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Despite Western sanctions aimed at restricting Russia’s access to technologies and materials necessary for the production of missiles and other precision-guided weapons, Moscow continues to secure the necessary components through Belarus. This finding comes from an investigation by the Belarusian Investigative Center (BIC) in collaboration with the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) released earlier today.
In November 2022, Ukraine’s then-Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov reported that Russia had only 119 Iskander missiles left out of the 900 available at the start of its full-scale invasion. Stocks of other precision missiles had also significantly diminished.
By December 2024, however, Andrii Yusov, a spokesman for the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, stated that Russia had ramped up missile production despite the process being “critically dependent on foreign components.” According to Yusov, Moscow is now producing up to 50 new Iskanders a month while replenishing its reserves of other missile types — all while continuing strikes on Ukrainian territories.
In 2025, Ukrainian electronics and weapons expert Serhii Beskrestnov, known by the call sign “Flash,” shared photos of the Zarya-61M computing module used in Russian missiles. The module, responsible for control functions, comprises four main circuit boards.
“Yes, it’s outdated. Yes, it’s bulky. But, unfortunately, it’s entirely built with Russian components. It’s produced, it flies, it kills,” Beskrestnov wrote.
However, BIC’s analysis of the circuit boards revealed that not all electronics in Russian missiles are domestically manufactured. Several microchips bore the logo of Belarusian company Integral, identified by a lightning bolt or the Russian letter “И.” The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) confirmed the use of Belarusian microchips in Russian missiles to the BIC.
BIC reports that Russia continues its missile strikes partly thanks to supplies from Belarus. Customs data reveals that between March 2022 and June 2024, Integral delivered over 6 million microchips to Russia, worth more than $130 million.
Integral’s profits have soared since the full-scale war began. In 2023, the company’s net income increased more than 11-fold compared to 2022, reaching approximately 150 million Belarusian rubles ($50 million) — 40 times higher than in 2021. Data for 2024 is not yet available.
BIC’s analysis of Integral’s shipments from March 2022 to July 2024 shows that the largest buyer of its microchips was Smolensk-based Integral-Zapad JSC (АО «Интеграл-Запад»), which purchased $31.3 million worth of products. Although this company is not officially linked to Belarus’s Integral, it is owned by a Belarusian citizen. Until July 2022, its website mentioned cooperation with Russia’s Ministry of Defense.
Another major buyer was Russian company Spets-Electronkomplekt JSC (АО «Спец-Электронкомплект»), which purchased $30 million worth of microchips. While its website does not list connections to the defense industry, the company’s partner, Angstrem JSC (АО «Ангстрем»), notes that Spets-Electronkomplekt has been certified by the Russian Ministry of Defense since 1998.
Integral’s subsidiary in St. Petersburg, SP AO Integral SPb (СП АО «Интеграл СПб»), purchased $16.8 million worth of microchips during the same period. Its CEO, Vladimir Lazovsky, has openly stated that the Russian military-industrial complex is a key client.
Despite EU and U.S. sanctions restricting the supply of dual-use materials to Belarus, Integral continues to acquire essential raw materials from EU countries. These include high-purity hydrochloric acid, a critical component in production.
In 2021, German company UrSeCo Handels GmbH & Co. KG supplied Integral with hydrochloric acid with a purity of 99.999%. However, after sanctions banned the compound’s export to Russia in 2022, a new delivery route emerged: the acid was shipped through Poland and Turkey to Kazakhstan, where a one-person company, United Trading Group, acted as the recipient. The acid was then redirected to Russia’s Siltron and Elektronsnab companies, which delivered it to Belarus. Labels on batches sent to Integral from Elektronsnab still listed Germany as the country of origin.
Other critical materials for Integral include MWM 2032 gas engines, essential for stable energy supply in production facilities. Although their export was banned in 2022, deliveries continue through intermediaries. Another example of sanctions evasion involves the purchase of miniature electric motors from Germany’s Faulhaber Group. In May 2024, Integral acquired 44 of these devices through Chinese company Hebei Nanuo Alloy Material Co. Ltd.