No more smoke on the water: Russia’s last aircraft carrier is being decommissioned

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What happened

In early July 2025, the pro-Kremlin newspaper Izvestia reported that the repair and modernization of the aircraft-carrying heavy cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov had been suspended. According to the paper’s sources, the vessel will be decommissioned or scrapped — possibly in the near future.

Just ahead of Navy Day (the last Sunday of July, which this year fell on the 27th) the news was confirmed by Andrey Kostin, head of the state-owned VTB Bank. Kostin explained that scrapping the cruiser would be easier than completing the repairs:

“We believe there’s no point in repairing it anymore. She's over forty years old, and she's an extremely costly asset… I think it’s either sell or dismantle.”

In October 2023, VTB Bank was granted trust management over 100% of the shares in the JSC United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), the umbrella organization and primary contractor responsible for almost all state defense orders in naval shipbuilding. For this reason, the statement made by the bank’s head can be regarded as a definitive decision on the future of the aircraft-carrying cruiser — even if no official comments have yet been made by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

It hardly seems coincidental that, during the Navy Day celebrations, Vladimir Putin focused his praise not on the surface fleet, but on the submarine fleet, highlighting its central role in the “naval component of the nuclear triad.» The Russian president took part in the naval flag-raising ceremony aboard the nuclear submarine Prince Pozharsky and held a separate meeting on the development of the Navy’s underwater forces. The loss of Russia’s only aircraft-carrying ship — now the subject of much discussion — went entirely unacknowledged by Putin.

The “nuclear triad” refers to the components of a nation’s strategic nuclear forces (SNF): the land-based leg (missile forces), the sea-based leg (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, SSBNs), and the air-based leg (strategic bombers).

Development of the Russian Aircraft Carrier Fleet

In the 1970s, the ambitious construction program to build Project 1143 Krechet aircraft-carrying ships was launched at the Black Sea Shipyard in Mykolaiv (then part of the USSR, now in Ukraine). By that time, the U.S. Navy already had around ten aircraft carriers in service. Carriers have long been a central element of power projection, and during the recent U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran’s nuclear facilities, it was American carrier strike groups that provided the guarantee of overwhelming firepower in the event that a truly large-scale military response to Iranian action became necessary. The Soviet military and political leadership, however, from the outset, never had any intention of competing with the United States in the area of real aircraft carriers — which, moreover, Soviet propaganda consistently portrayed as nothing less than “weapons of aggression.”

Both the Project 1143 ships and their predecessors — the helicopter-carrying cruisers of Project 1123 Kondor — were conceived and developed to provide cover and combat stability for large naval task forces and strategic submarines, as well as for anti-submarine warfare operations. In other words, their purpose was not to embark on long-distance deployments across the oceans, but rather to remain in nearby maritime zones, establishing so-called “protected combat areas” — from which nuclear-armed submarines (SSBNs) were expected to launch retaliatory strikes in the event of a global conflict.

The construction process was heavily influenced by the sorts of conflicts that were typical within the Soviet military-industrial complex — often driven by competing industrial lobbying groups. Complicating matters further were poor design decisions made in the project’s early planning stages, which led to constant attempts to “improve” the ships mid-construction. As a result, each successive vessel in the series differed significantly from the one before it and was traditionally classified as a distinct project — such as 1143.1, 1143.2, and so on.

A total of seven ships of this type were laid down in the Soviet Union. The last, and the most advanced of them — the Ulyanovsk — was equipped with a nuclear propulsion system and steam catapults, but construction was never completed. After the collapse of the USSR, the unfinished vessel was dismantled on the slipway in what had by then become independent Ukraine.

The future of the remaining six ships took a dramatic turn. The first two vessels of Project 1143 — the Kiev and the Minsk — were decommissioned and sold in the early ’90s. Both were later converted into entertainment complexes in China. The third ship in the series, the Novorossiysk, was sold for scrap and dismantled in South Korea.

Three later ships from Projects 1143.4, 1143.5, and 1143.6 remain in active service but are now part of different navies.

The Project 1143.4 Baku was renamed Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov before being sold to India. The final agreement on its sale, including modernization and repairs, was signed in early 2004. In 2013, after being refitted as an aircraft carrier at the Sevmash shipyard, the vessel entered service with the Indian Navy as the Vikramaditya.

The Russian defense industry earned approximately $5 billion from the export of the former Baku, a deal that included the supply of carrier-based aircraft, pilot training, and support. India renamed the ship the Vikramaditya, then built a carrier of its own: the Vikrant.

The unfinished Project 1143.6 vessel Varyag was sold by the Ukrainian government to China in the late 1990s — officially for conversion into an entertainment complex modeled after the Kiev and the Minsk. In reality, however, the construction of the aircraft-carrying cruiser was completed at a shipyard in Dalian and, in 2012, it entered service as China’s first aircraft carrier, rechristened as the Liaoning. In 2017, a second carrier — the Shandong, closely resembling the Varyag in layout and design — was launched in Dalian. Since then, China has built a third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, which is currently undergoing sea trials.

Finally, it is Project 1143.5 that remains as part of the Russian Navy under the name the Admiral Kuznetsov. From the very beginning, the ship was plagued by confusion over naming and suffered from a host of other complications. During the design phase, it was known as the Soviet Union. During keel laying in September 1982, it was named the Riga, and later that year, it was renamed the Leonid Brezhnev. In 1987, the ship became the Tbilisi, and finally, in October 1990, it was given its current name: officially, the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov. In 1991, the cruiser was hastily transferred from Mykolaiv to the Northern Fleet — before completing all required trials — in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of soon-to-be independent Ukraine.

Thus, in the post-Soviet era, the Project 1143 aircraft-carrying cruisers became a springboard for the development of aircraft carrier programs in two countries — India and China. Ironically, the Russian Navy itself has been left with a single aircraft-carrying ship that has never undergone full modernization.

What the Admiral Kuznetsov Meant for the Russian Navy

The Admiral Kuznetsov undertook its first long-range deployment in December 1995, sailing to the Mediterranean Sea. Over its service life, the ship completed seven long-distance missions, including one to the North Atlantic in 2004, and it underwent three major overhauls — in 2001–2004, 2007, and 2015. By the early 2010s, the Admiral Kuznetsov had become the flagship of the Northern Fleet’s naval aviation group, although during deployments it was often accompanied by more refueling tankers than actual warships. In 2016, the carrier was deployed off the coast of Syria in order to support Bashar al-Assad’s regime during the country’s civil war.

This mission brought the Admiral Kuznetsov global notoriety — not for its combat achievements, but for the thick plume of smoke trailing behind it, a visible sign of serious issues with its propulsion system. According to official Russian sources, between Nov. 8, 2016 and Jan. 6, 2017, the ship’s air wing carried out 420 combat sorties. However, Western observers estimate that only 154 sorties were actually flown from the carrier’s deck, and two aircraft were lost due to technical failures: a MiG-29KR on November 13 and a Su-33 on December 3. Ultimately, the carrier-based aircraft were relocated to the land-based airfield at Khmeimim.

Compared to American aircraft carriers, the Admiral Kuznetsov's air wing turned out to be severely under-equipped for strikes against land targets — with fewer than 30 combat aircraft and, crucially, no carrier-based AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning and Control) aircraft. The absence of catapults on the flight deck made launching such aircraft impossible. By contrast, a standard air wing aboard a U.S. Navy Nimitz-class carrier includes around 70 aircraft, including AEW&C planes, electronic warfare jets, and military transport aircraft.

Moreover, jets launched from the Russian carrier were effectively unable to take off with a full weapons load. To achieve sufficient lift for takeoff from the short deck, the carrier had to maintain prolonged high speed — something its propulsion system could not reliably support. Meanwhile, the overall cost of the Kuznetsov’s combat deployment to the Syrian coast was estimated at between 7.5 and 10 billion rubles ($113.6 million - $151.5 million based on the average exchange rate over the period).

In February 2017, the cruiser returned from the Mediterranean and was almost immediately taken out of service for repairs. In April 2018, a contract valued at 86 billion rubles (nearly $1.4 billion at the time) was signed for its modernization. The modernization program envisioned a complete overhaul of the Admiral Kuznetsov's systems — from electronics and weapons to the main propulsion turbines — but the repair process was marred by several serious incidents.

Work originally began in the Soviet-era, Swedish-built PD-50, Russia’s largest floating dry dock, located at the 82nd Ship Repair Plant in Roslyakovo, Murmansk Region. In October 2018, the dry dock sank. One of the dock’s cranes, weighing several tons, fell from a height of 15 meters onto the cruiser, damaging the hull and flight deck. Although the ship remained afloat,the cost of raising and restoring PD-50 was estimated in the “billions of rubles,” and the idea of following through with the process was ultimately abandoned. Notably, the sinking occurred due to a sudden power outage on shore. Backup generators failed to activate — most likely because they had been deliberately disabled as a cost-cutting measure.

With PD-50 lost and no suitable facility available to continue the overhaul, the Admiral Kuznetsov was transferred to the 35th Ship Repair Plant, also located in the Murmansk Region. In order to accommodate such a large vessel, one of the dry docks had to be expanded and upgraded — at a cost of 23.9 billion rubles ($379.4 at the time).

In December 2019, a fire broke out aboard the cruiser during welding operations. Two people were killed and another 14 injured. According to the official version of events, the fire started when «hot slag» from welding work ignited oil-soaked rags in the hold. The officially reported damage was limited to 600 million rubles ($9.5 million at the time). However, unofficial estimates cited by Kommersant painted a much grimmer picture: the damage caused by the fire may have amounted to as much as 95 billion rubles ($1.5 billion in 2019) — nearly the full value of the ship itself, which was estimated at 110 billion rubles ($1.74 billion in 2019). In December 2022, another fire broke out aboard the cruiser, though this time it was not as big.

The overhaul of the aircraft-carrying cruiser was originally scheduled for completion in 2022 — a deadline that was not met. The total amount spent on the ship over this period appears to have exceeded 100 billion rubles. That figure is just under one-third of the estimated cost of designing and building a brand-new Russian aircraft carrier from scratch. Over the course of its 33 years in service, the Admiral Kuznetsov has spent more than half of the time undergoing repairs.

What’s Next

Former Pacific Fleet Commander Sergey Avakyants has stated that the Russian Navy no longer needs ships like the Admiral Kuznetsov, declaring that “the aircraft carrier is a thing of the past” due to its extreme cost and limited effectiveness. At the same time, official Russian naval strategy documents continue to envision the development of a next-generation aircraft carrier platform and the establishment of several carrier strike groups.

The Russian Ministry of Defense had initially planned to lay down a new aircraft-carrying cruiser by 2025. Instead, it now appears to be phasing out its only existing carrier — a decision that, amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, signals the long-term loss of the fleet’s carrier capability, one of the defining attributes of a major military power.

Moreover, the decommissioning of the Admiral Kuznetsov stands in stark contrast to the development of the Indian and Chinese navies, which have not only retained aircraft-carrying vessels — including those literally built based on the same Soviet Project 1143 — but have also demonstrated how to successfully and swiftly build their own. In this regard, the Russian fleet and military shipbuilding are moving in the opposite direction.

In other words, not only the American, but also the Indian and Chinese navies are currently capable of delivering strike aviation to the shores of a potential adversary or ally — something that will significantly affect the balance of power in nearly any potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific region.

It is highly likely that the decision to decommission Russia’s only aircraft carrier was made at the very beginning of the full-scale war with Ukraine, partly due to difficulties in obtaining foreign-made equipment amid sanctions. For example, until February 2022, Russia planned to purchase a wastewater treatment system, Ecomar, from Italian company Tecnicomar — without a properly functioning system of this kind, the ship is not permitted to sail in international waters. But importing such goods is no longer possible.

An even more telling sign of the ship’s predetermined fate was the deployment of part of its crew to Ukraine in the summer of 2024 — not as sailors, but as regular infantry. As part of a widespread practice in the Russian Armed Forces, assault troops are recruited from military units not directly involved in the fighting: signal corps, airbase ground personnel, Strategic Rocket Forces, and ship crews. The sailors of the Admiral Kuznetsov were formed into the “Frigate” battalion, which initially operated in the Kharkiv area before shifting to the Pokrovsk sector.