Dream gone bad: Ivanishvili's doubtful victory may plunge Georgia into authoritarianism and repression

RU

Historical results

Created by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream has been in power since 2012. The party had previously secured more than 50% of the vote only once — in its first election, which was held against the backdrop of disillusionment with Mikheil Saakashvili's rule, highlighted by the “prison scandal.” In this past election, Georgian Dream received, officially at least, a whopping 54% of the vote, as stated by the Central Election Commission after processing 99.9% of ballots. This should give them 89 of the 150 seats in parliament, taking into account the redistribution of votes cast for parties that failed to pass the 5% threshold.

“Ivanishvili's victory means that all this will be legalized; dust will settle, and Ivanishvili will formalize his status as the owner of the land, and we all know whose vassal, because he cannot exist on his own,” says David Darchiashvili, political analyst and director of the Institute of Russian Studies. Anyone familiar with the Georgian political scene of the past decade already knows “whose vassal” Darchiashvili was referring to: he meant that Ivanishvili is Russia’s vassal.

Georgian Dream’s opponents collectively failed to capture a majority, at least officially. Coalition for Change came in first among the collection of opposition parties with just over 11% of votes, followed by Unity — National Movement with 10.16%, the Strong Georgia big-tent coalition with 8.8%, and the party of former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, For Georgia, which closes the list with 7.77%. Combined, the opposition parties should have 62 mandates. The remaining parties failed to pass the 5% electoral threshold, and the votes they gained — more than 6% — will be distributed proportionally among those who made it into parliament. Naturally, Georgian Dream will get the biggest share.

The results announced by the CEC diverged from the exit polls commissioned by two opposition channels. For Mtavari Archi, the research was conducted by HarrisX, which assessed that Georgian Dream would receive 42%, while the four opposition blocs together would receive 48% (13% to UNM, 18% to Coalition for Change, 9% to Strong Georgia, and 8% to For Georgia). Immediately after the polls closed, Formula TV channel published similar data citing Edison Research: Georgian Dream 40.9%, opposition 51.9% (UNM and Coalition for Change - 16.7% each, Strong Georgia 10.3%, For Georgia 8.2%). On the basis of these data, opposition representatives, including President Zourabichvili, declared victory over the ruling Georgia Dream.

In addition to the discrepancy with sociologists' data, the election result is questionable because of the numerous violations recorded by observers and journalists during the voting. This was stated, in particular, by the head of the OSCE mission, Pascal Allizard, who noted numerous facts of coercion, intimidation, and violation of the secrecy of the vote. Ruling party representatives were seen entering the voting booths with voters. Observers were removed from polling stations and attacked by pro-government “activists.” At several polling stations, observers reported “merry-go-round” voting and instances of voters being given more than one ballot. In addition, the media reported cases of violence on election day: attacks on the opposition and observers and fights involving the participation of instigators, presumably acting in the interests of Georgian Dream.

All this allowed U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell to question the official election results. The two officials demand an unbiased investigation. The EU also plans to review relations with Georgia at the November Foreign Affairs Council meeting.

The fog of election warfare

The outcome of the “existential” election, in which Georgia was effectively choosing between Europe and Russia, remained uncertain until the results were in. Opinion polls yielded conflicting predictions, and many Georgians did not know until the last minute who they would vote for. One thing was clear: the ruling party would lose in the 67 overseas polling stations — and indeed, Georgian Dream scored an average of just 15% among citizens in the diaspora. At the same time, neither the authorities nor the opposition so much as entertained the possibility of losing.

In the week preceding the elections, Tbilisi saw two major rallies. On Oct. 20, opposition-minded citizens led by President Salome Zourabichvili came to Freedom Square. Then, on Oct. 23, the government gathered its supporters from all over the country to listen to the leader of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, who despite being outwardly confident in the people's support has recently been speaking at public events from behind bulletproof glass.

Ivanishvili, who is convinced that the success of his party largely depends on voters' attitude towards him personally, gave an interview on the government-controlled Imedi channel a few days before the elections. Aside from pledging to ban the opposition after the elections and scaring the audience with war, he unexpectedly spoke at length about another threat to Georgia — LGBT propaganda. According to Ivanishvili, this threat is the reason why, in Western countries, one can no longer call a man a man and a woman a woman. The party leader, a recipient of the French Legion of Honor, also claimed that, in Europe, orgies are taking place in the streets, and people say that “men's milk is the same as women's milk.”

However, voters' preferences were not as critical to the outcome as their level of motivation. Even if most Georgians indicated in opinion polls that they do not support Georgian Dream, the ruling party’s capacity to turn out its electorate was superior. “Opinion polls showed that Georgian Dream supporters are more mobilized. Meanwhile, many opposition supporters are not sure whether they will go to the elections or not. Therefore, a high level of voter turnout was very important,” Ghia Nodia, a political scientist and director of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, explained to The Insider.

Demographics also played a role. For example, young people, many of whom never made it to a polling station, are 2-2.5 times less likely than their elders to support the ruling party, according to Caucasus Barometer. Still, support for European integration among young people is only about 10% higher than the national average, and Georgian Dream’s repeated calls to prevent war with Russia could have had a higher impact on young people, as sociology shows that the younger generation is more afraid of war than the older one.

Fear of war in general played no small part in this election. In addition to flagrant cases of fraud, in the run-up to the vote, the authorities employed an array of tactics to intimidate disloyal voters. Representatives of the opposition in different regions were attacked. Employees of the U.S.-affiliated think tank Atlantic Council, which was conducting a study on Russia's interference in the electoral process, had their apartments searched. The CEC was hastily placed on the list of strategic sites — to criminalize any potential actions that may interfere with its work. In the meantime, at the inauguration of a special forces base in Tbilisi, the head of the Interior Ministry presented new water cannons, promising that they would be used only “when necessary.” So far, however, this has not been necessary, because the protests that broke out on Monday after the elections were not so intense that the authorities had to use force to suppress them.

According to political analyst Paata Zakareishvili, Georgia’s former Minister of Reconciliation and Civil Equality, Georgian Dream has successfully manipulated the theme of war and peace. “Before Ukraine, [the prospect of another war with Russia] may have looked like some kind of fiction, but now it is no longer fiction” for a significant part of Georgian voters, he explained.

It is no coincidence that intimidation was one of the key tactics noted by many observers and opposition members. This fact speaks volumes about the general atmosphere in Georgian society, even if opposition-minded NGOs and activists did not retreat after the spring protests against the law “on foreign agents,” but rather became more active and consolidated. They launched numerous information campaigns explaining the importance of participating in the elections and the specifics of this year's voting process. Georgian citizens actively registered as observers and united into groups for joint trips to the polling stations at the place of their official residence. In the end, it was not enough.

After the election

According to official data from the Central Election Commission (CEC) — which has been called into question both by observers and by the opposition — the final turnout amounted to 58.94%, meaning that just over 2 million voters showed up. This is more than in 2020 and 2016, but less than in 2012, when 60.08% of voters took part in the elections, lifted by a wave of discontent with Saakashvili.

According to the election results, the biggest differences are observed in the results for diaspora and national minorities within Georgia. While the opposition won by a large margin in overseas polling stations (77% for the four opposition parties, 13.5% for Georgian Dream), in regions with a relatively compact Armenian and Azerbaijani population Georgian Dream received equally large majorities (about 80% in «Azerbaijani» Marneuli and Bolnisi and about 88% in «Armenian» Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda). Admittedly, neither diaspora nor minority votes would have been enough to dramatically affect the outcome of the election.

In the rest of the country, Georgian Dream received the fewest votes in Tbilisi and Rustavi. In the capital, 42% of voters cast their ballot for Ivanishvili's party. In Rustavi, the figure was 41%. Similarly, Georgian Dream received just under 50% in the second and third most populous cities, Batumi (49.7%) and Kutaisi (47.3%).

In Tbilisi, after the announcement of the results on Sunday, opposition protests commenced the following day, aided by a speech from President Zourabichvili saying that the results should not be recognized as legitimate. The demonstrations were large, but so far, they have posed no real danger to the authorities. Zourabichvili does not appear willing to schedule the first session of the new parliament, as required by the Georgian Constitution. However, her resistance is unlikely to stop Georgian Dream. Past years have shown that the current Georgian authorities are not afraid of protesters and are ready to crack down on any unrest.

As experts point out, an escalation of the protests may result in their violent suppression. Political analyst Ghia Nodia believes that the promises of repression by the Georgian Dream were not empty words, even if measures may not be implemented instantly after the elections: “Ivanishvili's style so far has been very slow, gradual. So we may see a gradual strangulation of the opposition, civil society, perhaps academia as well.”

According to Nodia, one should not expect concessions from Georgian Dream even if the protests against election fraud continue.“When power is at stake, no one will back down,” he sums up.

Russia: both a bogeyman and a partner

Georgian Dream centered its campaign on the supposed threat of war and on very real promises of repression. Among the positive items on Ivanishvili's agenda were the pledge of EU membership by 2030 (a course not backed by the party's actions so far) and talk of restoring Georgia's territorial integrity. The authorities are taking advantage of the schism in Georgian public opinion, which has been exposed by recent polls. On the one hand, more than 70% of Georgians believe that Russian aggression against their country continues to this day. On the other hand, a sizable segment of Georgians who fear an aggressive northern neighbor also believe in Georgian Dream's ability to avoid direct confrontation with Moscow.

Despite Georgians’ stated desire to move the country westward, promises by Georgian Dream Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze to carry out a qualitative “reset” of relations with the EU and the U.S. are unlikely to be fulfilled. Instead, Georgian Dream's victory is likely to further complicate things with both Washington and Brussels. That said, Ivanishvili is distancing himself from Moscow as well. In the wake of the election, Georgian Dream is trying to showcase its ability to balance, saying that, for example, the restoration of diplomatic relations with Moscow is out of the question.

In the end, while maneuvering between multiple contradictory public sentiments, Ivanishvili and his entourage have demonstrated that they are unafraid of saying and doing whatever it takes to continue holding onto power. The election did not bring them the desired 75% of seats in parliament, but as the opposition continues to protest the election results by refusing to take up the parliamentary mandates that they won, Georgian Dream’s majority may prove to be even larger than the CEC totals indicated. Going forward, the inevitable deterioration of Georgia's relations with the West will make it increasingly tempting for Ivanishvili to draw closer to Russia. The Kremlin is excited to see Ivanishvili further Georgian Dream's pro-Russian bias, as evidenced by the positive comments Moscow has offered in connection with these elections.