Half-life: Syria’s new rulers may struggle to prevent its collapse

RU

Events in Syria are unfolding rapidly. It seems like only yesterday that Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, the head of Syria’s new transitional government, was recording a video address to the nation, urging people to remain calm and believe in a better future. Just moments before, he had been serving as prime minister under President Bashar al-Assad. Later that same day, he announced that the dictator’s rule had ended, that the Assad regime had been overthrown, and that the dictator had fled. That day was December 8, 2024.

At the moment al-Jalali recorded his address, fighting was still ongoing between the now-dominant Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and remnants of Assad’s army. However, the outcome was already clear: within days, the rebels had seized most of the cities in Syria’s central and western regions, including Damascus, and were systematically eliminating any remaining pockets of resistance. Analysts and journalists rushed to declare the end of the civil war that had plagued Syria since 2011. But as it turned out, they spoke too soon. The ousted president still had loyalists willing to take up arms.

Regrouping after their defeat, these loyalists launched a low-intensity guerrilla war against the new authorities, ambushing security forces and assassinating newly appointed officials. The conflict escalated in early March when a former high-ranking officer in Assad’s army, Ghiath Dala, announced the formation of a so-called Military Council. Its primary objective was to drive the forces loyal to Syria’s new interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, out of the country’s western coastal regions.

In response to General Dala’s declaration, al-Sharaa deployed additional troops to the western regions, and the guerrilla war immediately turned into a massacre. Within days, more than a thousand people were killed, most of them civilians — primarily Alawites, along with Christians and Druze. Pro-Assad propagandists began circulating video and audio recordings in which bearded armed men called for the extermination of all Alawites, regardless of age or gender, accusing them of betraying both the country and their faith.

Iranian state media — loyal to the regime in Tehran that for decades had supported the regime in Damascus — described the actions of Syria’s new authorities as genocide. The Israeli government declared its readiness to assist Syrian Druze and Circassians, urging foreign governments not to rush into friendly relations with al-Sharaa’s administration — and even making a thinly veiled reference to the new authorities’ direct involvement in the bloodshed.

Meanwhile, Turkey, which has aligned itself with the new government, hinted that Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities were at least partially to blame. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan urged Alawites, Christians, and Druze to “refrain from participating in provocations” — whatever that may have meant.

Syria’s new authorities, for their part, blame the tragedy on supporters of the ousted Bashar al-Assad, whom they accuse of being incited by Iran. Assad himself has remained silent. However, rumors have surfaced online suggesting that the Russians, who granted him refuge, are pressuring him to announce a full-scale uprising in the Mediterranean province of Latakia. In short, all the key players in Syria’s still-unfinished war are trying to shift responsibility for civilian deaths onto their opponents while absolving themselves of blame.

Islamists in “Western” suits

Power in Syria changed hands just over three months ago — more than enough time to comb through the files and computer records of the fallen regime’s security forces in order to uncover information about secret agents, paid provocateurs, and informants. Unsurprisingly, a significant number of such individuals were found in historically Alawite lands, namely in the cities of Latakia and Tartus and their surrounding areas.

The Alawite Assad family’s roots trace back to this region, and the Alawites formed the backbone of his regime. Nearly all the top ranks of the army and security services during Assad’s rule were drawn from this sect, as Alawite regions served as a recruitment pool for government officials and military officers.

This does not mean that all Alawites supported Bashar al-Assad’s rule — there were, and still are, many dissidents and revolutionaries among them. However, loyalty to the regime was undoubtedly far stronger in Latakia and Tartus than in Aleppo or Homs. That is why counterintelligence agents and regular infantry of the new regime were sent there. Most of these security forces — if not all — come from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other Islamist factions ideologically aligned with the group. To them, Alawites, as well as their Druze neighbors, are heretics and apostates who have distorted the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and whose mere existence is an affront to Muslims.

It was easy to predict that, sooner or later, a conflict would erupt between the local population and the deployed counterintelligence agents of the new rulers in Damascus. The authorities could not afford to ignore the existence of an anti-government underground movement, which — especially with potential support from Iran and Russia — could pose a serious threat to the still fragile post-Assad state. Sending anyone other than former Islamist fighters to deal with this underground network was also unrealistic, as al-Sharaa simply had no other viable forces at his disposal. Those who were sent could not have helped but to ask themselves in recent weeks: “Is this really the Syria we fought for?”

This question became especially pressing when the new president welcomed delegations of “infidel” Druze and Christians, allowed the celebration of the haram holidays of Christmas and New Year, and gave speeches promising equal rights for all Syrians, regardless of their faith. These actions immediately sparked discontent among radical clerics, including those whose opinions still hold weight among former HTS fighters — now soldiers and officers of the Syrian army.

Of course, there is no concrete evidence to directly implicate the new president of ordering massacres of unarmed Alawites and other minorities in an attempt to appease the most hardline segment of Syrian society. However, the bloodshed did, to some extent, work in his favor, as it showed radicals that the army under al-Sharaa’s command remains a force of jihad warriors, who spare no enemies of the faith. Moreover, such brutal crackdowns will likely make many sympathizers of the defeated regime think twice before attempting even symbolic acts of defiance.

Does everyone benefit from a weak Syria?

The forces that opposed al-Sharaa and his faction during the civil war are also trying to use the bloodshed in Tartus and Latakia to their advantage. The Iranian authorities, who have consistently referred to Syria’s new president as a “terrorist” and a “Western puppet,” are now making repeated statements that Iran has always stood for Syria’s stability and territorial integrity, blaming the current government for its inability to stop the violence.

Iran, the main sponsor of Bashar al-Assad’s regime — and thus a highly complicit accomplice in its crimes, which include the indiscriminate bombing of residential areas, the use of chemical weapons against civilians, and the creation of an entire state apparatus dedicated to torture and executions — is now eager to portray its adversaries as being no better.

It is unlikely that Iran, having suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of HTS, is planning to restore its military presence in Syria. But if such plans exist, the defense of its fellow believers (Alawites are formally linked to the dominant Shiite branch of Islam, dominant in Iran) could serve as a justification for their implementation.

The ayatollahs also need to salvage their image after the humiliation in Syria, where Iranian military personnel and officials had to be urgently evacuated from Damascus as rebel forces advanced. The change of power in Syria wiped out years of human and financial sacrifices Tehran had made while actively fighting on Assad’s side.

In the eyes of Syrians who supported the old regime, the Iranians went from protectors to traitors, abandoning those they had supposedly vowed to defend. Naturally, Tehran’s flood of statements like “this wouldn’t have happened under us” has done little to restore the trust of its erstwhile allies. For the desperate and disoriented residents of Latakia, however, it just might be enough to convince some to forgive the Iranians.

Later, once a relatively stable peace is established, Tehran could try to manipulate these people for its own political purposes — such as using them to push pro-Iranian candidates into elected positions of power. That is, of course, if Syria ever holds free and competitive elections at all.

As for Bashar al-Assad, now an international fugitive enjoying protection somewhere in Moscow, he could have attempted to exploit the tragedy for his own political interests — if he still had any. Most likely, however, the deposed dictator is all but entirely dependent on the Russian regime that is providing him refuge. The strongest evidence that Assad has lost any real agency is his complete silence since relocating in December.

The only statement bearing Assad’s signature since his arrival in Moscow was released only in written form, and therefore cannot be verified as being authentic — especially since it echoed an accusation prominent in Russian propaganda about how it was Syrian government forces who were to blame for the failure to hold back the rebel advance. At the same time, the statement made no mention of the fact that Russian troops also failed to counter the opposition’s blitzkrieg — and that instead of putting up a fight, they simply locked themselves inside their bases.

Among those seeking refuge on one of these bases were hundreds of Alawites fleeing the March massacre. The Russians are already using this fact, possibly even as an element of their ongoing negotiations with the new Syrian authorities regarding the continuation of Russia’s military presence in the country. It can be assumed that the Alawites who found shelter with the Russians have provided additional testimonies of the Syrian military’s brutality against civilians — even beyond what is already publicly available.

Given that Russian forces had previously targeted civilian sites with precision weapons and carried out mass executions, it is unlikely that the new Syrian army can outmatch the Russians in sheer brutality. Still, every new photo or video showing the torture or killing of Alawites will deal a heavy blow to the image of the al-Sharaa government, which has been carefully projecting an image of tolerance and peaceful intentions. The Russians could very well use this evidence to blackmail the Syrian government. In that sense, if one can put it this way, Moscow, too, is a beneficiary of the Alawites’ tragedy.

The region’s two main powers: Israel and Turkey

While Al-Sharaa was changing from military uniform into a civilian jacket after the fall of Damascus, Israeli planes were bombing the remaining weapons depots of Assad's scattered army, and Israeli infantry and tanks were entering the southern regions of Syria that border the Golan Heights. Israeli authorities claimed that they were doing this for humanitarian reasons — to protect members of ethnic and religious minorities.

The world looked upon these Israeli actions with minimal enthusiasm, but the massacres in Tartus and Latakia have since provided Israel with a justification for its ongoing intervention. Israel is consolidating its presence in Syria and building relationships with local Druze, Circassians, and other minority groups, encouraging them to make political demands — if not independence, then at least as much autonomy as possible within the country.

A unified and strong Syria — one capable of resolving its most serious internal problems — would pose a serious threat to Israel. If such a Syria were to emerge, Syrians would surely seek revenge for the 1967 loss of the Golan Heights, along with other grievances. That is why the Israelis are doing everything in their power to keep Syria weak and fragmented.

Turkey, which helped HTS with money and weapons, has an entirely opposite goal. It needs a stable, unitary Syria that has defeated separatism and is developing economically and socially. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would like to make Turkey the leader of the Sunni world, and a successful new Syria built with Ankara's participation would be the best possible advertisement for his policies. But that’s not the main reason he is getting involved.

Turkey has a long-standing concern over the issue of Kurdish separatism, and the movement’s “nest” — that is, its arsenals, training bases, and hideouts — has been located in Syria for decades. A weakened, fragmented, or even federated Syria with strong local Kurdish authorities would all but guarantee that such separatism would persist. The massacre of Alawites, for which Ankara partially blames the victims, gives Turkey new arguments to use as pressure on Damascus. This constellation of factors will make it easier for Turkey to demand the prevention of any form of autonomy in Syria’s regions — especially Kurdish autonomy.

Will Syria survive?

“Syria is a mess but is not our friend,” wrote Donald Trump in December of last year — even before he had taken office — urging Americans not to get involved in what was happening there.

It is now known that around the same time, people from Trump's team were pressuring Syrian Kurdish leaders to agree to reintegration into a new Syria. Since the fall of Assad's regime, the Kurds have resisted, and Kurdish media still refers to the new authorities as “terrorists.” Kurdish formations, known as the “Syrian Democratic Forces,” control vast areas in the east and north of the country, including the main oil-rich regions. They played an active role in the war against ISIS, but in the battles between Assad's army and his opponents, they mostly remained neutral.

The victorious rebels demanded that all territories and armed groups be handed over to their control, but the “Syrian Democratic Forces” insisted on autonomy and the preservation of their army. Ideologically, the Kurdish paramilitary groups, which include Marxist, anarchist, feminist, and even LGBT factions, are almost the polar opposite of the strict Islamists from HTS, who form the backbone of the new Syrian government. As such, the Kurdish resistance to integration is completely understandable.

The United States gave the Kurds no choice: the Americans are increasingly planning the withdrawal of their troops still stationed in Syria, and Trump's statements leave little doubt that military aid to Washington’s allies will cease as well. Indirectly, a statement by Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party and currently imprisoned in a Turkish jail, may have played a role.

Öcalan called for the cessation of armed struggle, though he was primarily referring to Turkish actions when doing so. Still, the Syrian Democratic Forces agreed to sign an agreement with the new authorities for the complete integration and submission of all their civil organizations and security forces to Damascus.

The agreement was finalized at almost the same time that army units were killing the local Alawites in Latakia and Tartus. This starkly highlights the uncertainty and ambiguity currently prevailing in Syria. On one hand, the most successful and well-organized opponents of the new government surrendered their positions and agreed to submit to Damascus in exchange for promises of full citizenship and protection of their traditions and culture. On the other hand, the very same individuals who had promised the Kurds that they would be treated as fellow citizens and allowed to live as they wish were killing and torturing Alawites, Druze, and Christians simply because they refused to recognize them as Syrians like themselves.

Syria now stands at a historic crossroads. The violence from radicals and the pressure from certain external players are pushing the country toward further fragmentation, creating small quasi-states based on ethnic or sectarian divisions. Nevertheless, Syria's difficult historical experience points toward the possibility that common sense arrangements may be made to overcome internal divisions and build a country where belonging to a particular faith or ethnic group is neither a privilege, nor a source of shame.

Where Syria goes from here depends largely on the will of its people. If the current crisis, triggered by the horrific massacre of civilians, is resolved and those responsible for the bloodshed are held accountable, the country will have a real opportunity for renewal. If not, then the war — now approaching its 15th year — will continue. It is far from certain that, when the fighting ends, Syria will still exist as a unified country on the map of the Middle East. Instead, it may yet be replaced by a collection of Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, and Arab principalities and sultanates.