukrainians either to return home or to stay in Poland without benefits, and proposes leaving their embattled country without aid, or even without the promise of it.