Not coming to the rescue. Five insiders explain NATO’s reluctance to help Ukraine win

The final communique put out at the end of this year’s NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., speaks of Ukraine’s “irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.” And yet, the timeline for Ukrainian membership remains as uncertain as it was after last year’s Vilnius declaration promised “to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met,” and after the 2008 meeting in Bucharest assured that both Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.”

Russia’s war in Ukraine shows no sign of ending anytime soon, and until it does, the odds that an offer of membership in NATO will be extended to Kyiv remain remote. Although the summit saw the alliance announce a substantial military aid package for Ukraine, the help remains far short of what is needed for Ukraine to actually drive Russian forces out of the territory they currently occupy. Almost certainly, the Russia-Ukraine war will be a key topic of conversation at next year’s NATO Summit in the Netherlands.

Throughout his four-decade career in the U.S. government, Daniel Fried worked on nearly every policy question concerning America’s relationship with Russia and its European neighbors, serving as U.S. Ambassador to Poland among myriad other roles. Now a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, he continues to offer a respected, influential voice in his areas of deep expertise. While Fried is not shy about highlighting the shortcomings of Western support for Ukraine, he notes that the Washington Summit delivered positive results in several critical areas:

“Did the summit do all it could? Maybe not, but it’s done a lot. I like the announcement of the air defense systems, and now F-16 are going to be flying this summer, and that's important. Ukrainians are going to push for more, and I’d do the same in their place, but it’s not like Vilnius where you had the U.S. reluctant to even think about Ukraine’s future in NATO. An ‘irreversible bridge’ to NATO — that’s not nothing.

“The one area where I wish the U.S. were more forward-leaning is lifting caveats for using U.S. weapons. After the Russian attack on the children’s hospital, the U.S. should not impose any restrictions on Ukraine’s use of weapons other than those required by the rules of war. Other than that, Ukraine should act in a way that’s consistent with its own defense needs, because it’s fighting a just war and one consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which is self-defense.”

The Ukrainian delegation appeared to have a better time in Washington than it did last year in Vilnius. Part of this is thanks to the aid package Fried described, but part of it is also due to Kyiv’s lowered expectations for Western support. Hanna Shelest, a non-resident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), described the mood from the Ukrainian side — including Kyiv’s uncertainty about how the potential for political change in Washington this November might affect Western support for Ukraine:

“We knew that we wouldn’t get the invitation during this summit. We expected an invitation at the last summit; that’s why there was such a high level of disappointment. We know who the stumbling blocks are: the U.S. and Germany. We knew that in Vilnius. However, both countries are blaming each other. Now we understand that the Americans are making most of the decisions, and the Germans will follow the Americans as soon as the White House will make the decisions to step forward.

“We understand that these decisions won’t be made until November, so our task is to survive these months and to amplify as much as possible the support that we’re receiving. It’s not about Biden or Trump. The problem is unpredictability. We understand that a lot of statements that Trump is making, he’s making because of the elections. That’s why, if he wins, we’re waiting to see who’ll be his National Security Advisor or Secretary of State. De-facto, these people would influence much more and they’d have a lot of instruments for day-to-day support for Ukraine, not just statements about Putin. Trump already met with Putin in Helsinki and nothing changed.”

Another former U.S. ambassador turned Atlantic Council Senior Director, John Herbst, credited the U.S. administration for providing Ukraine with much-needed military aid — even if many of the deliveries are arriving later than they should have. He also spoke about the potential for a second Trump presidency to be something less than a disaster for Ukraine’s defensive efforts:

“The arms package associated with this summit is good given how Biden’s administration works. They had been intimidated by Russia’s nuclear threat, and so they haven’t taken the steps they needed to take. Over time they did the right thing — but always too late and in limited quantities. It’s always been a pattern. The announcement now is all about air defense, which is consistent with the go-slowly approach. Fewer Ukrainians are going to die because of Russia’s missile attacks, and fewer Ukrainians will die from glide bombs, which of course is good. We’ve declared that we want to help Ukraine defeat Russia and that we’re given everything to make that possible — we’re still not doing it, though. We need to address the problem as a crisis and use presidential powers to get the arms industry up and running.

“If Biden wins, in November a lot of decisions will remain the same. If Trump wins, it’s a question mark. I don’t believe it means disaster. It could be a disaster, but Trump has clearly distinguished himself from his loudest supporters who are talking about giving Ukraine to Putin. I don’t assume Trump will be a disaster, but I do consider that a possibility.”

Lieutenant General (retired) Ben Hodges once commanded the U.S. Army’s forces in Europe. Since his retirement from the military, he has served in a range of think tank and advisory roles. He spoke about why it is in NATO countries’ self-interest to help Ukraine defeat Russia, and described a potential pathway to victory — one that will require Ukraine to make serious reforms.

“We hear a lot about wanting to help Ukraine, but it’s actually about our strategic interests and giving them what they need. We have pretty dumb restrictions because of our fear of Russia using nuclear weapons. All of the shortcomings and failures are because of our excessive fear of nuclear weapons. Russia had all the advantages for ten years, yet still they only control about 18% of Ukraine. They’ve lost half a million soldiers, the Black Sea fleet is in retreat, its air force failed. They have to buy ammunition from North Korea. But we haven’t used all our economic capabilities. If we say we want Ukraine to win, then we must make it easy for them to get what they need.

“They’re not asking for troops, but what they don’t have is an effective recruitment system. This is where Ukraine is failing big time. They’re clamoring to nations to give them stuff, but yet they haven’t made it their priority to recruit and train their staff, what we call an institutional army. The government has to fix this, because this is a matter of national survival. So far, their government has totally failed to do that. If they won’t do that then they’re forever going to have a shortage of troops. It’s a steep climb because they have to resolve their own internal problems.”

Dalibor Rohac of the American Enterprise Institute offered a somewhat more pessimistic view of the summit’s results. Still, he sees the potential for the delivery of F-16s, expected later this year, to help ease restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western weapons against targets located on Russian territory:

“Ukraine’s membership in NATO remains as distant as it was before the summit. ‘Irreversibility’ doesn’t really change anything. Biden’s administration isn’t keen on bringing Ukraine in, and you can only imagine how Trump’s administration might look at the issue. The Europeans also have their concerns, so for me this is all very disappointing. There’s a Western commitment to restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and giving it everything it needs to succeed, but this rhetoric isn’t matched by deeds. And the summit hasn’t changed anything in this regard. Unfortunately, the West isn’t approaching this with the necessary degree of urgency.

“That being said, the F-16s should be delivered soon, and the lifting of restrictions could happen. You can’t really use F-16’s if you can’t strike defenses in Russia, so I think that this will be a conversation sooner rather than later, even if some countries are being dragged into this kicking and screaming. I imagine that this will be a next step, especially if the Russians continue to attack civilian targets. There might be some implicit or confidential restrictions about how far they could strike inside Russia, though.”