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Russia has drawn up a plan to interfere in Moldova’s Sept. 28 parliamentary elections. Its aim is to push President Maia Sandu’s ruling Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) from power, thereby blocking the country’s path to European integration and weakening ties with Ukraine, Bloomberg reported on Sept. 22, citing internal Kremlin documents. According to the outlet:
“Tactics include recruitment of Moldovans abroad, including in Russia, to vote at polling stations in the EU and elsewhere, deploying others to stage disruptive protests and a widespread disinformation campaign on social media, the documents show. Another core area of the plans by President Vladimir Putin’s executive office involves the use of compromising material to pressure public officials to disrupt the electoral process.”
The BBC published its own investigation into the same topic. The publication’s undercover reporters infiltrated a pro-Russian network that was coordinated via the messenger app Telegram and funded through Promsvyazbank (PSB), a sanctioned state-owned bank linked to fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor. Recruits were promised 3,000 lei (about $170) per month to post content on Facebook and TikTok discrediting Sandu’s government. The group also staged biased political opinion polls. The BBC found that the network was running at least 90 TikTok accounts, some masquerading as legitimate news agencies.
The Kirill Parubets Center analyzed the Kremlin’s covert activities in Moldova for The Insider.
Who is the Kremlin backing?
Moscow’s main objective is to secure at least 51 loyal MPs in Moldova’s 101-seat parliament, enough to block legislation and even impeach pro-European President Maia Sandu, who was reelected last year with 55.35% of the second round vote.
At least one Moldovan political alliance is directly financed by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, who is currently hiding in Russia. His Victorie (“Victory”) bloc brings together several parties: Shor (banned in Moldova in 2023 for unconstitutional activity and its ties to the Kremlin), Chance, Revival, the Alternative Force for Moldova’s Salvation and Victory. Moldova’s Central Election Commission barred the bloc from this year’s elections, though polls put its support as high as 11%.
According to the Kirill Parubets Center’s sources in Moldova, Russia is also using Shor to bankroll a number of smaller political projects designed to siphon votes from the ruling Action and Solidarity Party (PAS). These groups formally present themselves as pro-European or unionist, favoring unification with Romania.
Another tool of influence is the Moldovan Orthodox Church, officially the Chisinau Metropolitanate. While it is subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church, it retains nominal autonomy. As of 2021, the vast majority of Moldovan Orthodox Christians — about 90% — identified with it. Local outlet Newsmaker reported that Shor-linked NGO Eurasia funded “pilgrimage” trips to Moscow and Serbia for Moldovan Orthodox priests, handing them Russian Mir bank cards issued by Promsvyazbank.
During last year’s referendum in Moldova on EU integration, the Kremlin also resorted to direct vote-buying. However, the effort failed to tip the scales, as Sandu’s pro-European camp still received 50.35% support.
Other opposition parties
The “For Moldova” platform unites politicians with long-standing or recently reaffirmed ties to Moscow. It consists of four parties: the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), led by Igor Dodon; the Party of Communists (PCRM), led by Vladimir Voronin; the Future of Moldova party, led by Vasile Tarlev; and Heart of Moldova, led by former Gagauzia governor Irina Vlah. This bloc is considered the most electorally promising among pro-Russian forces. A PSRM-PCRM alliance won second place in the 2021 parliamentary elections, taking 27.17% of the vote and 32 seats. Recent polls suggest For Moldova is running neck-and-neck with PAS. Some surveys show PSRM could win more than 20 seats on its own, which may discourage Dodon from maintaining the alliance.
TERM (polls): Electoral polling data in Moldova varies widely. Only a handful of companies conduct surveys, and many are politically biased. The two main firms that provide sociological data in Moldova are IMAS and iData.
Russia’s point man on Moldova, Kremlin official Sergey Kiriyenko, met with a PSRM delegation in Moscow this past May during a visit formally organized to honor World War II veterans. And in 2022, investigative outlets RISE Moldova and the Dossier Center collaborated on a report that alleged Russian political consultant Vladimir Shirobokov maintained close contact with the FSB while working with PSRM in 2019.
In addition to the openly pro-Russian opposition, the centrist “Alternative” bloc presents itself as pro-European while criticizing PAS and Sandu. It includes the National Alternative Movement (MAN), led by Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban; the Party of Development and Unification of Moldova (PDCM); and the Civic Congress. Former Moldovan Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo has also joined its ranks. In 2024, he ran in the presidential election with PSRM’s support but lost to Sandu in the second round. PAS officials accused him of cooperating with former Kremlin envoy for Moldova Dmitry Kozak, though that has not been independently confirmed.
Gagauzia and Transnistria as sources of instability
Another lever of pressure on Moldova is the autonomous territorial unit of Gagauzia and the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR).
Last year, Vladimir Putin met with Evghenia Guțul, the Governor of Gagauzia (pop. 110,400). During Guțul's visit to Sochi, Russia and Gagauzia signed bilateral agreements facilitating access to the Russian market for Gagauz goods and granting the autonomous unit reduced prices on Russian energy resources, bypassing Moldova’s central authorities. As a result, Guțul came under EU sanctions for “promoting separatism and threatening the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova.” A court in Chișinău sentenced her to seven years in prison in a case of illegal campaign financing. According to the prosecution, between 2019 and 2022, Guțul, while serving as secretary of the Șor (Shor) Party, systematically brought Russian money into Moldova. She was also accused of coordinating the activities of several party offices and “knowingly receiving funds from an organized criminal group” to finance the party’s operations.
This past winter, Transnistria was plunged into an energy crisis after the contract for the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine expired. For more than 30 years, the region had been receiving Russian gas free of charge. However, after the Ukrainian route was cut off, Russia’s Gazprom refused to supply Moldova via the TurkStream or Trans-Balkan pipelines until Moldovagaz paid off the debt it had run up over the decades — more than $700 million in Moscow’s estimate. The problem was eventually resolved thanks to the introduction of supplies from Moldova and Europe.
Disinformation
In early September, while speaking at the European Parliament, Maia Sandu accused Russia of waging a hybrid war against Moldova, including through disinformation. “The Kremlin’s goal is clear: to capture Moldova through the ballot box, to use us against Ukraine, and to turn us into a launchpad for hybrid attacks on the European Union,” Sandu said.
The Insider has extensively covered the campaigns of the pro-Kremlin Matryoshka bot network, which aims to undermine Sandu’s approval rating. At various times, the bots have accused her of corruption, repression of opponents, and electoral manipulation. They have also tried to create a rift with European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas by alleging Sandu was intent on usurping Kallas’s post. The network even circulated an AI-generated music video mocking Sandu. Other short clips containing false information about the politician were passed off on X and Bluesky as content from global media outlets or Western universities.
In addition to these platforms, the Kremlin uses the following means in order to influence Moldovan voters:
· Telegram: in the spring of 2025, a network of channels was uncovered, named after administrative districts of Moldova and simultaneously spreading AI-generated messages. Local news and neutral greetings (such as “Good morning” or “Happy holidays”) were interspersed with anti-government posts. Some ridiculed Maia Sandu’s anti-corruption policy as political theater, while others promoted the Kremlin’s foreign policy, portraying Western countries as exploiters seeking to take away part of Moldova’s sovereignty. The TgStat service made it possible to establish that the channels were being administered from Russia.
· TikTok is used to engage young audiences with videos featuring simple slogans such as “Why is Moldova poor? Because for 30 years we’ve been choosing between ‘Europeans’ and ‘Socialists.’ Enough!”
· Facebook: in the fall of 2024, Meta reported blocking a network of fake communities and accounts targeting Russian-speaking residents of Moldova. These accounts published criticism of Sandu and other pro-European politicians while also supporting pro-Russian parties in Moldova.
The Kirill Parubets analytical center has highlighted several key themes in the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns that are underway ahead of the parliamentary elections:
· Moldova’s European integration is equated with the loss of neutrality and the imposition of “non-traditional values.”
· Moldova is persecuting the Gagauz and other national minorities.
· Moldova is being “drawn” into NATO and prepared for a war with Russia.
· The Moldovan economy is in decline, and the PAS cannot ensure a decent standard of living.
Additional themes of Russian propaganda include discrediting Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, spreading false information about the Moldovan government, fueling separatist sentiments, and promoting the idea of “spiritual closeness to Russia.”
Staged protests
In addition to online disinformation campaigns, the Kremlin organizes street protests with similar slogans. As Reuters reported in August, Ilan Shor directly promised to compensate participants in such actions, announcing that accounts for payment would be opened right at the protest sites. Interestingly, last year Moldovan law enforcement authorities seized large sums of money that private individuals affiliated with Shor-sponsored entities had brought in from Russia for these very purposes. Each of them was carrying no more than $10,000 in order to avoid violating customs restrictions.
According to sources at Kirill Parubets’ center, Sergey Kiriyenko, the Kremlin’s new Moldova portfolio “handler,” has demanded that a minimum of two to three protests be held weekly, with mandatory reporting to the Russian president's executive office. The minimum number of participants was set at 300 to start out with, followed by a gradual increase in turnout. Another key requirement was generating significant media resonance.
The Russian side intends to change the tactics of the opposition movement and involve participants who are inclined to engage in illegal forms of protest, including violent confrontations with law enforcement. Career criminals, members of athletic clubs, and former law enforcement officers with ties to criminal groups are expected to play an important role.