Ready or not: Despite active rearmament, Europe remains too vulnerable to Russia

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“The pursuit of a new defence role for the countries of Europe…has been much discussed. It is certainly true that, within NATO, the European countries should make a greater contribution. The European countries must also be prepared to take a more active military role in response to events outside NATO's present area.”

The above may sound like it came from Donald Trump in his first presidency, although the cadences are a little too polished. In fact it was Margaret Thatcher addressing the Hoover Institution in March 1991, only a few months after she had been forced out as Prime Minister by her own Conservative Party.

Nearly 35 years later, European countries are beginning to make that “greater contribution” to NATO and to the defence of the continent, but it has been an agonisingly slow journey.

Russia’s ground invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shook the European security architecture profoundly. Suddenly — it seemed sudden to some, at any rate — there was a full-scale hot war on European soil. The Russian forces which entered Ukraine numbered around 200,000, with nearly 1,000 tanks. The battlefield, with its armor, artillery, and tanks, made it look as if the fearful expectations of the Cold War were being realized after all.

It seemed then as if the need to expand and rearm their military forces had at last been brought home to European leaders. Three days after the Russian invasion, Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany addressed the Bundestag and admitted that the geostrategic situation had changed permanently:

​​”Wir erleben eine Zeitenwende. Und das bedeutet: Die Welt danach ist nicht mehr dieselbe wie die Welt davor. [We are living through a watershed era. And that means that the world afterwards will no longer be the same as the world before.]”

The Zeitenwende speech was an important declaration on behalf of Europe’s biggest economy. Scholz announced an additional spending programme of €100 billion on modernising and rearming the Bundeswehr, including hundreds of new tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, 185 new fighter and strike aircraft, 50 transport and tanker aircraft, 15 new frigates and enormous investment in intelligence, signals and reconnaissance platforms.

An extraordinary summit of NATO heads of government in Brussels the following month picked up Scholz’s theme. It declared that enhancing member states’ security would “require adequate resourcing” and that “allies are substantially increasing their defence expenditures.” They pledged that as many member states as possible would reach the NATO target of defence spending of two per cent of GDP.

Increasing Europe’s overall expenditure on defence was intensely debated in the run-up to NATO’s annual summit on 24/25 June in the Hague. The official declaration that emerged from the summit was only five paragraphs, amounting to fewer than 500 words. But it contained an enormously important element:

“Allies commit to invest 5% of GDP annually on core defence requirements as well as defence-and security-related spending by 2035 to ensure our individual and collective obligations… This 5% commitment will comprise two essential categories of defence investment. Allies will allocate at least 3.5% of GDP annually based on the agreed definition of NATO defence expenditure by 2035 to resource core defence requirements, and to meet the NATO Capability Targets…and up to 1.5% of GDP annually to inter alia protect our critical infrastructure, defend our networks, ensure our civil preparedness and resilience, unleash innovation, and strengthen our defence industrial base.”

Given that, in 2024, only two-thirds of NATO members had even reached the superseded target of two per cent of GDP, the Hague Declaration represented a massive increase in future spending. Of course, some allies are already close to that goal: Poland will already spend 4.8 per cent of GDP this year, and Estonia and Lithuania are expected to exceed five per cent. However, Belgium and Italy will only barely reach two per cent, and Spain has rejected the overall five per cent target entirely. There will be more arguments further along the road, but the progress achieved in the space of just one or two years remains extraordinary. However, the goal of strengthening Europe’s defence industrial base has shone a light on different approaches to rearmament among different nations.

Germany: A focus on domestic production

The overall scale of Germany’s initial rearmament, as recorded in detail for the period from January 2020 to July 2024 by Guntram B. Wolff, Ivan Kharitonov and Katelyn Bushnell for the Kiel Institute, is prima facie impressive, and major platforms are being acquired. The Deutsche Marine will receive four F126 frigates, Germany’s largest post-War surface ships; two Type 212CD attack submarines, later expanded to six; eight Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft; and 31 NH90 Sea Tiger anti-submarine helicopters.

The Luftwaffe has ordered 38 Eurofighter Typhoons of the most recent Tranche 4 specification; 35 Lockheed-Martin F-35A fighter/strike aircraft; 60 Boeing CH-47F Chinook Block II transport helicopters; five Airbus H145M LKH light combat helicopters for special forces; three Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile systems; eight MIM-104 Patriot PAC-3+ surface-to-air missile systems comprising 64 launchers.

For the Army, there will be 105 Leopard 2A8 main battle tanks; 273 BAE Systems/Hägglunds BvS10 all-terrain vehicles; 22 Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled guns; 1,508 Rheinmetall Caracal light utility vehicles; 50 ATF Dingo 2 A4.1 infantry mobility vehicles; 57 Airbus H145M LKH light combat helicopters. In addition, 297 Puma infantry fighting vehicles will be upgraded to the latest S1 design.

In addition to these new vehicles, aircraft, warships, and munitions systems, the Bundeswehr has also begun upgrading the technology on a range of platforms and has committed to purchasing large amounts of ammunition and other stocks: 135 million rounds of 7.62 mm training ammunition, 300,000 155 mm artillery shells, 962,860 smoke grenades, 16,041 MIKRON night vision devices, and 122,000 helmets. It is a wholescale re-equipment of the armed forces.

The €100 billion made available after Chancellor Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech was quickly spent, however. Germany’s newest equipment plan, recently revealed in the media, sets out another €377 billion of spending over the next decade and more, and it is noticeable that acquisitions are focused more firmly on domestic defence manufacturers than on EU-based industry, with a substantial reduction of its use of American equipment.

€182 billion, almost half of the total, will be spent with domestic manufacturers: Rheinmetall either alone or in partnership will supply major elements like the Boxer and Puma infantry fighting vehicles and Skyranger air defence systems, while Diehl Defence will provide IRIS-T surface-to-air missiles worth €17.3 billion.

Meanwhile, procurement from foreign companies, principally in the United States, adds up to only €14 billion, which is less than five per cent of the total programme. However, there is a caveat here: the proportion of expenditure may be small, but it consists of some of the most important and sophisticated capabilities the Bundeswehr will have.

A tranche of 15 additional F-35A fighters will be able to participate in NATO’s dual capable aircraft mission, equipped to carry the US-made B61 mod 12 tactical nuclear bombs available to the alliance. Germany will also buy 400 Tomahawk Block Vb cruise missiles from RTX, three Lockheed Martin Typhon launchers, and four additional Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Taken together, this may only be five per cent of the overall spending, but note what capabilities it is providing: tactical nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, reconnaissance, and intelligence-gathering platforms.

Poland: Speed and efficiency

The Polish Armed Forces have followed a very different approach from that of Germany. Poland has increased its defence spending enormously, from 2.2 per cent of GDP in 2021 and 2022 to 3.8 per cent in 2023, 4.2 per cent in 2024 and 4.8 per cent this year. Given that the country sits on NATO’s Eastern Flank and shares borders with pro-Kremlin Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, the Polish government has decided to prioritise speed and availability.

Its armed forces need to expand and reequip so that they can act as a deterrent to any potential Russian aggression — no-one has forgotten that eastern Poland was occupied by Soviet forces from 1939 to 1941, and that after its liberation in 1944/45 it was subject to a Soviet-backed Communist dictatorship until 1989. Given that there is not a substantial Polish defence industry, the government has bought a huge number of systems and platforms off the shelf.

Having previously purchased 116 refurbished M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks that had been operated by the US Marine Corps, it then placed a $4.75 billion order for M1A2 SEPv3 variants. It had also acquired 180 K2GF Black Panther MBTs from Hyundai Rotem in South Korea, and has agreed a deal to purchase another 820 K2PL versions; these will be constructed at the ZM Bumar-Łabędy facility of state-owned Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ, Polish Armaments Group) in Gliwice, Upper Silesia. (This means that for a time the Polish Army will be operating two types of main battle tank, as the country’s location meant the government has had to balance between efficiency and streamlined logistics when it comes to getting vehicles into service.)

A similar agreement has been reached with another Korean manufacturer, Hanwha Aerospace: Poland has committed to buy 364 K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers to strengthen its artillery force, then to purchase another 672 K9A1 and K9PL variants, the latter of which will be built in Poland at a new PGZ-owned facility, starting in 2026.

The UK and France: Challenges of the strong

Progress in Europe’s two nuclear powers has been less dramatic. France, home to several significant manufactures like Thales, Dassault, MBDA, Naval Group, and Arquus, has extravagant plans to spend €413 billion on defence modernisation by 2030. However, the country has been mired in political crisis since President Emmanuel Macron called early legislative elections in the summer of 2024, and Paris is on its fourth Prime Minister in less than 18 months. One of the challenges facing successive short-lived governments has been passing the budget through the National Assembly; if this repeats itself, ambitious spending plans will begin to unravel.

One shift in tone that President Macron has made is on nuclear weapons. France’s Force de dissuasion has air- and sea-launched capabilities — 54 ASMP-A cruise missiles with nuclear warheads deliverable by Dassault Rafale multi-role fighter aircraft and four Triomphant-class ballistic missile submarines each armed with 16 M51.3 nuclear missiles. These have traditionally been kept independent of NATO command structures, and only the President of the Republic can authorise a nuclear strike.

This summer, however, while visiting London, President Macron hinted that France’s nuclear capability could be deployed in defence of its allies as well as of France itself. “We cannot imagine a situation of extreme threat to Europe that would not justify a rapid response on our part, whatever the nature of that response may be… This is a message to our partners, and our adversaries.”

France and the UK have formed a joint Nuclear Supervisory Group “to coordinate cooperation between the two countries in terms of policy, capabilities, and operations.” As a source in the Élysée Palace told Euractiv,“nuclear forces, which are independent, can nevertheless be coordinated.”

Nevertheless, France remains hobbled by political instability. President Macron not only understands but sees opportunity in the challenge of rearming Europe. He has struggled to find a candidate who can serve sustainably as Prime Minister, but as President he is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and chairs the Defence and National Security Council. It is also worth noting that the incumbent Prime Minister, Sébastien Lecornu, served as Minister for the Armed Forces for three-and-a-half years until his appointment as head of government in October 2025. While the National Assembly remains effectively deadlocked between three roughly equal blocs of the left, right, and center, however, long-term progress remains elusive.

The United Kingdom’s armed forces are also beset by financial constraints. The Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, announced in February 2025 that the government would increase defence spending to 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2027 and that it had an “ambition” to move to three per cent during the next parliament, likely beginning in 2028 or 2029. That pledge, however, was soon overtaken by events. As NATO countries — warned and encouraged by Trump — revised spending targets upwards, the British government went from being at the front rank of military commitment to looking dangerously laggardly.

The current situation is that core defence spending will now reach 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2027, and the Prime Minister “estimates” that the UK will meet NATO’s new target of five per cent by the 2035 deadline. But that is still a decade away, and many military leaders and analysts believe a significant Russian threat to European security could present itself much sooner.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the UK Ministry of Defence is weighed down by long-standing budgetary overruns and disastrous procurement programmes. The two armoured fighting vehicles which will be the backbone of the British Army over the forthcoming decades — the General Dynamics Ajax and the Boxer — produced by a partnership of KNDS and Rheinmetall, are both vastly behind schedule and considerably over their anticipated costs.

The MoD has ordered 623 Boxers of various configurations, but the vehicle will not reach full operating capability until 2032; there will also be 589 Ajax platforms across six variants, but full operating capability will not be achieved until 2028 or 2029 at the earliest, and the Army can currently deploy only a handful of vehicles. Meanwhile, the 359 Warrior infantry fighting vehicles and 738 FV432 Bulldog armoured personnel carriers (which began production in 1962) will go out of service in 2030. The prospect of considerable capability gaps is obvious.

There are a number of other challenges for the UK. Having donated its AS90 155 mm self-propelled guns to Ukraine, the army has virtually no medium or heavy artillery. There are 126 L118 105 mm light guns and 43 M270 MLRS rocket launchers, but its conventional artillery capability, which remains crucial even in an age of drones, missiles, and rockets, relies on 14 Swedish-built Archer 155 mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers. 72 Boxer-based RCH-155 self-propelled guns have been ordered but will not enter service until the end of the decade.

The fundamental problem for the Ministry of Defence is that the increased spending it will enjoy, which is relatively modest in the short term, will barely offset current deficits. In 2023, its Equipment Plan 2023-33 was found to be “unaffordable” by the National Audit Office, with a shortfall between costs and budget of at least £16.9 billion. It has underestimated the whole-life costs of its F-35 fleet by £14 billion, and its nuclear programme, which includes the new Dreadnought-class ballistic missile submarines, will cost £10 billion more than anticipated. Catastrophic errors like these mean there is no scope for a spending spree on new equipment.

The UK’s armed forces are badly overstretched: recruitment is inadequate, the MoD’s financial situation is chaotic and overcommitted, procurement is widely regarded as disastrous (even if a new National Armaments Director position has been created in an attempt to bring the system under control), and the armed forces are unable to meet all of their standing commitments. A recent report from the House of Commons Defence Committee acknowledged the work the government had done in producing its Strategic Defence Review and National Security Strategy, but was very clear that good intentions were yet to be put into practice on a meaningful scale.

Rejuvenating Europe’s defence industry

Different countries have approached the issue of domestic manufacturing, secure supply chains, and sovereign capability in different ways, depending on their circumstances. Germany’s initial tranche of spending concentrated on its own defence sector, but there were significant exceptions to this. The 35 F-35 aircraft, 60 Chinook helicopters, and eight Poseidon patrol aircraft are all American-made, even if Rheinmetall is partnered with Lockheed Martin and will undertake some of the production of the F-35s.

In its longer-term procurement plan, Germany has focused overwhelmingly on a strong and pre-existing defence ecosystem, but has been forced to acknowledge there are still some particular capabilities which Europe cannot currently meet. The United States is a vital source for missiles in particular: the Patriot surface-to-air missile systems and Tomahawk cruise missiles are made by Raytheon, headquartered in Arizona, while the Arrow anti-ballistic missile is a joint project between Israeli Aerospace Industries and Boeing.

Poland, with no major defence sector to nurture but acute awareness of strategic threats, has chosen a faster route to creating one of the best-equipped armies in Europe. The later stages of its commercial arrangements with South Korean manufacturers will see domestic production stimulate economic growth, and Poland will hope to establish a solid relationship with its Korean suppliers. The priority, however, has been acquiring tried, tested, and capable equipment. The K9 Thunder is the most popular self-propelled howitzer in the world, with 50 per cent of the global market; in addition to Poland, it is in service in South Korea, Turkey, India, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Australia and Egypt (and is under order from Romania and Vietnam).

European countries are caught between two pressing demands. In the long term, they want to develop and sustain their own defence sector — for economic as well as security reasons. This is especially true for France, which has always taken particular pains to nurture domestic industry, not least because Thales, Naval Group, KNDS France, Airbus, MBDA, and Safran are all partially state-owned.

At the same time, Europe’s defence sector cannot currently provide some vital elements of the necessary armoury. While this is particularly true of some kinds of missiles, the war in Ukraine also exposed the limited capacity of ammunition manufacturing. Until recently, European output was of the order of 350,000 rounds each year, while Russia is producing at least three million. European countries have begun to address this disparity and should make two million rounds in 2025.

Ready for war?

Most European countries now “get” it: their armed forces are inadequately equipped for the roles we expect them to perform. NATO has set out its ambitious plans for members to spend 3.5 per cent of GDP on defence and another 1.5 per cent on security and resilience within the next decade. But the pace of production and acquisition remains alarmingly slow. Many of the programmes with billion-euro price tags attached will not reach fruition until the 2030s, and some of Germany’s intended procurement has no firm timeframe at all. While the signs may be pointing in the right direction, neither Europe’s armed forces nor its defence sector will be operating at a fully self-sufficient level in this decade.

The elephant in the room — the possibility of the United States withdrawing military forces from Europe almost entirely, even if it remains formally within NATO — is harder and harder to ignore. When Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and President Emmanuel Macron were constructing the so-called “Coalition of the Willing” as part of their efforts to develop a peace settlement in Ukraine, it was accepted but underplayed that the entire enterprise was impossible without American support in a number of key areas.

The reliance of NATO’s European members on the United States is not so much a matter of scale: Europe is a rich continent and could, in theory, generate larger armed forces than it currently does. The major weakness is in “strategic enablers,” some of the less prominent and occasionally less glamorous aspects of hard power which are nonetheless essential.

In particular, Europe lacks intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, along with air-to-air refuelling and strategic lift both by air and sea. Shortcomings in long-range precision fires and air defence missiles also exist but are being more urgently addressed.

The essential role of ISR was demonstrated in March of this year when the U.S. Department of Defense temporarily suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine: this left the Ukrainian Ground Forces and Air Force unable to use some of its long-range missiles and rockets, which were reliant on U.S.-supplied targeting data. America’s network of satellites and intelligence and reconnaissance aircraft is of a scale and sophistication that Europe cannot for the foreseeable future match, let alone replace.

Air-to-air refuelling is of course central to sustained aerial patrol and combat. Here again, the transatlantic divide is stark. NATO’s eight-member Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet, the participants in which are Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, has nine Airbus 330 MRTT tankers, with three more on order.

In addition, the French Air and Space Force has 13 Airbus 330s (as well as two Lockheed KC-130J Super Hercules tankers), the Royal Air Force has 14 similar Airbus Voyagers, and the Spanish Air and Space Force operates two Airbus 330s (with another to be delivered). The Italian Air Force possesses four Boeing KC-767A aircraft and the Luftwaffe has three Lockheed KC-130Js.

By contrast, the United States Air Force has 424 active tanker aircraft: 314 Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers, 77 Boeing KC-46As, and 33 Lockheed HC-130J Combat King II aircraft. There is simply no comparison in terms of scale.

This is one of Europe’s most pressing security problems. There is now a recognition among most countries that more — much more — needs to be done and spent to make the continent more self-sufficient in terms of military power and a sustainable and globally competitive defence sector. After decades of underspending and a tacit reliance on American military power as the ultimate guarantor of European security, there is no “quick fix.” Yet many Europeans believe the continent faces a threat in the shape of Russia which is immediate or imminent. It is proving extremely difficult to reconcile these two timetables, but a way will have to be found. If we can see the problem, there is no question that Vladimir Putin can see it, and the Russian President is a great opportunist.