When the “action” starts: Debunking 12 falsehoods from Vladimir Putin’s “Direct Line”

RU

On inflation and rising wages

“Yes, of course, inflation is a worrying signal. Just yesterday, while preparing for today’s event, I spoke with the head of the Central Bank. Elvira [Nabiullina] told me it’s around 9.2–9.3%, but wages have grown by 9% in real terms. I want to emphasize: in real terms, excluding inflation. Disposable incomes have also increased. So overall, the situation is stable and reliable.”

Median wage data from Sberbank’s SberIndex, updated for October 2024, shows median salaries rose from 52,272 rubles in October 2023 to 62,632 rubles — an increase of 19.8%. This aligns with Putin’s statement.

However, Putin only cited the official inflation rate published by Russia’s Rosstat federal statistics agency. Everyday goods, meanwhile, are rising in price at a much faster pace. The Russian research center ROMIR calculates the “Deflator Index,” which tracks real changes in prices for everyday goods (FMCG), describing it as “the average personal inflation rate for each consumer.”

The latest update, shown above, covers September 2024 (represented by the blue line at the top of the graph). It puts real annual inflation in Russia at 22.1%. Despite the technical fact that nominal wage growth is outpacing official inflation, purchasing power in the country continues to decline.

On Russian and American air defense systems

“There are several types of air defense systems, as you know... Patriot, and the more modern THAAD systems. I don’t know if they’re in Ukraine — probably not. If the Americans decide to send them, let them send THAAD; it’s similar to our S-400. If Patriot can be compared to the Russian S-300, then THAAD is closer to the S-400 — though with slightly weaker specs overall.”

THAAD is an air defense system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles outside the Earth’s atmosphere. The upper limit of the atmosphere is defined as the Kármán line, which is located at around 100 kilometers from the surface of the Earth. THAAD can intercept missiles at altitudes up to 93 miles (about 150 km). Even more capable are the U.S. SM-3 interceptors, which Putin failed to mention. Their missiles can reach altitudes of up to 250 km.

By comparison, Russia’s S-400 system has a maximum intercept altitude of 30 km, according to data from state defense exporter Rosoboronexport. While Russia’s now-retired 51T6 interceptor could engage targets in space as part of the A-135 system, there is no open information about newer Russian systems capable of exoatmospheric interception.

On Ukrainians returning to occupied Mariupol

“There is actually something of a construction boom happening in the annexed regions, and by our estimates, at least 300,000 people have already returned to Mariupol, and the population continues to grow rapidly.”

This figure is highly unlikely to reflect reality. Official Ukrainian data puts Mariupol’s pre-war population in January 2022 at 425,000, while Mariupol’s legitimate Ukrainian mayor, Vadym Boychenko, previously stated the city had 540,000 residents before the war.

Just a month into Russia’s full-scale invasion, however, Boychenko estimated 50% of the population had already fled. By mid-May 2022, Human Rights Watch reported 400,000 residents had escaped, and that thousands of civilians had been killed.

In November 2024, Ukrainian lawmaker Maksym Tkachenko of the Servant of the People party claimed that around 150,000 people — a third of those who fled — had returned to the occupied territories, including about 70,000 to Mariupol. This sparked backlash from Ukraine’s presidential office, leading Tkachenko to retract his statement.

A 2023 survey conducted at the Latvia-Russia border by the International Organization for Migration found that 49% of Ukrainians entering Russia from the EU intended to return to Ukraine, including to its occupied territories. Russian authorities, meanwhile, claimed in October 2024 that 107,000 Ukrainians had attempted to enter Russia via Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport, but only 83,000 were allowed in. The Russian claim was made without specifying the time frame in question or how many of the Ukrainians who had been allowed into Russia traveled on to the occupied areas.

On Zelensky’s alleged refusal of a ceasefire and prisoner exchange

“Erdogan calls and says [Ukraine] agrees. Then suddenly, the head of the Ukrainian regime declares: no negotiations, no ceasefire. I asked [Viktor] Orban, who proposed a Christmas ceasefire and prisoner exchange. I didn’t refuse — I said we should think it over and ask Kyiv. He asked, and the next day the head of the regime said: no ceasefire, no prisoner exchange.”

In reality, Vladimir Zelensky has made no such statements. First, prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine occur regularly. Second, Zelensky has never rejected a peaceful resolution to the war. However, Ukraine rejects Russia’s terms, which effectively demand Ukraine’s capitulation, the near-total dismantling of its military, and its agreement to cede all occupied territories to Russia — along with additional areas that are under Ukrainian control..

In late November, Zelensky even suggested that Ukraine might cede occupied territories to Russia under the condition that Ukraine receive NATO membership. Additionally, Andriy Yermak, head of Ukraine’s presidential office, recently stated that a Russian withdrawal to its pre-February 24, 2022 positions could be enough to start negotiations.

Putin’s claim was directly refuted by Zelensky, who said he had no discussions with Orban: “I don’t know what the Hungarian side is proposing or how.”

On the negotiations in Istanbul

Throughout the four-and-a-half-hour “Direct Line,” Putin repeatedly lied about peace talks, claiming Ukraine had rejected agreements that were “almost reached” in Istanbul in 2022. According to Putin, Russia was ready for compromises:

“The Ukrainian side initialed the document, meaning they agreed to it overall. And then, for some reason, they backed out. Well, we know why. Because your ally, Mr. Johnson [then the British Prime Minister], a man with a nice haircut, came over and told them they had to fight to the last Ukrainian.”

First, as mentioned earlier, Russia’s idea of “compromise” amounts to Ukraine’s surrender — losing its territories and drastically reducing the size and strength of its military.

Second, the story involving Boris Johnson, which Putin has repeated for nearly a year, is dubious. The wave of falsehoods began after David Arakhamia, the head of Ukraine’s delegation in the negotiations, mentioned in November 2023 that Johnson had visited Kyiv on April 9, 2022, shortly after one of the Istanbul meetings. According to Arakhamia, Johnson advised Ukraine to “just keep fighting” and avoid signing any agreements with Russia.

Russian propaganda quickly turned this fragment into arguments about a supposed “Johnson ultimatum,” alleging that the British Prime Minister had prevented Zelensky from signing a credible agreement to end the war. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova even explicitly accused Johnson of issuing this “ban.”

Johnson himself called these claims “total nonsense and Russian propaganda.” In an interview with The Times, he said that during his Kyiv visit, he expressed concern about the potential terms of any Ukraine-Russia agreement and pledged Britain’s “thousand per cent support” for Ukraine. However, he stressed there was no “ban,” only his skepticism about the feasibility of achieving a sustainable compromise with Putin.

Arakhamia also addressed Russia’s distortion of his comments, clarifying that he never claimed Johnson issued any orders or demands.

On the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022

“If you look at the situation in 2022 knowing what we know now, what would I think? That such a decision, made in early 2022, should have been made earlier. That’s the first point.

Second, knowing this, we should have simply started preparing for these actions earlier, including the ‘special military operation.’ The events in Crimea were spontaneous, and the events of 2022 were also started without much preparation. Why did we start? Because it was no longer possible to stand still and endure, to wait for the situation to worsen for us. That’s the point.”

On Oct. 30, 2021, The Washington Post reported that Russia was massing troops near Ukraine’s border, with an estimated force of 80,000–90,000 soldiers, according to Ukraine’s National Security Secretary Oleksiy Danilov. On Dec. 7, 2021, the same outlet cited U.S. intelligence sources predicting Russia would deploy an additional 175,000 troops to the border. Apparently, Putin does not consider these actions to constitute “preparation.”

On Ukrainian losses in the Kursk Region

“Right now, the amount of armored vehicles destroyed in the Kursk Region has, I think, surpassed the amount of equipment our troops destroyed along the entire contact line last year — roughly comparable figures.”

According to the Dutch independent project Oryx, which uses open source data to track losses, Ukraine lost 1,253 ground vehicles in 2023, including:

• 283 tanks
• 99 armored combat vehicles
• 382 infantry fighting vehicles
• 176 armored personnel carriers
• 157 mine-protected vehicles
• 156 infantry transport vehicles.

While Oryx does not specify where equipment losses occurred, its data since Aug. 6, 2024 — when Ukraine launched operations in the Kursk Region — show 780 vehicles lost across the entire front line. These include:

• 124 tanks
• 72 armored vehicles
• 134 infantry fighting vehicles
• 174 APCs
• 137 mine-protected vehicles
• 186 infantry transport vehicles.

Although Oryx data is not exhaustive, it provides a clear idea of the relative scale of losses, and by every available indication, Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has not been nearly as costly to Kyiv as Putin claims.

On Russia’s involvement in the war in Syria

“We had no ground troops in Syria. They simply weren’t there. There were just two of our bases — an airbase and a naval base. The ground component consisted of Syrian forces and, as we all know, certain pro-Iranian armed groups. We even withdrew our special operations forces at some point. We simply weren’t fighting there.”

In 2017, the Russian publication Voenno-Promyshlenny Kurier (lit. “Military-Industrial Courier”) wrote:

“The participation of our troops in ground combat in Syria is one of the most secretive topics. Initially, the Ministry of Defense emphasized that only the Aerospace Forces operated in Syria, officially referring to it as ‘the Russian Aerospace Operation in Syria.’ Yet early videos and photos from the Hmeimim airbase clearly showed tanks, armored personnel carriers, and marine infantry alongside aircraft. Later, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s reports revealed that Russian artillery forces were also assisting Syrian troops on the ground.

In 2016, Putin himself admitted during an awards ceremony that Russia’s Special Operations Forces were working on the ground in Syria, providing targeting for Russian airstrikes. Reports of Russian soldiers dying in combat also emerged during 2016–2017, with the Ministry of Defense claiming they were acting as advisors to the Syrian army.

By the summer of 2016, Russian sappers had been deployed to demine Palmyra and later participated in clearing Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor. Military police units were also stationed at Hmeimim and Tartus but were later expanded to stabilize “liberated” areas. By the final stages of the campaign against ISIS, Russian pontoon units facilitated Syrian forces’ crossing of the Euphrates River.

In addition to official reports, photos and videos of Russian troops regularly appeared online. Local social media described Russian military advisors as a key factor in victories against ISIS. Footage also captured Russian artillery operations, and in 2016, foreign journalists filmed a mixed armored group featuring T-90 tanks and BTR-82 APCs manned by Russian crews.”

Despite all this, Putin does not consider such participation to constitute the deployment of Russian “ground forces” — much as he does not acknowledge the months of devastating airstrikes carried out by Russian forces against Aleppo in 2016.

On the Ukrainian leadership’s attitude toward religion

“You know, what’s happening with the Russian Orthodox Church is absolutely unprecedented. It’s a gross, blatant violation of human rights and the rights of believers. The church is being torn apart before the eyes of the whole world. It’s like an execution. And yet everyone in the world prefers not to notice.

I think those doing this will face consequences. You mentioned they’re breaking ties — yes, that’s exactly what’s happening. The thing is, these people aren’t even atheists. Atheists are still people who believe in something. They believe there’s no God — that’s their faith, their conviction.

But these aren’t atheists. These are people without any faith at all — godless people. They’re ethnically Jewish, but who’s ever seen them in a synagogue? I don’t think anyone has. They’re not Orthodox Christians, either, since they don’t go to church. And they’re certainly not followers of Islam, because you’d never see them in a mosque.

These are people without roots, without heritage. They value none of the things that are dear to us and to the vast majority of the Ukrainian people. One day, they will flee, and instead of going to church, they’ll be sitting on a beach somewhere. But that’s their choice.”

Zelensky has, in fact, been seen at a synagogue on multiple occasions. For example, his official website published this statement in June 2020:

“During a working trip to the Kherson Region, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky visited the Chabad synagogue, which has over 5,000 members. The head of state met with the Chief Rabbi of Kherson and the Kherson Region, Yosef Yitzchak Wolff, and learned about the synagogue's activities.

‘You have done so much for the people of our country. You’ve brought moments of joy into many homes. Of course, you’ve given people hope. That’s why you’ve become a guarantor of our Constitution,’ said Yosef Yitzchak Wolff during a conversation in the prayer room.”

Israel’s Russian-language online publication Vesti reported in April 2024:

“Herzog and Zelensky inscribed letters into a special Torah scroll for a synagogue in Kyiv. Ukraine's president began the scroll, and Israel's president completed it.

More than two years after the war began in Ukraine and six months after the outbreak of fighting in Israel, a special Torah scroll was completed, dedicated to Ukraine’s Jewish community, the people of Israel, and the hope for peace in both countries. The scroll will soon take a place of honor in Kyiv’s central synagogue, JCC ‘Beit Menachem.’

The scroll initiative was led by Kyiv's Chief Rabbi, Jonathan Markovitch, who has worked tirelessly to strengthen ties between Israel and Ukraine. Writing began immediately after the war in Ukraine started. President Volodymyr Zelensky inscribed the first letter while in his presidential bunker in Kyiv. Among those who contributed to the scroll were Israel’s Chief Rabbis, Jewish soldiers of the Ukrainian army, members of Ukraine’s Jewish community, and families of hostages and fallen soldiers, including those who died in Gaza.”

On Russia slowing down YouTube

“The fact is, Google created its network here and established subsidiaries in Russia. After Western restrictions and sanctions were introduced, Google reduced its equipment supplies, creating problems for itself. Secondly, Google and YouTube must comply with our laws.”

Putin effectively repeated statements previously made by Russia’s largest state-controlled provider, Rostelecom, and Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy Anton Gorelkin. However, the main reason for YouTube’s poor performance is the Russian government’s deliberate throttling of the platform.

In July, Alexander Khinshtein, a key figure in Russia’s technological censorship efforts and now governor of the Kursk Region, blamed the American company’s apparent “non-compliance” with Russian law, saying: “The platform will clearly see that the state has moved from persuasion to concrete action.”

More details on how Russian authorities are throttling YouTube can be found in The Insider’s report on the subject.

On Stalin’s refusal to exchange his son for a German Field Marshal

“As for Biden pardoning his son despite promising not to — well, that’s a delicate matter. Our country’s history has seen other examples. Everyone knows the painting ‘Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan’ — whether it’s legend or not. The same goes for Peter the Great’s son, Alexei. And as for Stalin — that’s no legend. Stalin refused to exchange his son Yakov, who was in captivity, for Field Marshal Paulus, saying: ‘I won’t trade a soldier for a marshal.’”

The story of Stalin refusing to exchange his son Yakov Dzhugashvili for Paulus is indeed a legend. Historians still debate whether Yakov was actually captured or died on the battlefield. No German documents exist to confirm him as a prisoner of war. The photos in German leaflets urging Soviet soldiers to surrender are so poor in quality that it’s impossible to confirm Yakov’s identity. Witnesses who claimed to have seen him in captivity had never met him before the war.

However, accounts from Marshal Georgy Zhukov and Stalin’s daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva suggest that Stalin believed the German claims — even if they were disinformation.

The famous line about refusing the exchange isn’t a historical quote — it was created by screenwriters Yuri Bondarev and Oscar Kurganov for the Soviet film “Liberation,” first released in 1970. In her memoir, Svetlana Alliluyeva recalls Stalin saying: “The Germans offered to exchange Yakov for someone… Do you think I would bargain with them? No. War is war.” Zhukov’s memoirs recount Stalin saying: “Yakov won’t get out of captivity. The fascists will shoot him.”

Stalin’s cold reaction may reflect his strained relationship with Yakov, his son from his first marriage.

On the growth of Russian film production

Darya Shuchalina, a journalist from Komi’s Republic newspaper, said:

“… We really do have high-quality Russian patriotic cinema now.”

To which Putin responded:

“Yes, I agree. That’s a separate topic. Many foreign producers have left us — God bless them — and this has spurred our own production, including film production. That’s true.”

The impact of foreign producers’ exit on Russia’s film industry can be assessed through annual catalogs published by kino.mail.ru. These catalogs include all films released in Russia, including co-productions, documentaries, and shorts.

• In 2019, 276 films were released.
• 2020, a year affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, is not worth considering, as it is an outlier.
• In 2021, as the post-pandemic recovery began, 230 films were released.
• In 2022, the number rose to 300 (likely including films launched before the war).
• In 2023, 293 films were released.
• As of Dec. 19, 2024, 282 films have been released.

There is no clear evidence that the changes in the industry that have come about after the invasion of Ukraine have boosted productivity.