After losing its traditional electorate and ideological base back in the 1990s and 2000s, Europe’s left-wing movement has been mired in crisis. Social democrats and greens stopped being classical leftists, while the new parties that took up this flank are still struggling to attain relevance. The war in Ukraine has forced the left to choose between pacifism and antifascism, and electoral results show that groups which have managed to combine support for Ukraine with a commitment to antiwar positions are achieving the greatest success — even pushing traditional left-wing parties to the sidelines.
Rebirth
The collapse of the USSR in 1991 marked the end of informational, ideological, and financial support for communist and workers’ parties from Warsaw to Lisbon. The peaceful revolutions in Central and Eastern European countries were liberal or conservative in nature, while the very idea of the left had become associated in the public mind with Soviet-style pseudo-socialism: authoritarianism, lack of freedoms, a weak economy, and a low standard of living. As a result, some Eastern European communist parties ceased to exist.
The erosion also affected the western part of the continent. The once large and powerful Italian Communist Party, which had consistently achieved double-digit election results up until 1990, was disbanded. Likewise, communist parties in France and Spain experienced a sharp drop in ratings and a mass exodus of supporters.
Some communist parties chose the path of renewal and restructuring, while those that clung to orthodox positions were usually left on the sidelines. For example, Dutch leftists dissolved the old Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) and founded the New Communist Party of the Netherlands (NCPN), which remains marginal. Among the success stories were the projects in Poland and unified Germany, where the heirs of the former ruling parties of the Polish People’s Republic (PPR) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) created left-wing movements that remained active in mainstream politics.
In the meantime, many of Europe’s social democratic parties — Germany’s SPD, France’s Socialist Party, the UK's Labour Party — underwent a noticeable shift toward neoliberalism, which effectively placed them outside the traditional left. The clearest symbol of this shift was a document signed in 1999 by the heads of government of Germany and the United Kingdom, Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair, with endorsement from their French counterpart, Lionel Jospin.
The joint declaration of the “old left” emphasized a departure from the traditional “struggle against capitalism”
The Schröder–Blair document signaled an acknowledgment of the new economic reality — one largely determined by globalization and the power of financial institutions. However, this milestone ideological turn ultimately did the social democrats more harm than good.
As a result of the ideological shift, several European countries saw the emergence of new left-wing movements, such as La France Insoumise, Spain’s Podemos, and Germany’s The Left (Die Linke). These parties drew their support largely from the social democrats’ former electorate, leaving the newly center-left parties short of the full constituency necessary for political success.
For the French Socialist Party — once a ruling force and the political home of two presidents, François Mitterrand and François Hollande — these changes meant losing not only power but also its standing in the country’s political landscape. In the 2017 presidential election, the Socialist Party candidate came in fifth place, and in 2022, in tenth.
Germany’s social democrats never managed to achieve results comparable to their past victories. In 1998, the SPD won the elections with 40.9% of the vote, but by 2017, its share had halved to 20.5%. The center-left also failed to leverage the “shift to the left” of some formerly conservative European parties. For example, Germany’s Christian Democrats under Angela Merkel campaigned on slogans of social justice and humanitarianism in migration issues, further eroding the SPD’s electorate.
At the same time, effective positioning helped many of the “new left” movements carve out their own niche in the domestic political landscape. A significant factor in their success was public dissatisfaction with governments’ poor handling of the global financial crises of the 2000s and 2010s. In addition, the new leftist leaders were unafraid to address environmental and migration issues and were willing to reach beyond the traditional “working-class” electorate, reflecting the realities of the post-industrial era. They also did not shy away from discussions about wealth redistribution and the budgetary burden of debt — topics that social democrats had begun to avoid.
Their boldness translated into electoral gains. In Germany, The Left (Die Linke) consistently received around 10% of the vote in Bundestag elections and joined ruling coalitions in five federal states, including Berlin and the western German city of Bremen. In 2014, the party even secured Thuringia’s prime ministership for the first time. Spain’s Podemos garnered 21% of the vote in the 2015 parliamentary elections, effectively breaking the country’s long-standing two-party system. That same year, Greece saw a victory for the far-left Syriza, and two years later, La France Insoumise leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon finished fourth in France's presidential election, surpassing the Socialist Party candidate.
Right-wing resurgence
Debates continue in academia and the press over the criteria for classifying political forces as left-wing. Still, if a list of common features for the left existed, its first two entries would be antifascism and pacifism. And yet, it is precisely these principles that are now being put to the test.
Regional office of the Brothers of Italy party
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The 2020s have been marked by significant progress for right-wing radicals, populists, and extremists. In 2022, the post-fascist Brothers of Italy party came to power, with the right-wing populist party Lega per Salvini Premier joining the ruling coalition. In the 2024 parliamentary elections, Austria’s Freedom Party secured a decisive first place, and only lengthy negotiations among other political forces prevented its entry into government.
Alternative for Germany (AfD) has significantly expanded its representation in the Bundestag since 2021, finishing third and later second in federal elections. The party also came in second in several state elections and in the European Parliament. AfD even won in Thuringia — the very state once led by a Left prime minister. AfD now leads in opinion polls across Germany.
Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch far-right
In France, Emmanuel Macron won reelection against Marine Le Pen in 2022 thanks only to his consolidation of democratic forces. In 2024, Le Pen’s National Rally doubled its representation in the National Assembly. That same year, Geert Wilders’ far-right Freedom Party entered the Dutch government, only to later collapse it and, in the subsequent snap elections, share first place with the liberals.
Time to take a stand
One would think that a “right-wing resurgence” would have made it easier for left-wing forces to define their political profile in opposition to a counterweight on the other flank. However, with the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the “left” found itself in a new regional and global geopolitical reality. The full-scale war brought at least four serious challenges that required a political response from parties across the ideological spectrum — and the left was no exception.
First, they were expected to assess the events of February 24, 2022, and to either label Moscow’s actions as aggression or adopt equivocal Kremlin narratives about the “violation of the rights of Russian-speaking populations in Donbas” and Russia’s “response to NATO’s eastward expansion.” This initial step was extremely difficult for the left, as many of its orthodox adherents advocate for a “multipolar world,” espouse anti-Americanism, and view Russia as the “successor of the USSR” in its “struggle” against Western expansion, capitalism, and colonialism.
Second, a position on support for Ukraine had to be formulated. While the necessity of sending humanitarian aid sparked little debate, the question of supplying weapons to Kyiv predictably became a major stumbling block for the left.
The issue of supplying weapons to Kyiv predictably became a stumbling block for the left
Third, Russia’s war and the threats it posed to Europe inevitably led to the militarization of the EU. Many member states significantly increased defense spending, expanded their procurement and modernization of weapons, and planned to provide state guarantees to defense industry enterprises. Some countries, such as Lithuania, even reintroduced compulsory conscription, while others are debating such measures. These efforts clearly conflicted with the pacifist principle, meaning the left had to articulate a clear stance on these crucial issues.
Finally, an uncomfortable dilemma arose. At a time when opposition to the far right had become an existential issue for the left, it was extremely dangerous to find themselves effectively aligned with their arch-rivals. Pro-Russia sentiments, support for Vladimir Putin’s policies, anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, and a strong desire to distance Europe from the war were particularly widespread among adherents of the far right.
New strategies
The left-wing group in the European Parliament took a month to develop a position on Russia’s invasion. Towards the end of March 2022, a joint statement was issued on behalf of 41 MEPs from various parties: French, German, Spanish, and Portuguese.
The document made a mixed impression. On the one hand, it clearly condemned the “war of the Putin regime against Ukraine,” acknowledged the violation of international law, and expressed solidarity with the Ukrainian people. On the other hand, the statement called on Western institutions to refrain from escalation, advocated efforts to seek a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, and confirmed the left’s commitment to the European antiwar movement.
The appeal to the EU and NATO to “refrain from statements or actions that undermine the possibility of dialogue” can be interpreted as a desire to provide Kyiv with the minimal acceptable level of support. The faction’s leaders, meanwhile, aware of the situation’s complexity, effectively gave national parties a green light to formulate their own positions independently. Center-left movements were far more supportive of Kyiv. The social democrats issued a much firmer statement and sponsored a European Parliament resolution that paved the way for new sanctions against Russia and military aid to Ukraine, while key Green politicians backed the resolution.
European leftists agreed on two main points: criticism of Russia, albeit in varying forms, and the need to provide aid to Ukraine as a victim of aggression. Well integrated into the political processes of their own countries, members of the left understood that Russia’s war against Ukraine was clearly expansionist and imperialist, and that justifying it would entail reputational risks. However, voters expected answers, which meant further steps had to be taken. This gave rise to three main strategies.
Russia’s war against Ukraine is imperialist in nature, and justifying it would entail political risks for the left
The first strategy was adopted by parties and movements that express a certain disagreement with Moscow’s actions while adding numerous caveats. Thus, Sahra Wagenknecht, leader of the eponymous German bloc, “condemned the war” and even called Putin a “criminal” — albeit as part of a broader critique of any politician who starts wars. She acknowledged that she had misjudged Russia’s readiness to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and came out in support of providing Kyiv with security guarantees. At the same time, however, Wagenknecht had attempted to portray the EU, the U.S., and NATO as “responsible for the situation,” arguing that the war could have been avoided if “Russia’s red lines” had been respected. In short, while expressing sympathy for the “horrific suffering and deaths in Ukraine,” Wagenknecht advocates negotiating with the Kremlin and halting weapons supplies to Kyiv. Her bloc remains the most active segment of orthodox pacifism.
A similar stance — cautiously condemning aggression in general but taking no concrete steps to stop it — is shared by Portuguese and Czech communists, along with members of the Belgian Workers’ Party, the Progressive Party of Working People in Cyprus, and a handful of other small political forces represented in the European Parliament. This was evident from the list of those who, in November 2022, voted against the resolution condemning the deliberate shelling of civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and labeling such Russian actions as acts of terrorism.
While expressing sympathy for the “horrific suffering and deaths in Ukraine,” Sahra Wagenknecht advocates negotiating with the Kremlin and halting weapons supplies to Kyiv
The second strategy arguably represents the new dominant opinion within leftist circles. Political forces that follow it openly condemn the Russian invasion and are willing to support humanitarian, financial, and logistical aid to Ukraine, as well as sanctions against Moscow. However, they remain aligned with the traditional antiwar movement, criticizing the U.S. and NATO and characterizing the supply of weapons to Kyiv as escalatory. For them, diplomatic negotiations remain the only way to stop the war in Europe and the most effective means of supporting Ukraine.
In March 2022, Alexis Tsipras, leader of Greece’s Syriza, emphasized that Putin’s actions were entirely unjustifiable and highlighted Russia’s violation of international law. Nevertheless, while calling for negotiations, he stated that sending Greek weapons to Kyiv would constitute “great recklessness,” and the party’s spokesperson, Nassos Iliopoulos, warned against the “dangerous move.”
The leader of La France Insoumise, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, condemned Russian aggression as early as March 2022 and maintains that stance to this day. However, he advocates his own pacifist version of “radical diplomacy,” seeing it as the only path to peace in Ukraine. In March 2023, deputies from his party spoke out in the French Parliament against a bill on military aid to Ukraine, and two years later, they voted against a resolution calling for the seizure of frozen Russian assets.
Germany’s The Left (Die Linke) condemned the “war against Ukraine, which violates international law,” called on Russia to “withdraw its troops from Ukraine,” and stated that it “stands with the Ukrainian people, who have the right to self-defense.” The party proposes combining “substantial humanitarian aid to Ukraine” with “diplomatic initiatives” aimed at achieving a “ceasefire and a just peace.”
In recent years, The Left has, in one form or another, supported various projects to aid Ukraine, but the supply of weapons remains an insurmountable barrier for them. According to Gregor Gysi, a party veteran and one of its most prominent politicians, The Left, given Germany’s history, is fundamentally opposed to providing German weapons for combat — especially in a war “between one former Soviet republic and another.”
Finally, the third strategy follows the model of most mainstream parties: condemnation of Moscow’s actions, support for Kyiv, and approval of Western weapons shipments to Ukraine. Poland’s Razem party, for one, condemned Putin’s “repeated violation of international law” the day after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The party noted that “an illegitimate sense of sovereignty over Ukraine and imperialist aspirations are behind Moscow's actions” and that “responsibility for this aggression lies solely with Putin's regime.” To assist Ukraine, the party proposes, among other measures, sanctions and “supplying weapons, military supplies, and basic resources for the civilian population, as well as intelligence and medical support.”
In the early days of the full-scale war, Sweden’s Left Party was skeptical about the wisdom of supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine, and its MEP even abstained from voting on a resolution sharply condemning Russia. However, by March 2022, the party had revised its position and approved the provision of Western weapons to Ukraine to defend its sovereignty, emphasizing that this was an exceptional situation. Nevertheless, the party opposed NATO accession for Sweden and Finland.
The issue of supplying weapons to Kyiv predictably became a stumbling block for the left
Some parties failed completely in their attempts to stake out a coherent position. In Spain, where the Podemos movement was part of the country’s ruling coalition from 2020-2023, this indecision had implications for national policy regarding the war. In March 2022, Podemos Secretary General Ione Bellara characterized his coalition partners in Madrid as “the party of war,” criticized plans to supply weapons to Kyiv, and identified diplomacy as the only path to peace. At the same time, Podemos tacitly agreed to the transfer of Spanish missile systems and German Leopard 2A4 tanks from the Spanish arsenal to Ukraine. Observers explained this contradiction as the result of an intraparty struggle between ultra-pacifist and reformist wings. On far-left platforms, the party’s “dual” stance sparked outrage and accusations of “betraying” the antiwar movement, with some even drawing parallels to Francoist Spain’s cooperation with Nazi Germany.
Political gains
The results of recent elections and the current ratings of Europe's left-wing parties show that advocates of the second strategy — condemning Moscow’s actions while opposing weapons deliveries to Kyiv — have been the most successful. After a series of setbacks, including the failure to enter the Bundestag in 2021 for the first time since its founding, Germany’s The Left managed to regain parliamentary seats in the 2025 snap elections, securing nearly 9% of the vote. The party successfully occupied an electoral niche between the Social Democrats, the Greens, and the conservatives, and The Left has found its “second wind,” with support ratings now reaching 11%.
In 2022, Jean-Luc Mélenchon finished third in France’s presidential race, and in 2024, La France Insoumise won the second round of parliamentary elections as part of a bloc of several left-wing parties. Parties that have refused to abandon a pro-Russian course and flirt with right-wing rhetoric are also struggling at the polls. The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance performed well in elections in three eastern German states and even became part of coalition governments in two regions. However, in 2025, it failed to enter the Bundestag, and voter support for the bloc now hovers around 3–4%. Potential voters are deterred not only by Wagenknecht’s anti-immigrant and anti-social narratives, highly atypical for a leftist movement, but also by her excessive justification of Putin's policies. Several of the party’s significant state-level organizations have openly opposed Wagenknecht and are now pursuing independent policies.
In 2022, Jean-Luc Mélenchon finished third in the presidential race
In short, left-wing voters tend to shun parties that express unconditional support for Ukraine, that refrain from criticizing the West and NATO, and that refrain from coming out against the supply of weapons to Kyiv. The case of Podemos shows that, while there are forces willing to reconsider outdated principles within the “new left,” doing so would not yield significant dividends at present. (The exception is countries where condemning Russia’s actions is an unquestioned mainstream position, as is the case in Poland and Sweden.)
Political strategists of the “new left” appear to have struck a chord with their core electorate. Their audience remains committed to anti-fascist principles, condemns war and aggression, and demands social change. However, at the same time, they are reluctant to abandon their fundamental antiwar and antimilitarist positions. They believe in a peaceful resolution to any conflict, and supplying weapons to a war zone remains an absolute taboo for them, even when it concerns the self-defense of a victim of aggression.