Unite and rule: Syria to hold first parliamentary elections since fall of Assad as tensions with minorities persist

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So far this year, three series of major sectarian clashes shaking the foundation of post-Assad Syria have attracted major media attention. First, in March, there was the rebellion of Alawi groups linked to the previous regime in Latakia and Tartus, which caused the security forces of the new regime to crackdown heavily on the Alawi population. The second clash took place in the south in April-May between Druze militias and pro-government forces. And the third took place in the south in July.

While the original clash with the Alawis in March was often dismissed as being one last gasp of the previous regime, those in the south — along with rising tension among the Kurdish minority — contributed to paint a much more problematic picture of sectarian and ethnic divergence.

On the brink of collapse

Ever since he seized power in December 2024, former Hayat Tahrir as Sham (HTS) commander Ahmed al-Sharaa (a.k.a. Abu Mohammad al-Julani) has been under pressure. His policies of opening to the West, negotiating with Israel, keeping a door open for Russia, and seeking a deal with the ethnic and religious minorities ended up irritating quite a few of his supporters. In June, the first avowed splinter group confirmed its existence with an attack on the Mar Elias church in Damascus. According to a source within the formally disbanded HTS, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah is a splinter of the group and is led by Abu Aisha al-Shami, a relatively senior figure who had always been known for being one of the most extreme members of the organization al-Sharaa formerly headed.

Al-Shami’s group is accused of having links to the Islamic State, which indeed supports it on its social media. Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah claimed attacks on the religious minorities and criticised al-Sharaa for having betrayed the jihadist cause. While presumably not large, the group appears to have cells in several cities. Hardline dissidents now have an address to go to.

At the same time, al-Sharaa has had to align with Turkish policies — discretely but closely — and to keep relations as warm as possible with the Americans, who still have troops deployed in Syria and support the largely Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Bloodshed and backlash

The first crisis, in early March, appears to have been a shock — not because of the remnants of the Alawi militias resisting, but because the repressions turned straight away into a bloodbath, with up to 1,659 civilians killed, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Media commentaries showed that internal and external goodwill towards the new regime took a serious hit.

An HTS official acknowledged that the Latakia and Tartus massacres were seen at the top of the government as having endangered al-Sharaa’s reputation. Not only that, HTS sources say that the weapons used in the revolt were newly smuggled from Iran, and there were also worries in Damascus that Israel might offer support to the Alawis after reports emerged that some figures had reached out to Druze groups to act as intermediaries.

Al-Sharaa decided swiftly to engage in damage control in order to prevent an escalation fuelled by hostile regional actors. He chose to negotiate a deal with the SDF, the minority group strongest militarily and with the best contacts in the US. However, from the start this turned out to be a difficult path. Even in March there were concerns within HTS that the groups closest to Turkey, like the SNA, might not tolerate the deal.

Already on Mar. 10 an agreement was signed, reportedly mediated by the Americans. It envisaged equal representation for the minorities in the political process and called for the integration of the SDF’s military and civilian structures into the new Syrian state (but remaining under de facto SDF control, as would the border posts and the oil fields in Kurdish areas).

A crisis without a solution

The April/May intense fighting in the south between pro-government forces and Druze militias broke any hopes that the fighting in Latakia and Tartus had been an isolated case. The fighting was kickstarted by an audio recording circulated on social media and containing a fake blasphemous pronouncement by a Druze scholar. This first round of fighting caused 19 civilian casualties and approximately 120 among military and militiamen, but the worst was yet to come. Nonetheless, the crisis cracked Damascus-SDF relations. The SDF expressed its solidarity with the Druze, even promising support that was never delivered. By June, rhetoric was escalating and some HTS activists were even accusing the SDF of being behind the Mar Elias Church attack, with the intent of creating tension.

Before the first southern crisis, the Druze community was very divided over how to approach Damascus and al-Sharaa. While the eight Druze armed militias split evenly between elements supportive of al-Sharaa and those opposed. According to a Druze notable in Suwayda, up to a quarter of the community was opposed to any agreement with the new leader in Damascus, while at least half were in favour of what al-Sharaa had offered — that is, supporting the new government in exchange for guaranteed protection and a Druze-staffed battalion in the armed forces. The smallest faction, perhaps 15-25% of the Druze community, wanted a more ambitious deal along the lines of the one that the SDF had obtained in March. The first southern crisis hardened the Druze, making al-Sharaa’s decentralisation plan more difficult to implement.

Within HTS there were both voices encouraging a return to the original centralisation policies and those advocating caution. The SDF, meanwhile, saw that regardless of whatever deal al-Sharaa might negotiate, he would not exert control over the various components of his coalition government — perhaps out of malice, though maybe only out of incapacity.

In July 2025 the fighting restarted in the south with renewed violence, initially due to an old blood feud that escalated amid Bedouin groups. Syrian government forces intervened, possibly in the hope of exploiting divisions among the Druze. The tone of some propaganda coming from Damascus, presenting the Druze as a remnant of Assad’s militias, must not have reassured the SDF. The Syrian armed forces tried to seize the opportunity to crush the Southern Military Council of the Druze once and for all, but once they started making serious advances on the ground, Israeli airstrikes started again. Druze sources in Suwayda confirmed that they had been seeking Israeli support, and that Israel indeed provided it.

The trap of neutrality

At this point the pressure on al-Sharaa became overwhelming, with hatred against the minorities growing among his men. Footage had been circulating online for some time, showing episodes of government supporters entering Christian houses and breaking religious symbols. Even within HTS critical voices emerged accusing al-Sharaa of being unable to restrain not just allies such as the SNA and the Bedouins, but even some of his own HTS comrades.

One HTS official in Damascus believed that the SNA had its own agenda of kickstarting a civil war, setting off the southern crisis with a fake pronouncement by a Druze scholar, presumably in order to legitimate a future move against the SDF. Increasingly, within HTS ranks, lodging accusations against the SNA became seen as a barely veiled criticism of Turkey, the SNA’s patron.

At the same time, Israel’s protection of the Druze made even al-Sharaa’s strategy of appeasement with Israel openly unpopular even within the ranks of the HTS, as one MoD official in Damascus acknowledged.

Al-Sharaa sought to exit this trap by trying to rescind the concessions he had to make in March about decentralisation. In August, at a meeting with the SDF, sponsored by the American and French governments, al-Sharaa made it clear that the March agreement was dead. He demanded complete SDF disarmament and the complete integration of its forces under the MoD.

An SDF officer noted at that time that he thought the SDF was losing U.S. support. The SDF believed the U.S. government had given al-Sharaa’s their green light for a military operation against the SDF should negotiations fail. Given the obvious untrustworthiness of the new Syrian armed forces, the SDF had no interest in any plan that called for the dismantling of its own armed forces.

The source concluded that if al-Sharaa insisted on rejecting the March agreement, there would be war. The tension was compounded by the appointment in May of Abu Hatem Shakraa, an SNA commander, to lead the 86th division in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. In the meantime, skirmishes between the SDF and government forces were going on continuously in Deir Ezzor. A source in the Syrian MoD described these skirmishes as motivated by local disputes, even if he acknowledged that HTS supported the Bedouin militias involved.

Back to centralization

An HTS official confirmed in August that al-Sharaa was now determined to go for a centralised government. The official sounded supportive, but he worried that a large-scale conflict could test the solidity of the ruling coalition and of the not-yet-merged armed forces. Some of the allied groups and even elements within HTS were believed to retain links to Al Qaida or even the Islamic State, while others, like Ansar al Tawhid, insisted on radical measures. He acknowledged that the armed forces were undisciplined and often disobeyed orders. Al-Sharaa understands that wanton violence does not help and wants a disciplined army, but many do not listen, he said.

A few days later, at a large meeting of the minority groups organised to select a delegation that would negotiate with al-Sharaa, a statement was drafted showcasing strong opposition to the Syrian leader’s centralisation plans. At this point, SDF figures were insisting that al-Sharaa had attacked Alawis and Druze in order to lay the groundwork for a campaign against the SDF. On 20 August, however, an HTS official at the Syrian MoD claimed that al-Sharaa was not ready for war with SDF, because he did not feel he could muster the military force he needed to crush the group. He claimed that the government could only muster 40,000 fighters, a figure that in reality excludes the Turkey-aligned militias in the north and many of the factions not closely allied with HTS. Against them, he also said, were the SDF’s 130,000, a seemingly inflated number that would anyway include many local militias.

The real reason for al-Sharaa’s hesitation is likely to be a fear of external intervention in support of the SDF. The Kurds, while not enjoying overt Israeli support like the Druze Southern Military Council, nonetheless were believed to be talking to the Israelis. In fact, sources in Tehran say, they were talking to both Israel and the Iranians, even if they were not in a hurry to reach an agreement with either of them until the Americans withdraw their forces from Syria.

By early September the coalition of minorities had sent its list of demands to al-Sharaa: a high level of decentralisation, regional armed forces, no presence of central armed forces in Syrian Kurdistan, equal rights for the Kurdish language and other minority languages, local councils in charge of police forces, and also religious freedom and women’s rights.

The indirect elections of Oct. 5 — in which a committee of electors will select members of parliament — will be a test of how inclusive the new regime is really going to be. As interim president, al-Sharaa will directly appoint a third of the members of parliament, but the Supreme Committee, which will play an important role in supervising the process, is not an exclusive HTS entity. The scope for manipulation is very wide, as the process is not transparent, and minority groups like the Druze still have armed factions at their disposal.