Changing channels: How three years of Kremlin propaganda bans in the EU have affected Russian-speaking audiences

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Latvia: Channel bans and the decline of pro-Russian political parties

Given their shared border with Russia, the Baltic states took the fight against Russian propaganda particularly seriously following the start of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The efforts appear to have paid off: in Latvia, pro-Russian political parties are losing support, while public backing for Ukraine has surged. Latvians are actively donating money, organizing charity events, and continuing to welcome and support Ukrainian refugees. According to surveys, 78% of Latvians remain in favor of supplying military aid to Ukraine, while 63.7% believe that helping Ukraine is tantamount to protecting Latvia from a potential Russian invasion.

Attitudes towards Russia as a state have changed completely. According to a report by the SKDS Center for Public Opinion Research, in 2021, 48% of Latvians had a favorable view of Russia — a year later, that number had dropped to just 20%. Public opinion measurements conducted by Berg Research indicate that two-thirds of Latvia’s population now hold a negative view of Russia.

The number of people willing to support Ukraine until it defeats Russia has risen from 57.7% in 2023 to 61.7% in 2024, while 66% of Latvians firmly believe that Russia is responsible for starting the war. Moreover, nearly half of the population, 48.2%, are willing to endure rising prices in order to help stop the Russian invasion.

While the war itself has been the primary driver of this shift, experts say that restricting Russian media and countering disinformation also played a role. Latvia had already been blocking some Russian channels since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. These temporary bans, lasting for months to a year, mostly targeted channels run by Russia’s state-controlled VGTRK network, such as “Russia-RTR,” which Latvia’s National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP) accused of spreading “biased information about the events in Ukraine” and “incitement to war and hatred” long before the events of 2022. At the same time, First Baltic Channel — a broadcaster whose programming was based on Russia’s largest propaganda network, Channel One — initially only faced a fine despite spreading similar rhetoric. However, its license was later revoked for violating electronic media laws, particularly for broadcasting misinformation about COVID-19.

Latvian authorities were initially hesitant to impose a full ban, fearing the move might violate the principles of free speech. Instead, they opted for strict monitoring of re-broadcasted programs, removing them when they contained hate speech or propaganda. By 2014, Russian state media was spreading so much anti-Ukrainian disinformation that as soon as one restriction ended, a new one would follow.

Despite frequent bans, many Russian-speaking viewers in Latvia simply switched to alternative Kremlin-backed channels, says Latvian political analyst Sigita Struberga, who explains that politicians in her country were overly optimistic, believing people had already become skeptical of Russian news. But that was not the case.

A significant portion of the audience watched Russian channels not for their news programs, but for entertainment, which led to dissatisfaction with the bans. “There was a perception that these nominally non-political programs were more diverse and that Russian films were of higher quality than Latvian alternatives. This view was shared not only by the Russian-speaking population but also by Latvian speakers, who consumed a large amount of Kremlin-produced content,” Struberga says.

Struberga also points out that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Latvia’s Russian-speaking population experienced psychological trauma. They suddenly found themselves living in a country with a single official language — which was not the one they spoke fluently:

“Some couldn’t get citizenship, others didn’t want to get it and began to identify themselves more with Russia. At the same time, many of them had never even been to Russia, but they consumed Kremlin content — and believed it. Some still continue to believe not what is happening on the street, but how it is told on Channel One or Rossiya-1.”

The bans affected 80 Russian channels in Latvia at a time when 44% of the population relied on Russian state-controlled media for information, with this figure rising to 70% among non-citizens. Following the broadcast restrictions, 8% of viewers — and 14% of the country’s ethnic minorities — immediately sought ways to continue accessing blocked content through VPNs, IPTV services, satellite dishes, and various other methods.

Nevertheless, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022,, 60% of Latvians stated that the war in Ukraine was increasing tensions between Latvians and Russians. Latvian political analyst Kristians Rozenvalds notes that Russian channels primarily catered to a segment of the population that subscribed to the concept of the “Russian world” and sought validation of this ideology. However, by November 2023, only 4% of respondents in a Berg Research poll said they still watched Russian channels, and by 2024, just 6.9% said they trusted Russian state media’s coverage of the war in Ukraine.

Struberga also points to positive trends within the Russian-speaking community:

“This can be traced back to polling indicators — when asked about attitudes to the war, to NATO, to Russia, to the West. There’s a little progress, but mainly among the younger generation.”

Lithuania: Kremlin media consumption drops from 48% to 14%

Lithuania has also been actively combating the spread of Russian propaganda. In 2025, the country’s Department for National Minorities prioritized media literacy, allocating €405,000 for information security projects.

“The higher the level of media literacy, the harder it is to manipulate people's minds. We aim to build a community resilient to external informational influence and to ensure that national minorities have access to high-quality information,” commented Vaiva Vėželytė-Pokladova, head of policy analysis for national minorities, in an interview with LRT.

Like Latvians, Lithuanians actively donate money in order to purchase drones for Ukraine — in early 2025, a nationwide fundraiser collected over €5 million. They also donate fire trucks, hold rallies, and organize marches. At the same time, attitudes toward Russia are growing increasingly negative. According to data from the Eurobarometer survey, 94% of Lithuanians support humanitarian aid for Ukraine, 78% back financial assistance, and 76% support the supply of weapons.

A growing number of Lithuanians also perceive Russia as a direct threat. In 2024, 50% of the population held this view, but by 2025, the figure had jumped to 76.1%. More than half, 56%, believe Lithuania must fully support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. Three years after the full-scale invasion began and restrictions on Russian television were introduced, 76% of Lithuanians unequivocally hold Russia responsible for starting the war in Ukraine.

According to Lithuanian political scientist and propaganda researcher Nerijus Maliukevičius, attitudes toward Russia in Lithuania had already been deteriorating since 2014, but after the full-scale invasion and decisive measures to combat disinformation, the trend accelerated.

A 2023 survey found that following restrictions on Russian television, viewership of Russian programs was cut in half, dropping from 48% to 24%. At the same time, only 12% of respondents considered the information in Russian broadcasts reliable, while 65% thought it unreliable — with the figure reaching 61% even in border regions. Current sociological data suggests that only 14% of the Lithuanian population still consumes Kremlin-controlled content.

Karina Urbanavičiūtė of the independent organization Debunk EU, which researches disinformation, notes that it is difficult to track exactly which Russian TV programs people are searching for. “It could be 'Ice Age,' or it could be 'Vesti Nedeli.' But at the same time, after the war began, even entertainment programs on Russian channels started incorporating elements of military propaganda. This 'touch' is now everywhere — even in ‘The Field of Wonders,’ if you look closely enough.”

According to Viktor Denisenko, head of the Centre for Communication Influences and Propaganda Research at Vilnius University, between five and ten percent of Lithuania’s population remains particularly susceptible to propaganda. However, he notes that national minorities are no more influenced by Russian disinformation than other segments of the population.

Achieving such results required serious effort. When Lithuanian authorities began banning the retransmission of certain Russian programs in 2014, many saw the bans as a restriction on freedom of speech. Urbanavičiūtė notes that the suspension of Russian broadcasts was used by some as an excuse to claim that Lithuania was no longer a democratic state:

“This sentiment was not only present among Russians but also among Lithuanians nostalgic for the Soviet Union. It was the view of all those who felt a connection to the so-called 'Russian world.'”

The battle has not only taken place on television. In May 2022, LRT, together with Debunk EU, identified over 100 Facebook groups spreading Kremlin propaganda and disinformation about the war in Ukraine in both Russian and Lithuanian. Some of these groups glorify Putin and express hostility toward NATO, others spread conspiracy theories, some recruit users into pro-Russian communities, and others amplify Kremlin narratives. Blocking these groups has proven ineffective, as clones continue to multiply on Facebook and YouTube, where Kremlin messages are retold in Lithuanian, echoing those heard on the most extreme examples of propaganda programs aimed at the domestic Russian audience.

Urbanavičiūtė stresses that merely relying on sanctions is not enough:

“At Debunk EU, we invest heavily in indexing and educating both schoolchildren and older generations — not just to block disinformation but to teach people how to critically evaluate what they hear. It is essential that we, along with the authorities, do everything we can to close as many loopholes as possible where Putin’s narratives could take hold.”

Estonia: Trust in pro-Kremlin media is fading

According to the country’s latest census, ethnic Russians make up around 24% of Estonia’s population, while 39% of the country speaks Russian. This Russian-speaking community has long been fertile ground for Kremlin propaganda, prompting Estonian authorities to actively combat its influence, much like other Baltic states have done. Estonia has focused on promoting media literacy, and its residents continue to organize public demonstrations in support of Ukraine and donate money to support the country’s ongoing war effort (even if a controversy involving the charity organization “Glory to Ukraine” has caused financial assistance to decline significantly).

According to Eurobarometer data, 88% of Estonians approve of providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine, 56% support financial assistance, and 60% are in favor of supplying weapons. In 2024, two out of three Estonians had no doubt that Russia was responsible for starting the war.

Another survey showed that 84% of Estonia’s population condemned Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, with the number rising to 96% among ethnic Estonians and 60% among Russian speakers. 74% saw humanitarian aid as necessary, though among minorities this figure dropped to 56%, while 72% supported taking in Ukrainian refugees.

Such levels were not present at the beginning of the war, when nearly a quarter of Russian speakers in Estonia considered Russia’s aggression in Ukraine justified and over 30% opposed accepting refugees fleeing the war.

This shift in public opinion required effort.

Estonian authorities banned several Russian television channels the day after Moscow launched its full-scale invasion. Initially, the Russian-speaking audience reacted negatively. A survey carried out by the Turu-uuringute AS agency in the first weeks of the invasion found that 34% of Estonia’s national minorities trusted Kremlin-controlled media for coverage of the war in Ukraine, compared to just 3% of ethnic Estonians. One year later, in February 2023, that number had dropped to 20%.

The Estonian government had hoped that banning Russian media would drive viewers toward Estonia’s Russian-language public channel ETV+, or to other Estonian news sources in Russian, such as Raadio 4, but these expectations were only partially met.

Viewership of ETV+ did increase, reaching a record 3.1% in May 2022. However, according to chief editor Ekaterina Taklaja, the early weeks of the war saw a surge in phone calls from both Estonian and Russian-speaking viewers. Ethnic Estonians complained that the channel was too lenient in its criticism of Vladimir Putin, while Russian-speaking viewers were unhappy with the way guests on the show spoke about him.

By October 2022, the news program “Aktuaalne kaamera” on ETV+ had 52,000 viewers — but more than 30% of the country’s non-Estonian residents still did not consider Estonian television to be their primary source of information. 44% of them said the same about Estonian online news platforms such as Delfi.

Germany: From TV channels to Telegram channels

Germany has long been a target of Russian information warfare. According to political scientist Dmitri Stratievski, director of the Berlin Center for East European Studies (Osteuropa-Zentrum Berlin e.V.), Russia has sought to influence the large Russian-speaking community in Germany through social organizations and cultural institutions.

“Germany had an extensive network of both public and quasi-public organizations affiliated with the Kremlin. These included kindergartens, schools, and Russian language courses for children born in Germany to parents from post-Soviet countries. There is nothing inherently wrong with this, but the Russian government attempted to use these channels to control public opinion. Even some individuals from the post-Soviet space who were critical of Putin’s regime and Moscow’s policies still found themselves within this sphere of influence,” he explained.

According to Stratievski, native Germans were not immune to Russian propaganda, either.

“Disinformation reached them primarily through Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, which operated very professionally in the German media market. Russia Today recruited some of the most well-known hosts from major German television networks. Not everyone agreed to work for such an organization, but some did — because the salaries were exceptionally high,” he noted.

This propaganda campaign had tangible results. According to data from the Center for Monitoring, Analysis, and Strategies (CeMAS), in 2022 over 40% of Germans believed that Putin was “fighting against a global elite that pulls the strings behind the scenes.” 19% agreed that NATO had provoked Russia into war.

However, as international sanctions expanded and Russian aggression continued, public attitudes began to shift. By 2023, 91% of Germans supported humanitarian aid to Ukraine, while 73% backed financial assistance. 82% were willing to accept Ukrainian refugees, and 61% approved of sending weapons to Kyiv. In 2024, support remained strong, with 89% backing humanitarian aid, 70% approving financial support, and 60% continuing to be in favor of military aid.

Stratievski explained that even among Germans who had traditionally supported Russia, sentiment was turning.

“Negative attitudes toward Russia have emerged even among those Germans who previously considered themselves close friends of the country. Unlike pacifists or anti-American activists, who automatically refuse to support Ukraine, these individuals have been able to process new information and reach the conclusion that the Russia they once believed had won World War II has now committed an act of aggression.”

Pro-Russian rallies and motorcades — the types of events that Putin supporters in Germany were organizing with regularity as of mid-spring 2022 — have either disappeared over time or evolved into different forms. “If we look at Sahra Wagenknecht's rallies, which officially promote peace in Europe, we sometimes see Russian flags among the attendees. Former participants in pro-Russian demonstrations no longer organize separate marches but instead integrate into larger German protests that do not directly violate German law. However, society does not always perceive this as a threat,” says Stratievski.

Despite sanctions and content bans, those in Germany who still want to consume Kremlin propaganda can easily access it. André Lange, coordinator of the Denis Diderot Committee and former head of the European Audiovisual Observatory, notes that the Russian media audience split after the imposition of sanctions — some switched to social media, while others turned to IPTV platforms.

He explains that while these platforms primarily target audiences in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, Germany often ranks fourth or fifth in terms of viewership. This is likely due to the presence of approximately three million Russian emigrants and an additional three million Russian-speaking residents in the country.

There is now an extensive network of German-language Telegram channels and chat groups that spread pro-Russian propaganda. These include Uncut-News.ch, Schuberts Lagemeldung, Eva Herman Offiziell, and Anti-Spiegel, among others.

Anti-Spiegel, run by Thomas Röper — a pro-Kremlin propagandist and self-proclaimed Putin loyalist who, after the war began, rebranded himself as a fierce critic of all “Nazis” in Ukraine — is one of the most prominent. Röper’s content is in line with Kremlin narratives, featuring sensationalist statements by Russia’s ex-president Dmitry Medvedev, reposts of videos claiming that “fascists continue to execute pro-Russian civilians in Donbas,” articles about the “resurgence of Nazism” in the Baltic states, and supposed “exposés” of The New York Times, accusing it of ignoring Nazi symbolism in Ukraine. His channel also regularly attacks the German press, with headlines such as “Nazi attacks from Ukraine show who really rules in Kyiv,” and “It’s shocking how German media turns Nazis into heroes.”

Nevertheless, Stratievski stresses that overt Putin supporters who adhere to the rhetoric of these channels remain a marginal group in Germany. Even the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which refused to condemn Russia's aggression against Ukraine and actively lobbied for resuming Russian gas imports and lifting sanctions, does not rely on the support of pro-Russian sympathizers. Instead, Stratievski says, it appeals to those who oppose the policies of the current German government.

“In the minds of AfD voters, the party’s pro-Russian stance does not contradict its other positions. It’s hard to imagine an average German reading about the restoration of relations with Russia and saying, 'No, I won’t vote for this party because of that.' In their worldview, everything aligns. But we can draw an indirect connection: since Germany’s transition to alternative energy sources was a painful process, AfD skillfully exploited the situation, instilling in its electorate the idea that the country’s economic decline was caused by cutting ties with Russia.”