War as usual: Who stands to win from Israel’s strike on Iran — and who will take the fall

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Who stands to gain from Israel's success

Israel and Iran have been at war for years. What we are witnessing now is merely its latest act — and almost certainly not the last. Israeli authorities have openly expressed their desire to dismantle the Iranian theocratic regime in the hope that something more democratic — and, more importantly, less anti-Israeli — might emerge in its place. Nevertheless, such a regime change scenario is unlikely to occur without direct intervention, for which no one currently appears prepared. Therefore, the current hostilities are bound to continue, even if Israel succeeds in once again pushing Iran back decades in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Against the backdrop of this conflict — which, at least rhetorically, bears the hallmarks of a war of annihilation — a long list of actors is seeking to extract maximum benefit. Donald Trump undoubtedly ranks high on this list. Unlike his European allies, who have sought to avoid escalation and pushed for negotiations, Trump makes no secret of his satisfaction and confirms that he was aware of the preparations for the strike. He has pledged U.S. military support to the Israelis — and is already providing it, with the U.S. military shooting down Iranian Shahed drones launched as part of Iran’s initial retaliatory efforts against the Jewish state.

Trump has had the opportunity to demonstrate his resolve. True, Israel is doing all the fighting, but no one ever doubted its readiness for a confrontation with Iran. Meanwhile, the American president gets the chance to prove his firmness, even though his contribution to the operation was largely limited to the diplomatic sphere.

It was as part of these efforts that Trump spoke with another potential beneficiary of this war. In the run-up to the Israeli attack against Iranian military and nuclear facilities, the American president engaged in a long phone call with Vladimir Putin, formally an active ally of Iran. Putin has received drone manufacturing technology from Tehran, securing a temporary but significant advantage in his war of aggression against Ukraine.

Over the past two years of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Iran has been considered a potentially important supplier of missiles to the Russian army. The Iranians have been purchasing Russian goods and even signed a bilateral agreement with Moscow (although it lacked provisions for direct military assistance).

However, in the short and medium term, Russia is likely to benefit from the Israeli strike. It is in Moscow’s interest to see the current surge in oil prices, which was driven by fears of Iran partially or fully blocking shipments from the Persian Gulf to global markets, or of Tehran halting its own supplies.

Russia also stands to gain from the fact that, even before the strike on Iranian targets and leadership figures, the U.S. had already redirected its military supplies from Ukraine to Israel. American air defense systems that were originally intended for the Ukrainians have remained in Israel instead. According to the latest reports, Kyiv never received the outdated Patriot systems and missiles that Israel planned to send, despite earlier discussions about their transfer.

Finally, the attention of global media, bloggers, and politicians is now shifting from Ukraine to Iran and Israel, and it is likely to remain there for weeks to come. Russia is now free to do as it pleases — no one will notice, even if new strikes target Ukraine’s civilian population. And the cautious response from the Kremlin — a mix of condemnation and expressions of concern — clearly confirms this understanding.

Another beneficiary of the current war — one many tend to overlook — is Azerbaijan. While being Iran’s immediate neighbor, Azerbaijan actively purchases weapons from Israel and can, in some respects, even be considered a military ally of the Netanyahu government.

Without Israeli technologies, Azerbaijan’s military would not have been able to regain control over Nagorno-Karabakh — which it had lost amid the collapse of the Soviet Union — as quickly and effectively as it did during Baku’s 2023 offensive. At the same time, a significant number of ethnic Azerbaijanis live in Iran (with no official statistics available, estimates put the figure at anywhere from 5 million to upwards of 20 million).).

In the first half of the 20th century, this demographic fact prompted not-so-subtle suggestions from Soviet authorities about potential territorial claims. In recent years, Azerbaijan — whether acting independently or in partnership with allied Turkey — has made efforts to build positive relations with Iran.

However, Tehran has consistently stated its support for Armenia's sovereignty and even declared its readiness to provide military assistance if necessary. Recently, attention has been focused on the so-called Syunik (or Zangezur) Corridor — a proposed transit route from Turkey to Azerbaijan that would run through Armenian territory via the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. This corridor is mentioned in the declaration that marked the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Russia has also expressed strong interest in opening this transport and trade corridor. However, due to the extraterritorial nature of the route — which would operate outside Armenia’s control — it would, in effect, cut Armenia off from Iran, as it runs directly along the Armenian-Iranian border. Meanwhile, Armenia and Azerbaijan have yet to sign a peace treaty or officially recognize one another’s borders. The Azerbaijani government has repeatedly put forward the demand that Armenia revise its constitution, which references the 1990 Declaration of Independence — a document that includes a clause about the “reunification of the Armenian SSR with Nagorno-Karabakh.

Consequently, Iran’s potential withdrawal from events in the South Caucasus as a result of Israeli attacks could realign the regional balance of power, stripping Armenia of its only potential regional ally in the event of a new conflict with Azerbaijan. But this, of course, assumes that the current confrontation between Iran and Israel proves to be long-term.

Many other actors stand to benefit from the current developments. Syria’s new authorities, for instance, can reasonably expect no serious interference from Iran in their affairs in the foreseeable future. And in Iraq, the largely pro-Iranian Shiite majority has temporarily lost an important ally. With both the Iranians and Americans occupied, Turkey has gained an opportunity to strike at the Iraqi Kurds.

There is Saudi Arabia, a country that, unlike the UAE, did not sign the historic Abraham Accords with Israel, but has traditionally been hostile toward Shiite Iran. Even though China successfully mediated what could be called a friendship agreement between the Saudis and Tehran in 2023, the two countries never attained full-fledged diplomatic relations. Meanwhile, the Houthis in Yemen — Iran’s close allies — remain a direct enemy of the Saudis.

Qatar, in light of its historically close ties with Iran, also has its own interests.. In short, the war could quickly metastasize across a region that is defined by Iran's significant, often destabilizing, role.

The list of casualties

Naturally, Iran is at the top of the list. Netanyahu’s government claims the destruction of Iran’s defensive systems, with official Tehran now facing an Israeli ultimatum. The Iranian regime must agree to the complete dismantling of its nuclear program and accept international oversight — which means resuming negotiations with the U.S. and other mediators, despite Iran's recent announcement of withdrawal from these talks. Otherwise, Israel is prepared to destroy Iran’s oil industry — and, more broadly, the country’s entire economy.

The next-most affected category is Islamist terrorist organizations supported by Iran — the so-called “Iranian empire,” which Israel has seriously weakened in recent years. This includes Hamas, which maintains control over part of the Gaza Strip; Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has already refused to break its ceasefire with Israel despite the attack on Iran; and finally, the Yemeni Houthis. Should Iran accept Israel’s ultimatum, the cessation of support for these and other groups — which implies their dismantling — will almost certainly be among the conditions.

The “black sheep” in this list appears to be Armenia, which had considered Iran a potential ally after Vladimir Putin decided, even before the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, to withdraw support from Yerevan, effectively handing the country over to Azerbaijan.

However, official Yerevan may not be the only country that finds itself in this situation. The implications of such a sharp shift in the balance of power in the Middle East could be felt as far away as Central Asia. Iran plays an influential role in the Taliban terrorist movement in Afghanistan, and the population of Tajikistan is ethnically related to the Iranians.

In other words, by striking Iran, Israel has lit the fuse on a huge powder keg — one that has still not exploded. The consequences are already serious, but what we have seen so far is only sparks from a smoldering fuse. The blast itself will stretch on for months — even years.